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4. 
Summary 
It has been proposed that delusional thinking 'may be on a 
continuum with, normal behaviour and can be assessed by taking 
account of, factors such as the client's degree, of belief conviction or 
the extent of preoccupation with the belief. In the present research 
a number of -measures were employed to assess theý delusional 
thinking of people diagnosed as schizophrenic. - Two -interventions 
were eipployed: (i) a structured verbal challenge, and (ii) a reality 
test in which the belief was subject to an empirical test. The 
research offered support for the continuum view of delusional 
behaviour, and demonstrated that a number of aspects of 
delusional behaviour, including the degree of conviction with which 
the belief is held, are open to modification. 
On the one hand, numerous speech 
stimulations have removed us from reality, 
and we must always remember this in order 
not to distort our attitude to reality. On the 
other hand, At is precisely speech Ahat has 
made ug'human. ' (PavlO-v, 1941). 
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CHAPTER 1. VERBAL SELF-REGULATION. 
V 
Introduction 
A major focus Within contemporary psychology has been on 
language, not merely as a means of communication, but also as a 
way of directing behaviour (e. g. Vygotsky, 1962; 1978). The 
process of learning to describe our environment alters our relation 
to it, because in so doing we organize and structure our 
subsequent interactions. Chapter I is concerned with this 
regulatory function of language. The chapter begins by detailing 
some recent developments within the behavioural tradition which 
suggest that language, and particularly its regulatory function, 
might be responsible for some of the qualitative differences 
between human behaviour and the behaviour of non-human 
species. Moreover, these findings suggest that the emergence of 
the regulatory function of language in early childhood is 
responsible for qualitative changes in human behaviour. For 
instance, simple instructional interventions which bring behaviour 
under verbal control can lead to surprising and dramatic changes 
in behaviour. Vygotsky's account for the emergence of the, 
regulatory function of language is discussed. The central tenet of 
Vygotsky's theory is that the ability to regulate one's behaviour 
verbally is the end product of -a complex developmental sequence 
which is fostered by the verbal community. 
The second half of Chapter I is concerned with the clinical 
importance of verbal regulation. It is suggested that one of the 
major reasons for the 'cognitive revolution' within clinical 
psychology (Mahoney, 1974) was the failure of behaviour 
therapists and analysts to address themselves to the issue of 
verbal behaviour. In recognition of the potency of the regulatory 
function of language, there have been a number of attempts to 
understand many clinical problems as being maintained by the 
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ways in which clients describe themselves and their interactions 
with others. A number of clinical theories are discussed in which 
verbal behaviour is given a central role. These include: Personal 
Construct Theory, Rational Emotive Therapy, Beck's Cognitive 
Theory of Depression, Attribution Theory and Self-Intructional 
Training. It is argued that in spite of their theoretical differences, 
these approaches are alike in two respects: first, in the importance 
they attach to the way in which clients describe themselves and 
their dealings with others, and second, the methods they 
recommend for changing these verbalizations. One issue which 
arises a number of times during the chapter is the assumption, 
sometimes explicit and sometimes implicit, that the beliefs and 
descriptions formed by the clinical population are unlike those of 
the population in general. For example, the negative beliefs of 
people suffering from depression have been described as 
'irrational'. Chapter I concludes by referring to the literature on 
the formation and maintenance of beliefs in the 'normal' 
population. This makes clear that the processes by which normal 
beliefs are formed and maintained are fraught with bias and 
error. 
1.1 Some human-animal differences on schedules of 
reinforcement. 
In his science of human behaviour B. F. Skinner emphasised 
the importance of environmental consequences which in.. --. -. creased 
the probability of responses, from a given class, which thny fol1mv 
Such consequences are termed positive reinforcers. The behaviour 
of many non-human species can be maintained for long periods of 
time when reinforcers are scheduled to occur intermittently, 
either on the basis of number of responses (ratio schedules) or the 
passage of time (interval schedules). Animal performance on 
schedules of reinforcement is typically orderly and replicable 
within and across species (Ferster & Skinner, 1957). Consider, for 
example,, performance on the fixed- interval (FI) schedule. On an 
FI schedule, the first response is reinforced following a pre- 
determined interval since the previous reinforcement, irrespective 
of the number of responses during the interval. In many species a 
typical pattern of responding emerges under an FI contingency; a 
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pause after reinforcement, followed by an accelerating rate of 
responding culminating in the next reinforcement (Ferster & 
Skinner, 1957). This response pattern has been referred to as the 
'scallop'. Furthermore, performance can be manipulated reliably 
by systematic changes in such variables as the temporal 
parameter (Skinner, 1938) and the reinforcement magnitude 
(Staddon, 
. 
1974). 
In contrast, human schedule performance frequently bears 
little resemblance to that of any other animal species either in 
terms of response pattern or sensitivity, to the schedule (Lowe, 
1979). Typically humans do not produce the classic 'scallop' 
pattern of., responding on FI schedules. Instead, they tend towards 
either a high and continuous rate of responding between 
reinforcers, or a low rate of just one or two responses at the end of 
the schedule interval (Weiner, 1965). It is common for both 
response patterns to be seen in the same study (e. g. Leander et al., 
1968; Lippman & Meyer, 1967). Such F1 behaviour is unlike that 
of any other species. Humans have also been found to perform 
uniquely on other types of reinforcement schedules. On a fixed- 
ratio (FR) schedule, reinforcement is made available after a 
specified number of responses following the previous 
reinforcement. Whereas animal performance varies in accordance 
with the schedule value, human responses on FR schedules tend 
towards a steady high rate that is unrelated to the schedule 
parameter (Weiner, 1965). 
This insensitivity to certain schedules of reinforcement also 
extends to changes from one schedule to another. For example, if 
human subjects perform first on FR schedules, the constant high 
rate of responding persists unaltered for many sessions even after 
the schedule is changed to an Fl. Alternatively, a history on a 
schedule which produces a low rate of responding (such as a 
differential reinforcement of low rate, or DRL schedule) produces 
the low rate pattern of responding on subsequent FI schedules 
(Weiner, 1964,1969). Such perseveration is unknown in animal 
schedule behaviour, and has been called 'behavioural rigidity' 
(Lowe, 1979). 
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In attempting to account for the idiosyncratic nature of 
human schedule performance, Catania (1981) suggested that much 
human schedule performance may be governed by the 
experimenter's instructi ons rather than by the reinforcement 
contingencies. However, this explanation does not account for 
human-animal differences in studies where experimenter 
instructions are minimal. Lowe (1979) proposed that human 
schedule performance reflected not simply instruction or rule 
following, but rule formation. That is, human subjects formulated 
their own descriptions of the reinforcement contingencies, and it 
was these verbalisations which directed their subsequent 
behaviour. Such behaviour was therefore not contingency shaped, 
but rule governed (Skinner, 1969). Contingency shaped behaviour 
occurs when an organism acts in a given way with a given 
probability because the behaviour has been followed by a given 
type of consequence in the past. In contrast, rule governed- 
behaviour follows a formulation of the relation between a 
response and its consequences (ibid. ). Skinner contended that 
whereas with contingency shaped behaviour the control tended to 
be non-verbal, with rule governed behaviour the control was 
primarily verbal. 
There is now a large body of support for the hypothesis that 
human schedule performance is rule governed, and that this is 
why it differs from animal schedule performance. First, on,, FI 
shedules, pre-verbal infants have been shown to produce the 
'scallop' pattern of responding so typical of the behaviour of, ot4eý 
species. Pre-verbal infants have also demonstrated , 
sensitivity to 
schedule parameters (Lowe, Beasty & Bentall, 1983). Second, the 
progression from such animal-like, responding, through a 
transitional phase, to adult responding. has been shown to be 
language related (Bentall & Lowe, 1982). These, findings are 
consistent with the argument that mature human - schedule 
performance is rule governed. Subsequent work -has strengthened 
this argument - 
further. Children at the transitional stage of 
development, whose schedule performance was , neither, animal- like nor like that of older children, were found to produce adult 
patterns of responding with the aid of a verbal intervention 
(Bentall, Lowe & Beasty, 1985). Reciprocally, it has been shown 
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that preventing adults from forming rules about the contingencies 
can result in animal-like responding (Lowe, Harzem & Bagshaw, 
1978). 
In summary, it would appear that mature human 
performance on certain schedules of reinforcement is unlike that 
of any other species. At least part of the reason for this difference 
would seem to be the peculiarly human ability to form verbal 
descriptions of the environment, and subsequently to act in 
accordance with these descriptions. How then, might this self-' 
regulatory function develop? 
1.2 The development of self-regulation. 
Vygotsky (1962) stated that 'the most significant moment in 
the course of intellectual development, which gives rise to purely 
human forms of practical and abstract intelligence, occurs when 
speech and practical activity, two previously completely 
independent lines of development, converge' (p. 24). Vygotsky 
argued that with the coming together of speech and activity (or 
tool use), behaviour was 'transformed and organised along 
entirely new lines' which were peculiarly human. One example of 
this transformation would. be the metamorphosis of human 
schedule performance with the development of language. An 
additional example of this transformation was provided by Luria 
(1961). Children aged between 12 and 18 months were given 
small red boxes which contained sweets and small green boxes 
which did not. In practice the children experienced great difficulty 
in selecting the red box consistently; moreover, when such 
discrimination was attained it was extinguished quickly. However, 
if the experimenter named the coloured boxes 'red' and 'green, 
the child was quickly able to establish choice behaviour which 
lasted for up to one week. In addition the names were transferred 
readily to other objects which the child began to classify in a 
similar way. (Whilst the Lurian example testifies to the potency of 
speech in transforming and directing activity, there is some 
evidence that initially verbal control can function at a pre- 
semantic level; Luria called such-regulation 'impulsive'. For 
instance, when required to press a bulb twice, children responded 
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successfully to the command 'Gol Gol', 
, 
but tended to produce only 
one long protracted movement to the command, 'I shall press 
twice'. Also whilst the regulator 'Press' was a successful inhibiter 
in that the children responded only once, 'Don't press' actually 
disinhibited responding. ) 
a 
Clearly, simple verbal interventions can 
, 
have a quite 
surprising effect on behaviour. Vygotsky argued that mature self- 
regulation both forming and following verbal descriptions - had 
its developmental roots in instruction governed behaviour. To 
Vygotsky self-regulation was of social origin, and its development 
was fostered by the verbal community. Vygotsky called the 
process by which self-regulation emerged 'internalisation', and 
identified four dynamic developmental stages. Initially, the child's 
behaviour was regulated by the instructions of others. 
Subsequently, before being able to master his or her own 
behaviour, the child began to master his or her suroundings with 
the help of speech. This produced 'new relations with the 
environment in addition to the new organisation of behaviour 
itself' (Vygotsky, 1962, p. 25). Vygotsky argued that the major 
change in the ch! ld's ability to use language as an aid to problem- 
solving occurred when socialised speech was turned inward - that 
is, when speech which hitherto the child had directed towards 
others was directed to himself or herself. This change from 
interpersonal speech to intrapersonal speech formed the essence 
of the Vygotskyian notion of internalisation. Only finally was the 
child able to regulate his or her own behaviour. At first this self- 
regulation was overt, until at the last stage of internalisation the 
regulation became covert. 
Vygotsky called those behaviours which involved the 
regulatory (or planning) function of speech the 'higher 
psychological processes', and believed them to be the 
distinguishing feature of human psychology. The peculiarly human 
capacity to use speech to guide behaviour freed the individual 
from immediate environmental control, and rendered aspects of 
human behaviour qualitatively unlike that of any other species 
(p. 57). By placing the development of higher psychological 
processes firmly within the context of a verbal community, 
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Vygotsky arrived at a new formulation of the- relationship 
between learning and development. Traditionally a child's' 
developmental level was assessed by various tests, which the' 
child was required to solve alone. In Vygotsky's terms, this 
measured the child's actual developmental level. However, 
Vygotsky proposed that assessing what the child can do with the 
help of others was even more indicative of their mental 
development. Vygotsky illustrated this point by the example of 
two children, each with a chronological age of ten and an actual 
developmental level (i. e. a mental development) of eight. This 
meantthat they were able to perform independently tasks up to 
the degree of difficulty standardised for the eight-year-old, level. 
These two children could then be shown different ways of solving 
problems which they were unable to solve alone. If, with 
assistance, one child was able to-solve problems up to a twelve-, 
year-old level, and the other up to a nine-year-old, Vygotsky 
argued that the two children could not be said to be at the same 
developmental level. 
Vygotsky called the difference I bet ween a child's 
performance without assistance and with assitance the zone of 
proximal development. Thus, the zone of proximal development 
defined the child's potential development, because it contained 
those functions which though still embryonic would soon be 
mature. Vygotsky argued that an essential feature of learning was 
that it created the zone of proximal development. That is, that 
through interaction with others the child was able to utilize 
functions still in an embryonic state. Vygotsky believed that all 
higher psychological processes appeared first during social 
interaction;, subsequently they underwent internalisation. Once 
internalised, such skills become part of the child's, behavioural 
repertoire, and would be reflected in the child's new level of 
actual development. In this way, learning and development are 
seen as interwoven dynamically. 
It now becomes possible to see the human-animal 
differences on schedule performance, with which, this chapter 
began, as just one case of a more general phenomenon. Through 
internalisation, Vygotsky offered an account of how all higher 
I 
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psychological processes developed. His work provides a 
developmental framework from within which to understand how 
speech comes to regulate behaviour, and how in the process the 
behaviour is changed qualitatively. The integral part played in 
this process by the verbal community, and the concept of the zone 
of proximal development, have implications for educator and 
clinician alike. 
1.3 The clinical importance of self-regulation. 
When Ullman and Krasner (1969) suggested that abnormal 
behaviour was learned, Maintained and altered in the same ways 
as normal behaviour, a new kind of therapy was born. Behaviour 
therapy, as it became known, was derived from the, work of 
Skinner, and assumed that all behaviour could be seen as 
adjustments to particular histories of reinforcement, and therefore 
was open to a functional analysis (Skinner, 1938). Skinner was 
well aware that covert behaviour was a necessary part of a 
functional analysis, as his distinction between rule, governed and 
contingency shaped behaviour made clear. In spite of this, ,, behaviour therapists and, analysts failed consistently to address 
the issue of covert events, preferring instead to deal with 
observable variables. It was noticed that it was behaviour 
therapists and analysts who ignored private events (London, 
1972); there was nothing in the theoretical underpinnings of 
behaviour -therapy which required this (Lowe & Higson, 19013). 
The neglect of covert behaviour 'has been identified as a major 
contributing factor to the emergence of the 'cognitive revolution' 
within clinical psychology (Mahoney, 1974). 
Behaviour therapy had scored some notable successes. In 
the treatment of autistic children and the mentally handicapped it 
proved to be more effective than traditional psycho 
' 
therapy 
(Kazdin & Hersen, 1980). However, even where great claims had 
been made for behaviour therapy, there were upper limits to its 
effectiveness (Hersen, 1979). For instance, although phobias have 
been treated successfully by techniques such as systematic 
desensitisation (a graduated introduction of the phobic stimulus) 
and flooding (a sudden and total introduction of the phobic 
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stimulus), agoraphobia has proved resisttLnt to such techniques 
(Zitrin et al., 1980). Much of the traditional behaviour therapy 
research was plagued by methodological problems, such as the use 
of sub-clinical populations, so casting doubt upon the generality of 
some of the findings. For instance, while modelling techniques 
failed to produce a behaviour change in unassertive college 
students (McFall & Twentyman, 1977) it did so in similarly 
unassertive chronic psychiatric patients (Hersen et al., 1973). 
Other methodological shortcomings included a lack of assessment 
for generalisation of behaviour change outside the clinical setting, 
and a shortage of long term follow-up data to assess for 
maintenance (Kazdin and Hersen, 1980). 
Central to the 'cognitive revolution' was an interest in covert 
verbal behaviour, particularly as an organizing influence on 
behaviour. Clinicians became concerned not simply with isolating 
and understanding the particular environmental contingencies 
brought to bear upon the indiviual, but also with how the 
individual interpreted his or her surroundings. In recognition of 
the potency of the regulatory function of language, a number of 
attempts were made to understand many clinical problems as 
being maintained by the ways in which clients described 
themselves and their dealings with others (e. g. Abramson, 
Seligman and Teasdale, 1978; Meichenbaum, 1977). 
Covert verbal behaviour has become a central variable 
within clinical psychology. Clinicians from a variety of theoretical 
backgrounds have stressed the importance of self-regulation, andý 
looked for ways of changing a clientIs covert and overt verbal 
behaviour. 
Personal Construct Theory. 
In 1955, George Kelly forwarded his Personal Construct 
Theory (PCT). Kelly based his theory on the premiss that 
psychologists should view the behaviour of all people in the way 
they viewed their own behaviour - that is, as scientists, ever 
seeking to predict and control those events with which they were 
involved. Kelly felt that this most certainly was what he himself 
was doing. Kelly considered that traditionally psychologists had 
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viewed the individual, as physicists had viewed objects, - as being 
inert, and therefore requiring either 'pushing' or 'pulling' into, 
action (Kelly, 1955, p. 36). To a 'push theorist' (such as an early 
behaviourist), the environment provided the -necessary 
stimulation; to a 'pull theorist' (such as Freud) the impetus hailed 
from the person's biological needs and drives. Kelly's objection to 
both was that they suggested that it was the stimulus or the need 
which accounted for the action, rather than the individual. It was 
Kelly's express purpose to forward a theory of personality which 
portrayed the individual as dynamic and able to provide his or 
her own impetus. 
Central to PCT was the idea that people do not respond- to a 
stimulus, but to their interpretation or construction of that 
stimulus: 
Man looks at the world through transparent patterns or 
templates which he creates and then attempts to fit over the 
realities of which the world is composed. ' (Kelly, 1955, p. 8) 
Kelly used the word constructs to refer to those verbalisations 
which people formed to account for their experiences. A construct 
is formed by considering not only similar objects or events (as 
would be the case with a concept), but also dissimilar. A construct 
can thus be thought of as a distinguishing feature with an explicit 
standard of comparison. For example, the construct 'Martin is 
pleasant' entails the view that Martin is not unpleasant or nasty. 
This construal of Martin would be derived (rightly or wrongly) 
from experience of Martin, and would be instrumental in directing 
future behaviour towards him. If Martin turned out consistently 
to be unpleasant, the construal of him as pleasant would need to 
be modified or abandoned. Because the process of construing is 
one of interpretation guided by past experience, while one person 
may construe Martin as pleasant, another may construe him as 
unpleasant. 
Whilst PCT concerned all behaviour (Kelly would say his 
theory has a wide range of convenience), its intended focus was in 
the realm of psychotherapy. Whatever the nature of the client's 
problem, Kelly stressed that it was never the place of the therapist 
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to project particular constructs onto the client. Rather, the 
therapist sought to assist the client in identifying and testing the 
validity of particular constructs. Because both, therapist and client 
were 'scientists', therapy was conducted within an ýatmosphere of 
experimentation. The therapist encouraged- the client to consider 
new ways of describing or construing his or her environment and 
made validating data available during therapy so that these 
constructs could be reality tested. 
The therapeutic goal of personal construct therapy was to 
enable the client to exercise improved self-control. In order to 
achieve this, clients were asked to consider alternative ways of 
viewing both themselves and their dealings with others. Kelly 
hoped that this would promote the understanding that people are, 
in an important sense, 'self inventing and that they are -not 
necessarily trapped forever inside their own autobiography and 
their customary thought and behaviour' (Bannister and Fransella, 
1980, p. 139). By highlighting in this way the causal status of 
constructs, and by showing further how they can be generated 
and tested, the client is given the wherewithal for self-control. The 
client's own beha , 
viour is the one variable common, to any 
situation which is, potentially at least, under his or her control 
(Adams-Weber, ' 1979, p. 130). 
ý Many of the central aspects of PCT have appeared in 
subsequent therapies, particularly those which followed the 
cognitive revolution. Before it was fashionable to do so, Kelly 
tackled head on the clinical implications of verbal self-control and 
self-regulation. Attention has tended -to focus on specific aspects of 
his theory, such as his attempt to measure constructs via his 
Repertory Grid Test, but little credit is given him by, those 
theorists who have since adopted (knowingly or unknowingly) 
many of his central ideas. There were certainly problems with 
Kelly's theory; for instance, PCT lacked a plausible developmental 
account of how people first came to construe events' at all. But 
approaching Kelly from an informed developmental 'account of 
self-regulation, such as the' one provided by Vygotsky, can be a 
rewarding exercise. The essential feature of Kelly's therapy is' to 
teach the client how to regulate most effectively his or her own 
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behaviour. To achieve this, the client is first, made aware that 
constructs, 'or verbal descriptions of the world, can exert a 
profound influence upon his or her subsequent behaviours and 
interactions with others. This awareness is a critical first step 
along the road to self-control. What then remains is for the client 
to realize that he or she can be ensnared or misled by particular 
descriptions; constructs are usually 'influential, and occasionally 
fallible. For this reason, clients are taught to be critical of their 
construals and to submit them to empirical test whenever 
possible. 
Rational Emotive Therapy. 
Another therapy to emphasise the importance of verbal 
descriptions of oneself and one's interactions with others is 
Rational Emotive Therapy (RET: Ellis, 1957). Since its conception, 
RET has undergone numerous reformulations, and . has . adopted a, 
multitude of different therapeutic techniques. RET was conceived 
as a means of altering key irrational beliefs, which Ellis felt were 
at the bottom of many clinical problems. An irrational belief has 
been defined as 'related to magical, empirically unvalidated 
hypotheses for which there is not-any factual evidence' (Ellis, 
1973, p. 6). The statement 'It is easier to avoid than to face certain 
life difficulties and responsibilities' is one of the eleven core 
irrational beliefs identified by Ellis (Ellis, 1962, p. 79). 
Unfortunately, the definiton of such beliefs is weak, and would 
include statements such as 'one should love God' and 'you shculd 
respect your parents' (Zettle and Hayes, 1980). RET also lacks an 
adequate explanation of the formation of irrational beliefs, 
although this is less of a problem because it is quite possible to 
account for their appearance as being fostered through social 
interaction with the verbal community (cf. DiGiuseppe et al., 
1977). 
In his RET Ellis certainly attached a critical importance to 
self-regulation. Ellis went one stage further, however, by 
specifying which particular 'verbalizations were problematical (i'e. 
the irrational beliefs). He also stated why irrational beliefs were a 
problem, arguing that they were the cause of anxiety, and , 
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emotional arousal. Whilst these additions serve to distinguish RET 
from similar theories, they also seem to be its Achilles heel. Ellis's 
irrational beliefs can neither be defined nor measured 
satisfactorily (Zettle & Hayes, 1980), nor has it been shown clearly 
that they cause anxiety and. arousal ( e. g. Rogers & Craighead, 
1977). As such, RET can add little to our theoretical understanding 
of the way verbal self-statements underlie many clinical 
disorders. 
Procedurally RET is also beset by difficulies. Ellis (1977) 
stated that of the '50 or 60, different kinds of cognitive procedures 
in therapy' RET attempted to use them all. Clearly RET does not 
have a specific procedure; rather, rational emotive therapists 
borrow from any and all existing therapies. Its unity comes not 
from the means, but the end - the pursuit of a common goal. This 
goal is to point out to clients that maladaptive behaviours are 
caused primarily by irrational beliefs, and to teach clients how to 
test these assumptions. Like PCT, RET is concerned with imparting 
understanding and improved control of the self-regulatory 
function; the difference is that a rational emotive therapist would 
attempt to distil down the clinical problem to one, or more, of the 
core irrational beliefs. Unfortunately, the problems with defining 
and measuring irrational beliefs cannot be avoided. 
Cognitive Theory of Depression. 
Heavily influenced by Ellis, Beck put forward his now 
famous cognitive theory of depression (1967,1976). Like Kelly 
and Ellis, Beck too emphasised the importance of self-regulation, a 
view he traced to the early stoic philosophers, such as Epictetus, 
who stated that 'Men are disturbed not by things but by the views 
which they take of them'. Another historical influence was Adler, 
who also stressed the importance of self-regulation: 'We do not 
suffer from the shock of our experiences - the so-called trauma - 
but we make out of them just what suits our purposes. We are 
self-determined by the meaning we give to our experiences' 
(Adler, 1958, p. 14, as quoted by Beck, Rush, Shaw & Emery, 1979). 
To Beck, depression was primarily a disturbance in cognition, and 
could be understood in terms of three postulates; (i) the cognitive 
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triad, (ii) schemas, and. (iii) cognitive errors (faulty information 
processing). 
The cognitive triad comprises negative views about oneself, 
one's dealings with others, and the future. The negative self image 
comes about through the client's tendency to see bad experiences 
as reflecting,, some defect in himself or herself. The tendency, to 
view interactions with others negatively, can be seen in those 
instances when the client construes situations negatively, even 
though more plausible alternative interpretations exist. When 
projecting into the future, the client predicts that his or her 
present difficulties or suffering will continue indefinitely. Beck's 
model placed other indices of depression, such as emotional states, 
as consequences of these negative cognitive patterns. A client who 
thinks incorrectly that he is being rejected will react with the 
same sadness and anger as occurs with actual rejection (Beck et 
al., 1979). 
The second of Beck's postulates - schemas - serves to explain 
why negative attitudes persist in the face of contradictory 
experiences. Beck has defined a schema as an abstract and 
generalisable rule regarding regularities among internal 
representations of events, which serve to guide behaviour and 
direct the assimilation of incoming behaviour (Beck,, 1976). Whilst 
some theorists might be uncomfortable with Beck's 'language 
game', this should not obscure the fact that essentially Beck is 
referring to the regulatory role of language. - His point is that 
particular descriptions of events become fixed and over- 
generalised,, so that they guide subsequent. behaviour in a whole 
host of situations. Schemas can be thought of as a form of 
'cognitive style', where what is meant is that the individual forms 
similar types of description about a number of different events. 
The difficulty for Beck is to explain where schemas come from in 
the first place (this point will be discussed more fully later in this 
chapter). Over-generalisation is an example of faulty information 
processing, which is the third of Beck's postulates. Beck argued 
that over-generalisation -, was an example of 'primitive', as opposed 
to 'mature', thinking. In primitive thinking, which typified 
depression, the 'complexity, variability, and diversity of human 
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experiences and behaviour are, reduced into a few crude 
categories' (Beck et al., 1979). In Kellyian terms, this meant that a 
small number of core constructs had a large range of convenience. 
Practically Beck's therapy was problem orientated. Beck 
distinguished his approach to therapy from traditional 
psychotherapy on two counts. First, like Kelly's 'man the scientist', 
the therapist was actively involved in a process of 'collaborative 
empiricism'. Second, unlike the psychoanalytic interest in the 
distant past, Beck was concerned primarily with 'here and now' 
problems. Within Beck's therapy the initial task facing the 
therapist was to obtain a detailed picture of the client's life 
situation, and of the way the client described his or her . 
experiences. The therapist then looked for the relationship 
between particular aspects of the client's life situation, thought 
and emotional distress. This relationship must be made clear to 
the client. Beck recommended doing this by waiting for a sudden 
mood change on the client's behalf, pointing it out to the client, 
and asking what he or she had been thinking immediately prior to 
the mood shift. Thus, to Beck, an important part of insight is the 
recognition that self-statements have an important influence on 
the way people behave and feel. 
By focusing on the way language governs behaviour it 
becomes possible to programme for both maintenance and 
generalisation. The client must learn to monitor and evaluate his 
or her own self-talk. Jn the first instance, this entails being able to 
recognize negative thoughts and being able to test them. To 46 
encourage this process, the therapist asks the client to suspend his 
or her conviction that a particular negative thought is undeniably 
true, and. instead to view it as a hypothesis to be tested. Beck 
argued that in many cases the client's negative thoughts stemmed 
from an underlying 'maladaptive assumption'. The therapist must 
identify one if one exists. Maladaptive assumptions are similar to 
Ellis' irrational beliefs, some examples being 'To be happy I must 
be accepted by all people at all times', and 'I can't live without 
you'. For instance, the negative thoughts that 'I caused my 
husband to behave badly' and 'I ruined my children's lives by 
getting a divorce', can be traced to the underlying assumption 'It 
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is my fault when bad things'happen to me' (Beck et al., 1979, 
p. 250). Once identified, such assumptions must be 'evaluated. To 
achieve this, Beck recommended that the therapist collaborate 
with the client to devise a simple test of the assumption; where 
necessary, this may take the form of a series of graded exercises. 
For example, one of Beck's clients held the assumptions that 'If 
you want people to like you, you should always be nice to them', 
and 'If you find fault, they will punish you'. One of the client's 
presenting clinical problems was a lack of assertiveness towards 
his wife, so the first of a series of tests was to confront his wife on 
a minor issue (ibid., p. 256). 
Attribution Theory and Learned Helplessness Theory. 
Another way self-statements have been talked about in 
terms of guiding behaviour has been in terms of causal 
attributions. Attribution is 'a process whereby the individual 
"explains" his world' (Nisbett & Valins, 1972). In essence 
attribution theory proposes that people form (often unreliable) 
explanations or causal attributions about the things which happen 
to them, and that these attributions influence their subsequent 
behaviour. Attribution therapy aims to replace existing 
maladaptive attributions with more 'rational' and adaptive ones. 
Nisbett and Valins report a case of attribution therapy with a 
young man who feared that he might be homosexual. The 
attribution about homosexuality was formed in response to three 
behaviours; he found sex unsatisfactory, frequently observed 
himself looking at other men's crotches, and believed that his 
penis was abnormally small. Neale (the therapist) implemented 
some, simple steps to provide a normal. explanation for these - 
behaviours. The essential feature of Neale's argument was that 
lack of sexual satisfaction and looking at other men's crotches 
were understable reactions to concern about inadequacy. Neale 
dispelled the client's worry that his penis was abnormally small 
by pointing out that when viewed from above, objects in the same 
plane as the line of vision appear shorter. 
In his Learned Helplessness Theory (LHT), Seligman 
proposed that depressed people tended to generalise from specific 
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instances of failure to a more general sense of helplessness 
(Seligman, 1975). In this way, depressed people came to expect 
that outcomes would be out of their control - that is, they 
developed an expectation of non-contingency, between their own 
behaviour and the environmental outcome. In the reformulated 
version of LHT (Abramson, Seligman & Teasdale, 1978), it was 
proposed that this general expectation of non-contingency was 
based upon specific kinds of causal attribution. Similarly, the 
presence or absence of depression was 'closely linked' to the type 
of causal attribution made when- confronted with failure 
(Atherley, 1988). Causal attributions were classified in three 
dimensions: 
(a) Internal - external. The causes of uncontrollable events could 
either be viewed as due to something about the person (internal) 
or the situation (external). 
(b) Global - specific. The causes of uncontrollable events could be 
seen as generally applicable (global) or peculiar to the situation 
(specific). 
(c) Stable - unstable. The causes of uncontrollable events could be 
seen as long-term (stable) or fleeting (unstable). 
These dimensions made it possible to classify the different ways 
in which people responded to non-contingency. Hiroto and 
Seligman (1975) observed that when faced with an unsolvable 
task, subjects could attribute failure either to task difficulty (an 
external cause) or to the task being' too difficult for them (an 
internal 'cause). If an internal attribution was made, whether it 
was then generalised and maintained would further depend on if 
the failure was attributed to global and stable factors. It should be 
noted that the internal -external dimension has poor reliability, 
and in a further reformulation (Abramson et al., 1986) greater 
emphasis was placed on the remaining two dimensions. 
WhiIst the three attributional dimensions classified the 
different ways people might respond to non-contingency, they did 
not explain why one individual reacted negatively whereas 
another did not. That is, the account was merely descriptive. To 
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account for individual differences, the notion of a predisposing 
attributional style was invoked., Attributional style is a similar 
concept to Beck's predisposing schemas. The contention was that 
certain individuals developed a tendency to attribute failure to 
permenant and pervasive aspects of their character, which made 
them vulnerable to depression. However, the existence of a 
predisposing attributional style remains unproven (Atherley, 
1988). Indeed, the very notion of a cognitive style, let alone an 
attributional one, has been contested (Lazarus, 1976). However, 
the question of whether the attributional model is useful clinically 
does not 
-depend 
upon the existence of a predisposing 
, 
attributional 
bias. What is unfortunate is that the majority of research in the 
field has focused on this issue, and the question of whether 
attributions are important in the maintenance of depression has 
been neglected (Alloy et al., 1988). What LHT does offer, is a 
useful clinical tool for describing both the client's presenting 
problem, and the desired clinical goal. For instance, one might 
wish to change the internal stable attribution 'I failed because I 
am stupid' to the internal variable one 'It's not that I am stupid, I 
just didn't try hard enough': alternatively, one might wish to 
replace the internal stable attribution 'I am a failure with women' 
with the external variable one 'Those two were not right for me, 
so I need to increase the sample' (Forsterfing, 1980). 
Self-Instructional Training. 
Another clinical approach to emphasise the - importance of 
covert behaviour was self-instructional training (SIT). One of the 
forerunners in the field was Meichenbaum. Well aware of the 
work of Vygotsky, Meichenbaum was keen to exploit the 
enormous' potential for self-regulation within the clinical setting. 
Meichenbaum -postulated that many clinical problems stemmed 
from a failure to regulate behaviour verbally. He therefore sought 
to mimic the Vygotskyian process of internalisation within 
therapy. Initially, the client's behaviour was guided by overt 
instuctions from the therapist, after which the client would 
regulate hi's ý or her'own behaviour first by overt,,, and 
subsequently, covert self-instructions. To assist in the process of 
internalisation 'Meichenbaum employed some more traditional 
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behavioural techniques. Thus, Meichenbaum recommended that 
the therapist model each of the three stages of internalisation, and 
voice self-rein forcing statements throughout. In his 1973 study, 
Meichenbaum found that this programme successfully established 
control over orienting, organising, regulatory and self-rewarding 
behaviour in schizophrenics. 
As in all the therapies discussed so far, Meichenbaum, was 
interested in regulating covert behaviour as a means of altering 
problematic overt behaviour. Clearly it was critical to demonstrate 
that changing what people said to themselves did indeed produce 
a predictable change in overt behaviour. In an early, experiment, 
Meichenbaum altered client's self verbalizations about signs of 
stress, such that hitherto debilitative sweaty palms and increased 
heartbeat came to be seen as facilitative, in that -they, offered the 
opportunity to employ new coping strategies. Meichenbaum, 
argued that the production of inner speech had 'deautomised' the 
maladaptive behaviour. Whilst this study confirmed the clinical 
promise of self-regulation, it is not clear that it confirmed 
Meichenbaum's ýassumption that clinical disorders reflected a 
failure to self-regulate. It is possible that the intervention simply 
changed the, nature of the guiding speech, from maladaptive to 
adaptive. -Support ý for the contention that at least some clinical 
disorders reflected a failure to employ verbal regulation was 
provided by Camp (1977). Camp demonstrated that young 
aggreisive boys failed to employ verbal mediation, and that even 
when they did so it failed to gain functional control, over their 
behaviour. 
In a paradigm study, Bornstein and Quevillon, (1976) used 
self-instructional training to teach hyperactive children to 
verbalize the nature of specific tasks, and to employ an 
appropriate problem-solving strategy. Reinforcement was made 
contingent upon a correspondence between the verbalizations and 
the behaviour, and the authors were able to report a significant 
and stable generalisation effect in the classroom. However, 
generafisation has not commonly been obtained with self- 
instructional packages. Research by Lowe and Higson (1981) 
involving people diagnosed as schizophrenic demonstrates the 
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typical drawbacks encountered. Although self-insfructional 
training did improve performance on the specific problem-solving 
training tasks, training proved extremely 'difficult and the effect 
only generalised to tasks of a clearly similar nature. This' is a 
major problem, because the ultimate aim of self-instructional 
training is to promote self-control. The specific tasks which are 
used at the training stage are normally arbitrary problem -'solving 
exercises and of limited interest cliftically. The aim of the training 
is only nominally to improve performance on these tasks; the 
hope is that these newly acquired self-regulatory skills Will be 
applied in a variety of new (i. e. untrained) situations, some of 
which will be of considerable interest clinically. In the absence of 
wide generalisation, the technique remains of limited use. 
The problem for self-instructional training seems to be one 
of finding the right instructions. 'Mechanical' instructions are task 
specific, and whilst they facilitate greater control on the training 
tasks, generalization is poor. 'Elaborative' instructions are more 
general, such as 'what is it that I am supposed to be doing? ', but 
have enjoyed only slightly more generalization (Loper, Hallahan & 
Lanna, 1982). What is interesting is that spontaneous transfer or 
generafisation is not actually too common in the general 
population (Reed et al., 1974). The difficulty seems to be one of 
spotting problem isomorphs (Newell, 1979) - that is, seeing how a 
new situation resembles one previously encountered. This 
explains why generalisation does occur with tasks of an obviously 
similar nature to the training tasks. Glick and Holyoak (19833) 
found that any manipulation which stressed the similarity 
between the training and novel tasks enhanced transfer. Crisafi 
and Brown (1983) found giving hints sufficient to induce ,- 
generalization from easy to difficult problem variations. What is 
noteworthy, is' that those interventions which did produce 
generalisation did not require -extensive training. 
A Contextualist Approach. -. I- 
Hayes (1987) put forward a contemporary behavioural 
approach which addressed the issue of self-regulation. Hayes 
argued that the 'cognitive revolution', had been a case of the right 
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problem but the wrong solution. Just because-in the past 
behaviourists had paid scant attention to covert, behaviour, this 
did not necessitate a volte face, but rather placed the onus on 
them to develop their account more fully. Hayes acknowledged 
that covert behaviour was important and necessary for a -full 
contingency analysis. However, he stipulated that verbal 
behaviour could not be said to cause overt behaviour, or vice 
versa; all ultimate causes of behaviour were environmental. To 
Hayes, in - so far as radical behaviourism applied to contingencies, 
it applied to contexts; contingencies of reinforcement simply 
described the relationship between behaviour, covert 'and overt, 
and those events which preceded and followed it. A behavioural 
analysis which included covert behaviour' would always distil 
down to the task of contingency analysis., 
Hayes argued that control by covert, verbal behaviour (i. e. 
seff-regulation) was like control by overt instructions. Heavily 
influenced by Skinner's distinction between rule governed and 
contingency shaped behaviour, Hayes conceptualised the problem 
of irrational beliefs (Ellis), maladaptive assumptions (Beck) or 
negative attributions (Seligman), as relating to different kinds of 
maladaptive rules. Provisionally, Hayes demarcated two types of 
rule following; tracking, and plying (Zettle & Hayes, 1982). A track 
occurs -when there is an apparent correspondence between the 
rule and the contingency. Pliance -refers to those instances when 
the rule appears to be under the control of socially mediated 
consequences for a, correspondence between the rule and the 
behaviour. Hayes further distinguished conditional rules (which 
were clearly discriminated from the events to which they 
referred) and literal rules (which were not). The question of why 
people followed maladaptive rules then becames one of, under 
which conditions do rules produce an insensitivity to the, 
environmental contingencies (Hayes, 1987). However, this, may be 
an oversimplification. It is possible that the majority of rules 
produce this insensitivity (cf. 'Lowe's work cited earlier), and that 
only some of them are maladaptive. Alternatively, some 
maIadaptive rules may be accurate reflections of the 
contingencies. 
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Although Hayes was at odds with cognitive therapists 
theoretically, therapeutically, he too was concerned with verbal 
control. To a contextualist, it is very often not the events 
themselves which are problematic, but the social-verbal context 
within which they occured. That is, feeling anxious, for example, 
is less of a problem than believing that one should not feel anxious 
and should avoid anxiety at all cost. To use, Hayes' analogy, this is 
akin to *trying to dig one's way out of a hole with a spade! Thus, 
Hayes was more concerned to change the way the client felt about 
being anxious than to prevent him from being 'anxious. In a 
slightly different way Kelly made the similar point that it is not 
for the therapist to tell the client how he or she should feel. Hayes 
argued that the way to change covert behaviour, indeed all 'types 
of behaviour, was to change the context within which it occurred. 
Therapeutically, because the client's maladaptive rules were 
supported by a particular context (i. e. set of contingencies) Hayes 
sought to alter the context within which the client behaved. Like 
Kelly, Ellis and Beck, Hayes recommended deautomatizing, verbal 
control by giving the client insight into the ways in which 
verbalizations or rules influenced behaviour. 
1 
In the same way that 
Beck urged his clients to view beliefs as hypotheses, Hayes urged 
his clients to formulate rules without necessarily following them. 
Hayes argued that too often rules were seen as being 'literal'. For 
example, when one says 'This is a good cup', this is not generally 
interpreted as describing our reaction to the cup, so much as the 
cup itself. So too when one says 'I am bad' ( Hayes, 1987). One 
way Hayes employed of weakening the literality of rules was to 
instruct clients to add the rider 'I am having the thought that ... I to 
statements such as 'this cup is good' and 'I am bad'. Again the 
similarities with the other clinical approaches discussed are 
manifest. Hayes' goal was to awaken the client to the reality of the 
regulatory power of language, to deautomatizethe regulatory 
strength of particular maladaptive rules, and to impart greater 
self-control. 
1.4 A Critique and Synthesis. 
What is particularly striking about the various clinical 
approaches discussed is the enormous degree of overlap in terms 
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of the importance placed on self-regulation,, and the ways 
proposed for changing it. What is also striking are the apparent 
developmental differences underpinning these different 
approaches. 
What most cognitive and cognitive behavioural theories 
have in common, is the tenet that the cognitive and affective 
systems are not independent. Cognition is assumed to determine 
affect; a successful intervention is presumed to change the 
maladapive cognition, which results in an improved affective 
state. Yet there have long been doubts as to whether cognitive 
theory provides a satisfactory theortical underpinning for 
cognitive therapy (e. g. Bebbington, 1985; Gilbprt, 1984). Certainly, 
there appear to be major problems with cognitive and cognitive 
behavioural theories of depression. 
Not the least of these difficulties is the need to define 
satisfactorily the terms cognitive and affective. For instance, does 
'cognitive' refer exclusively to conscious activity, or does it include 
preconscious activity (Bradley & Power, 1988)? Problems of 
definition apart, there is a question mark over the postulated 
sequence of cognitive change leading to affective change. First, in 
order to demonstrate that cognitions are indeed changed by an 
intervention, they must be measured before and after it is 
introduced. But this is not common practice (ibid. ); typically, only 
behavioural measures and symptom measures (such as the Beck 
Depression Tnventory)' are administered (McLean & Hakstian, 
1979). The link between the theory and the practice is weakened" 
further by the lack of a component analysis of the various 
interventions employed. Cognitive and behavioural techniques are 
often combined, so that it remains difficult to attribute a change in 
cognition, or indeed affect, to a particular technique, such as the 
challenging of maladaptive assumptions. Furthermore, cognitive 
change has been reported in studies which employed a 
psychopharmacological intervention only (e. g. Simons, Garfield & 
Murphy, 1984). 
Another point of theoretical debate concerns the onset'or 
aetiology of depression. Those theories reviewed which adopt the 
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model of affect as being determined by cognition each posit - 
predisposing maladaptive attitudes as underlying depression. 
Beck, for example, has argued that 'early experiences 'provide the 
basis for forming negative concepts about one's self, the future, 
and the external world' (Beck et al., 1979, p. 16). Whether clinical 
depression was manifested then depends on life experiences. 
Similar vulnerability models have been forwarded to account for 
the emergence of schizophrenia (cf. Meehl, 1962, discussed in , 
Chapter 11). Ideally a large longitudinal study would be conducted 
with the emergence of clearly defined negative rules being 
monitored during childhood. This would enable predictions to be 
made regarding the likelihood of the emergence of clinical 
depression, subject to certain kinds of triggering life experiences. 
Unfortunately, such a study is prohibitively expensive. Brewin 
(1985) reviewing the existing evidence for the revised learned 
helplessness model of depression concluded that the theory had 
not been adequately tested, but that what evidence there was did 
not support the proposed developmental account. Willner (1984) 
drew a similar conclusion; he reported finding little empirical 
support for the hypotheses of learned helplessness 
, 
and Beck's 
theory of depresion, that depression arose out of a set of 
predisposing attitudes. Moreover, if there were pervasive 
'cognitive styles' underlying depression, one would' expect them to 
be in evidence even when the individual was not experiencing an 
episode of depression. Yet differences have not been found 
between recovered depressives and non-psychiatric controls 
(Wilkinson & Blackburn, 1981). 
Clearly the role of verbal behaviour in the aetiology of 
depression remains unclear. However, even if they were found to 
play no causal role in the emergence of depression, negative 
verbalisations about oneself and one's dealings with others could 
still be important in the maintenance of depression (Bebbington, 
1985). Yet negative verbalisations have not always been observed 
in clinically depressed individuals (Coyne & Gotlib, 1983). Also, 
Hargreaves (1985) found no support for the hypothesis that 
depressed individuals make significantly different attributions 
about the causes of events than non-depressed people. Brewin 
(1985) argued that depressive or negative attributions may 
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simply be symptoms, of depression, and of no causal significance in 
either the onset or maintenance of the condition. Simons et aL 
(1984) offered the halfway position that a change in the client's 
covert verbal behaviour, may be an important part of overall 
clinical improvement, rather than being the major, cause of that 
improvement. This would certainly account for the change in . 
verbal behaviour observed in psychopharmacological studies, and 
for the finding that combinations of therapies are sometimes, more 
effective than cognitive therapy alone (Williams, 1984). 
A final bone of contention for cognitive theories of 
depression, and one which has received surprisingly little 
attention, 
- 
is the extent to which, depressive cognition accurately 
reflects reality. Many of the theorists discussed assumed that the 
depressive's negative cognitions were misattributions - that is, 
that they- were irrational. And yet, as Smail (1984) observed, it 
may well be that the for some people the world is a genuinely 
painful and depressing place. Certainly the possibility that 
depressed individuals perceive their life situations- accurately 
cannot be rejected. Research investigating estimation accuracy 
when judging relationships between behaviour and environmental 
consequences has suggested that depressed people are more likely 
to perceive situations accurately. If there is any irrationality, - it -, 
appears to be on the part of non-depressed individuals, who have 
a tendency to view the world through rose tinted glasses (e. g. 
Alloy & Abramson, 1979; 1982). Furthermore, Layne (1983) 
observed that high scores on an irrational beliefs 'test may reflect, 
pessimism rather - than irrationality. 
Unlike the cognitive and cognitive behavioural theorists, 
behaviourists such as Hayes (1987) do not accept the postulate 
that cognition determines affect. Rather, cognition is viewed as 
behaviour which cannot be seen (i. e. covert behaviour), but is 
nevertheless controlled by the same laws as overt behaviour. 
Hence, Hayes stated that all ultimate causes of behaviour were 
environmental, as one behaviour cannot be said to the cause of 
another behaviour. T' hus, although_covert behaviour is viewed as 
an important and necessary part of a functional account of clinical 
disorders, self-verbalizations could not be said to be the causel of 
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disordered affect. Yet as Mahoney (1974) observed, talk of 
ultimate causes of any kind is of dubious worth, since it is not 
clear where complex interactional causal - chains actually start and 
finish. Moreover, to state that all A's, (ultimate causes of 
behaviour) are Bs (environmental), is to ignore Wittgenstein's 
polar principle. This requires there to be some A's which are not 
B's if the statement 'this A is of type B' is to convey anything (cf. 
Harzem & Miles, 1978). A second difficulty with -Hayes' position 
concerns his contention that all maladaptive rules or assumptions 
do not reflect the contingencies. Although it is possible that this is 
the case, there is no a priori reason why a rule which is 
maladaptive could not also be an accurate reflection of the 
contingencies. (This issue is an empirical one). 
Each of the theories discussed involves its own 'language 
game', and what aetiological claims are made remain speculative. 
What is striking is the similar way in which each of the theorists 
identified the client's verbal behaviour (covert and overt) as an 
important variable in determining his or her subsequent 
behaviour. Great store is placed on the client's verbal descriptions 
of himself or herself and his or her interactions with others. 
Whether these descriptions are called constructs, irrational 
thoughts, maladaptive assumptions, rules, or attributions, they are 
viewed as important. What- is also striking is the similar way each 
theorist, with the possible exception of Meichenbaum, -, 
recommended for changing a client's verbal behaviour. 
(Meichenbaum's self-instructional training is slightly different 
from the other therapies discussed in that his starting point was 
that the client was not employing verbal mediation). The initial 
clinical goal is to give the client insight into the way verbalisations 
influence behaviour -that is, to make the client aware of the 
regulatory function of language. One way of doing this is to 
employ Beck's strategy of waiting for a sudden mood change, and 
asking the client what he or she had been thinking immediately 
prior to it. The second goal is to help the client to exercise better 
control of this verbal regulation. That is, to assist clients to 
monitor and evaluate critically the descriptions they formulate 
about themselves and their dealings with others. First, this entails 
deautornising the verbal control of particular beliefs the clients 
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hold about themselves and their dealings with others. 
Assumptions about oneself and one's world must be seen''to be 
fallible. To achieve this, Hayes recommended adding the rider 'I 
am having the thought that... ' to assumptions such as 'I am a bad 
person', as a way of demonstrating that rules are hypotheses 
which may or may not be accurate. Second, clients must become 
aware that they can gain better control over the regulatory 
function of language, and in so doing can free themselves from a 
particular self-image. Kelly recommended' asking the client to 
generate and consider other construaIs of himself or herself, in 
order to see that people are self-inventing. Having deautomised 
the verbal control of particular rules, the client is then in a 
position to monitor and test his or her furture verbal behaviour. 
What is interesting about Meichenbaum's self-instructional 
training is that in assuming that clinical, disorders reflect a failure 
to employ verbal mediation, the onus was placed on, the therapist 
to supply the instructions. Unlike the other therapeutic 
approaches, the task was not to deautomise ongoing verbal 
control, but to initiate it. This explains why self-instructional 
training does not. attempt explicitly to give the client insight into 
the way self-regulation works. This may, also explain why self-. 
instructional training has been plagued by a lack of generalisation. 
Researchers, who have suggested that a metacognitive element 
needs to be added to self-instructional training in order to 
promote transfer (e. g., Lowe & Higson, 1981) may have in mind 
just the kind of insight into self-regulation that the other theories,, 
discussed seek to impart. I 
What the above analysis reveals is that a number of 
seemingly diverse approaches to clinical disorders in fact share a 
common purpose - to enable the client to regulate effectively his 
or her behaviour. Moreover, this goal is pursued- in a similar 
fashion by each approach. This common therapeutic process is 
consistent, with the Vygotskyian concepts of internalisation and 
the zone of proximal development. At the onset of therapy the 
client functions at a certain level of development; he or-she has 
limited understanding of and control over the self-regulatory 
function. In keeping with the concept of internalization, the 
therapist helps the client to do with assistance what he or 'she 
could not do alone; namely, to monitor self descriptions and 
descriptions of his or her interactions with others. Being initiated 
by the therapist (i. e. the verbal community) the acquisition of this 
new skill is of social origin. As' such, the therapeutic process can be 
seen to explore the client's zone of proximal development - that 
is, it. explores the difference between what the client can achieve 
without assistance and with assistance. Whether the client can 
display mature regulation with the assistance of the therapist will 
depend to a large degree on the success of the therapist in. 
negotiating a common understanding from which to-go forward. In 
all situations where a teacher or clinician assists in, the exploration 
of an individual's zone of proximal development, the process can 
only take place if the teacher or clinician can establish such a 
platform successfully (Wertsch,. 1984). In therapy, - because the 
client and therapist might have different perspectives on the -, 
nature of the problem, if necessary the therapist must suspend 
temporarily his or her opinion on how the problem is besv 
understood in order to negotiate a starting point. The only lasting 
redefinition that takes place occurs subsequently on the part of 
the client. If the-client's zone of proximal development was 
sufficiently broad and an adequate common 'understanding was 
negotiated, it would be possible for the client to acquire improved 
control of the regulatory function of language. Whether this newly 
acquired higher psychological function was maintained and , 
generalised to situations outside the therapeutic'' situation would 
depend on whether it underwent internalisation., If internalisation 
occurred, the client would then be able to regulate effectively his 
or her own behaviour, without assistance. 
The above analysis offers a way, of, conceptualising the 
acquisition of effective self-regulatory skills within the clinical 
setting. It should be emphasised that although Vygotsky's account 
is developmental, it is also dynamic and concerns processes'which 
develop throughout life. Thus, it is not assumed that individuals in 
need of assistance to exercise mature self-control are in any way 
developmentally retarded. Nor is it assumed that the, non-clinical 
population would not also benefit from such assistance. This point 
is well worth making, because a number of the theories discussed 
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display a 'rationalistic bias'. It is a common assumption that 
people suffering from disorders such as depression do so, at least 
in part, because they hold beliefs which are in some sense 
irrational. Presumably, the implicit standard of comparison is the 
rational beliefs formed by the non-clinical population. Yet is it the 
case that the non-clinical population typically forms, beliefs which 
reflect reality accurately and monitors and discards those beliefs 
which do not? 
1.5 Is it normal to be rational? 
Every day the social perceiver makes numerous, apparently 
complex social judgements, such as predicting another person's 
behaviour and attributing causality. Until recently, although it has 
long been known that perceivers 'go beyond the information 
given' (Bruner, 1957), research on this topic was marked by a 
'rationalistic bias' - that is, the assumption that judgements are 
made using thorough, optimal strategies (Taylor et al., 1983). 
Errors in judgement 
, 
were attributed either to accidental error, or 
to the irrational motives 
, 
and needs of the perceiver. Within social 
psychology this perspective is represented by research on causal 
attribution. In its broadest sense, -attribution, 
theory is concerned 
with the attempts of ordinary people to understand the causes 
and implications of the events they witness (Ross & Anderson, 
1983). Over the past decade or so, a body of evidence has 
accumulated to suggest not only that people's, judgements and 
decisions are less complete than had been assumed, but also that 
not all errors can be traced to motivational factors. ý% 
When discussing judgements or 'beliefs, it is important to 
distinguish formation from maintenance. In the first instance, the 
belief must b, e arrived at by some means; the individual must 
formulate (or acquire) a hypothesis on the basis of his or her 
experience. Ideally, the individual should then actively seek both 
confirmation and disconfirmation of his or her belief. Finally, in 
the light of this endeavo ur, the individual should either continue 
to hold the belief (when the belief is confirmed), modify the belief 
(when some aspect or aspects of it are found to be wanting), or 
reject the belief outright (when it is found to bear no relation to 
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experience). 
(i) Belief formation. 
Much is now known about the sources of non -motivational 
bias in social judgement and inference. 
, 
The fundamental 
attribution bias, for example, is the tendency for attributers to 
under-estimate the impact of 
, 
situational factors and to over- 
estimate the role of dispositional factors in controlling behaviour 
(Heider, 1958). Bierbrauer (1973) studied subjects' impressions of 
the forces operating in the classic Milgram (1963) setting, and 
found a consistent bias towards assuming that the subject's 
obedience reflected his or 
, 
her distinguishing personal 
., 
dispositions, 
rather than the potency 
. 
of the situational constraints and 
pressures. 
In fact the fundamental attributionaI bias may be an 
example of the more pervasive 'availability' bias (Tversky & 
Kahneman, 1973). 'A person is said to employ'the availability 
heuristic whenever he estimates frequency or probability by the 
ease with which instances or associations come to mind' (ibid., 
p. 208). It appears that whenever some aspect of the environment 
is made more salient to the perceiver it is given more weight in 
causal attribution. One consequence of this bias is that people tend 
to overlook the importance of less salient non-occurrences when 
forming inferences or beliefs (Ross, 1977). For instance, Chapman 
(1967) described a bias in judging the frequency with which two 
events occurred. Naive subjects were presented with information 
concerning hypothetical psychiatric patients. In each_ case these 
data consisted of a clinical diagnosis together with a drawing of a 
person made by the patient. Later the judges had to estimate the 
frequency with which each diagnosis, (such as paranoia) had 
, 
been 
accompanied by various features of the drawing (such as peculiar 
eyes). The subjects were found to over-estimate markedly the 
frequency of the co-occurrence of natural associates, like 
suspiciousness and peculiar eyes.:, Chapman -called this-, tendency 
'illusory correlation'. The illusory correlation effect proved 
extremely 'resistant, occurring even when the, correlation between 
symptom, and diagnosis was actually negative and serving to 
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obscure relationships which were present. 
The false consensus, or egocentric - attribution bias, dictates 
that people often pay no attention to consensus information when 
making causal attributions either about themselves or about 
others. For exaple, McArthur (1972) gave subjects a number of 
one line descriptions such as 'While dancing, Ralph trips over 
Joan's feet'. Additionally subjects were told that Ralph trips over 
almost all girl's feet (or over almost no other girl's feet), that Ralph 
almost always (or almost never) trips over Joan's feet, and that 
almost everyone else (or almost no one else) trips over Joan's feet. 
Subjects were then asked whether the tripping incident was 
Ralph's fault, Joan's fault, or just the fault of circumstances. A 
detailed analysis revealed that consensus information accounted 
for only 3% of the variance 
i 
in any of the three sorts of inference; 
whilst subjects seemed to think it important whether Ralph trips 
over other girl's feet and whether he usually tripped over Joan's 
feet, it was of no concern to them whether other people trip over 
Joan's feet. 
There is also evidence that subjects do not take proper 
account of the reliability of information when making causal 
attributions. It is a common observation that psychologists who 
conduct job interviews often experience considerable confidence 
in their predictions, even though they know of the vast literature 
showing that selection interviews are highly fallible. Social 
judgement is frequently based on innacurate recall of other's 
behaviour. Yet research by Trope (1978) demonstrated that 
subjects tended to rely almost exclusively on unreliable memories 
when making certain inferences, even when they were aware of 
the unreliability of those memories. Moreover, subjects have been 
found to express high levels of certainty in their inferences and 
judgements, even when the unreliability of the source was 
stressed (Tversky & Kahneman, 1983). 
There are other forms of bias in the process of forming a 
causal attribution of inference, but the two most important points 
are clear. First, for a variety of different reasons, the process of 
forming an inference does not conform to the dictates of a 
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probabilistic and optimal model, but rather is based'on certain 
heuristic models which are prone to be innacurate. Secondly, 
people-do not appear to be aware of a number of these biases. 
(ii) ' Seeking disconfirmation. 
Popper (1977) observed that the formation of a theory or 
conjecture always included a 'dogmatic' phase, and often included 
a, 'critical' one. A dogma may be thought of as an initial hypothesis 
or causal attribution; -the critical phase 
is when the dogma is given 
up in the light of disconfirmation. As we have seen, the formation 
of a dogma is open to bias and error. Erroneous judgements 
therefore need to be identified and rejected at the critical phase - 
that is, they need to be falsified. Thus, the attributer should 
actively seek to disconfirm his or her judgements. However, it 
appears that far from pursuing disc onfirmation, people tend to 
seek only to confirm their judgements - that is, they exhibit a 
confirmation bias. 
The confirmation , bias is illustrated well by the work of 
Wason (1960) on the elimination of hypotheses. Wason told his 
subjects that' the *sequence -of numbers 2,4,6 conformed to a simple 
rule. Their task was to discover this rule by generating successive 
number series of their own. After each series, subjects were told 
whether their numbers conformed to the rule, which was 
'numbers in increasing order of magnitude'. Unlike traditional 
concept formation experiments, the -aim of the task was not to see 
if the subjects discovered -the rule, but how they reacted to their 
hypotheses being corroborated. Suppose a subject believed the 
rule to be ascending numbers separated by an interval of two. 
Typically Wason's subjects 'tested' such hypotheses by offering 
sequences which 'conformed to their rule, such as 10,12,14 and 
20,22,24. What the subjects should have done was to offer a 
sequence which did not conform to their rule. A subject who was 
told that the sequence 3,6,9, did conform to the rule would have 
rejected decisively the hypothesis of ascending numbers 
separated by an interval of two. The, correct rule could not in fact 
be proved, but any incorrect rule could be disproved. Wason 
reported that the subjects 'appeared to display rigid or fixated 
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patterns of behaviour because they failed to overcome the set 
created by their confirming evidence'. 
The confirmation bias has been demonstrated in a, variety of 
logical reasoning tasks ( see Wason & Johnson-Laird, 1972) as well 
as in more realistic settings (Mynatt, Doherty & Tweney, 1977). 
What is worrying about the confirmation bias is that in a rich and 
complex social environment it is often possible to find some 
supporting evidence for almost any belief. As Popper stated, it 'is 
easy to obtain confirmations or verifications for nearly every 
theory - if we look for confirmation. ' ( as quoted in Wason, 1977). 
Self-fulfilling prophecies amplify this point well. Jussim (1986) 
identified three sequential stages to self-fulfilling prophecies 
within the classroom. Initially, teachers develop expectations - 
(dogmas) about students. This leads them to act differently 
towards the students, depending on their expectations, as a 
consequence of which students react in expectancy-confirming 
ways. 
(ii) Rejection of disconfirmed hypotheses. 
The last part of Popper's critical stage is when a belief which 
has been falsified is rejected. Popper (1977) reported being 
'shocked by the fact that Marxists (whose central claim was that 
they were social scientists) and the psychoanalysts of all schools 
were able to interpret any event as a verification of their 
theories'. This led Popper to argue that only attempted refutations 
which did not succeed should count as verifications. Popper 
reported that only subsequently did he arrive at the realization 
that all theories could beco me 'immunized' against criticism. 
However, it is not only complex social or psychological theories 
which are resilient to empirical challenge; it appears that all 
beliefs, from personal' impressions through to broader social 
theories, are extremely resistant to falsification. 
Lord et al. (1979) selected two groups of subjects on the 
basis of whether they supported or opposed capital' punishment as 
a useful deterrent. Each group was then presented with two 
hypothetical studies, one of which reported evidence to support 
the belief that capital punishment was an effective deterrent, and 
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one reporting evidence to the 'contrary. Subjects had to make 
ongoing ratings of their conviction in their particular belief, and to 
assess the worth of the two studies. The first finding, was that 
proponents and opponents alike rated the study that "'supported 
their beliefs as consistently 'more convincing' and 'better 
conducted' than the study that' opposed their viewpoint. In fact 
the formal nature of the evidence reported in'both studies was 
identical. Secondly, the effect of reading both studies was to 
polarize further the beliefs of both proponents and opponents. 
As well as having to incorporate new data, beliefs can also 
be challenged by having the original evidence discredited. One 
way of assessing this experimentally is to employ-a debriefing 
paradigm. Jennings, Lepper and Ross (1980) found that subjects' 
impressions of their ability to persuade a confederate to donate 
blood could persist even after learning that the initial outcome 
was totally inauthentic. That is, even though the knowledge that 
the behaviour of the confederate had not been contingent upon 
their own power of persuasion, the impression formed during the 
experiment persisted. Similar findings have been reported for 
distinguishing genuine from bogus suicide notes (Ross et al., 1975) 
and assessing one's own logical problem-solving ability (Lepper, 
Ross & Lau, 1980). Perseverence of this kind has also been 
demonstrated experimentally with broader beliefs about the 
world. Anderson, Lepper and Ross (1980) manipulated subject's 
beliefs about the relationship between firemen's professional 
performance and prior scores on a pencil and paper test. In one 
variation, they presented only two cases; one successful and one 
unsuccessful fireman, with appropriately discrepant test scores. 
Subjects were asked to account for this relation. The theories 
formed to account for the relationship survived the revelation that 
the two cases had been totally fictitious. Interestingly, another 
attributional bias was at work in that inadequate sample size did 
not deter them from this task. 
This literature on the formation and maintenance of beliefs 
within the normal population is consistent with the research on 
verbal self-regulation discussed at the start of this chapter. The 
beliefs and judgements formed by the normal population are not 
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always accurate reflections of reality; the process of belief 
formation is plagued by bias and error. Once formed, beliefs direct 
subsequent behaviour; they can be self-fulfilling and extremely 
resistant to change. Disconfirmation is generally not sought, whilst 
ambiguous information which supports the belief tends to be 
accepted and ambiguous falsifying data tends to be dismissed. 
Even when faced with disconfirmation which seems logically 
devastating, beliefs can persist unaltered. To hold an innaccurate 
and fixed belief does not, therefore, appear to be the prerogative 
of the clinical population. This begs the question of where exactly 
the distinction lies between, for example, the negative beliefs of 
people suffering from depression or the delusional beliefs of 
people diagnosed as schizophrenic, and the beliefs of the non- 
clinical population. This point will be dealt with in greater detail in 
Chapter III, which focuses on delusional beliefs, but before then 
Chapter II introduces the topic of schizophrenia and details the 
rationale for the single symptom approach to studying psychosis 
employed in the present research. 
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CHAPTER Il. SCHIZOPHRENIA 
p 
Introduction 
Chapter II begins with an introduction to the role of 
classification within psychiatry. There follows an introduction 
to the diagnosis and classification of 'schizophrenia'. Some of 
the difficulties to have plagued attempts at understanding 
more about the concept of schizophrenia are then discussed. 
Whilst far-reaching advances in the diagnosis of schizophrenia 
have been made, there remain major problems with the 
concept's validity. For example, the precise aetiology of 
schizophrenia is still unknown and the clinical prognosis is 
highly variable. Uncertainties such as these have led clinicians 
to adopt a number of diverse approaches to the the study of 
'schizophrenia'. One such approach has been to study particular 
symptoms of 'schizophrenia, rather than the syndrome itself. 
The chapter concludes by detailing some of the single symptom 
work conducted on hallucinators. 
2.1 Psychiatric classification. 
The term classification may be used to refer to the 
system of classes into which objects or data are sorted, and also 
to the process of allocation itself. In an ideal world, each object 
would belong to one class and to one class only, and all objects 
would be classified; such classes would be what Hempel (1961, 
in Neale & Oltmanns, 1980) termed monothetic. However, ours 
is not an ideal world, and many classes are polythetic, that is, 
the members of the class share different attributes, and there 
is no one common defining attribute; furthermore, some of 
these attributes may appear in other classes. 
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Several systems of classification are used in psychiatry, 
nearly all of which share similar underlying principles. Typically, 
the first step is to separate mental retardation and personality 
disorder from mental illness, on the grounds that mental 
retardation is present continuously from early life, and 
personality disorders from the end of adolescence, whereas 
mental illness has a recognizable onset after a period of normal 
functioning in adult life (Gelder, Gath & Mayou, 1983). Usually, 
the mental illnesses are then subdivided into psychoses 
(functional and organic) and neuroses, along the following lines: 
46 
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Table 2.1. The basic classification. 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
Personality disorder 
Mental retardation 
Organic psychoses 
Functional psychoses (schizophrenia; affective psychoses) 
Neuroses 
Adjustment disorder 
Other disorders 
Disorders specific to childhood 
( From Gelder et al. 1983, p. 70) 
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Psychoses, however, are notoriously difficult to define, 
rendering a clear demarcation from the neuroses difficult; indeed, 
in The Oxford Textbook of Psychiatry, (Gelder et al., 1983), an 
alternative classification system is employed. This is shown in 
Table 2.2. 
4. 
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Table 2.2. Alternative Classification of Mental Disorders 
----------------------------------------------------------------- 
Organic disorders 
Acute organic syndrome 
Dementia (chronic organic syndrome) 
Amnesic syndrome 
Schizophrenia 
Schizoaffective disorders and related syndromes 
Paranoid states 
Affective disorders 
Depressive disorder 
Mania 
The neuroses 
Non-specific 
Anxiety neurosis 
Phobic neurosis 
Obsessional neurosis 
Hysteria 
Depersonalisation syndrome 
Personality disorders 
Adjustment disorders 
Other disorders 
Sexual dysfunction and sexual deviations 
Alchohol and drug dependence 
Miscellaneous syndromes 
Psychological factors associated with medical conditions 
Mental retardation 
Disorders specific to childhood 
--------------------------------------------------------------------- 
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Within psychiatry there are many possible techniques for 
classifying abnormal mental states, the most familiar of which is 
clinical diagnosis. Diagnosis is concerned with the identification of 
classes or syndromes - that is, clusters of symptoms or traits 
which frequently occur together at one point in time, or which 
follow a characteristic sequence over a number of months or years 
(Wing, Cooper and Sartorius, 1974). 
2.2 Classification and diagnosis of schizophrenia. 
Before reviewing the symptornatology of 'schizophrenia, it is 
necessary to distinguish between acute and chronic schizophrenia. 
Essentially, in acute schizophrenia, the predominent clinical 
features are the so-called 'positive' symptoms (such as 
hallucinations, delusions, and interference with thinking), while 
chronic schizophrenia is characterised by the 'negative' symptoms 
(like apathy, social withdrawal, and lack of drive). The major 
symptoms of 'schizophrenia, as described in The Oxford Textbook 
of Psychiatry. (Gelder et al., 1983), are as follows: - 
The Acute Syndrome. 
Appearance and behaviour: some patients with acute 
schizophrenia seem entirely normal, whereas others seem 
awkward in their social behaviour, and in some way odd. Some 
patients smile or laugh without obvious reason, some are restless 
and noisy, or show sudden changes of behaviour, or a marked 
withdrawal from company. 
Speech often reflects an underlying thought disorder. In 
the early stages, there is vagueness in the patient's talk that 
makes it difficult to grasp the meaning. Some patients have 
difficulty in dealing with abstract ideas (i. e. they show 'concrete 
thinking'). Others become preoccupied with vague pseudoscientific 
or mystical ideas. 
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When the disturbance is more severe two characteristic 
kinds of abnormality may occur. Disorders of stream of 
thought, include pressure of thought (when ideas arise in 
unusual variety and abundance and pass through the mind very 
rapidly), poverty of thought (when the patient has only a few 
thoughts, lacking in colour) and thought blocking (a sudden 
interruption in the flow of conversation). Thought withdrawal (the 
conviction that one's thoughts have been taken away) is 
sometimes classified as a disorder of the stream of thought, but is 
more usefully considered as a form of delusion. 
Loosening of association denotes a lack of connection 
between ideas. In the severest form, the structure and coherence 
of thought are lost. 
Abnormalities of mood are common and mainly fall into 
three types. First, there may be sustained abnormalities of mood 
such as anxiety, depression, irritability or euphoria. Second, there 
may be blunting of affect (sometimes called flattening of affect), a 
sustained emotional indifference or diminution of emotional 
response. Third, there is incongruity of affect, where the mood, 
though not necessarily diminished, is not in keeping with the 
context (e. g. laughing when informed of a bereavement). 
Auditory hallucinations are amongst the most frequent 
symptoms. They may be noises, music, single words, brief phrases 
or whole conversations, and may be unobtrusive or the cause of 
great distress. Some voices seem to the patient to give commands. 
Some patients hear their own thoughts spoken out loud either as 
they think them (Gedankenlautwerden) or immediately 
afterwards (echo de la pensees). Some voices are in the third 
person. Some comment on the patient's actions. 
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Visual hallucinations are less frequent and usually 
accompany other kinds of hallucination. Tactile, olfactory, 
gustatory and somatic hallucinations are sometimes reported, 
and are often interpreted in a delusional way. 
Delusions are characteristic. Primary delusions (a delusion 
which appears suddenly in the absence of any rational or logical 
reason) are rare and difficult to identify with certainty. 
Persecutory delusions are common, but not specific to 
schizophrenia. Less common but of greater diagnostic value are 
delusions of reference and of control, and delusions of possesion of 
thought (see Chapter III for definitions). 
Insight is usually impaired. Most patients do not accept 
that their experiences result from illness. 
Patients diagnosed as schizophrenic do not necessarily 
experience all these symptoms and the clinical picture is variable 
This is discussed in more detail below, but for the present Table 
2.3 offers a useful indication of the prevalence of the various 
symptoms in the acute form of schizophrenia. 
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Table 2.3. The most frequent symptoms of acute 
schizophrenia (World Health Organisation, 1973) 
----------------------------------------- 
Symptom Frequency (%) 
Lack of insight 97 
Auditory hallucinations 74 
Ideas of reference 70 
Suspiciousness 66 
Flatness of affect 66 
Voices speaking to the patient 65 
Delusional mood 64 
Delusions of persecution 64 
Thought alienation 52 
Thoughts spoken aloud 
---------- --------------------- 
50 
-------------- 
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The Chronic Syndrome. 
The most striking feature is diminished volition, that is, 
a lack of drive and initiative. Left to themself, the patient may 
be inactive for long periods, or engage in aimless and repeated 
activity. Social behaviour may deteriorate, with the patient 
becoming 'dirty', and engaging in activities such as shouting 
obscenities in public places. 
A variety of motor disorders occurs, but most are 
uncommon. Such disorders are often called catatonic, and 
include stereotypy, a repeated movement that does not 
appear to be goal directed, and a mannerism, which though 
goal directed appears odd and out of context. 
Speech is often abnormal, showing evidence of thought 
disorder of the kinds found in the acute syndrome. Affect is 
generally blunted. Hallucinations are common in chronic 
schizophrenia. 
Delusions are often systematised. In chronic 
schizophrenia delusions may be held with little emotional 
response; for example, a patient may be convinced that he is 
being persecuted, but show neither fear nor anger. Delusions 
may also be 'encapsulated', leaving the remaining beliefs 
normal and the working and social life well preserved. 
Insight is impaired; the patient does not recognise that 
his symptoms are due to an illness and is seldom convinced of 
the need for treatment. 
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Although groups of symptoms which would now be 
subsumed by the diagnosis of schizophrenia were described in 
the mid-19th century by Morel, Hecker and Kahlbaum, Kraeplin 
(1896) was the first to place these conditions under a single 
category, dementia praecox. Kraeplin originally divided the 
illness into three subtypes (catatonic, hebephrenic, and 
paranoid) an later added a fourth (simple). Catatonic 
schizophrenia is characterised by the presence of motor 
disorders, and these symptoms will be more prominent than 
hallucinations, delusions and affective symptoms. With 
hebephrenia, disorders of abstract thinking and affect 
predominate. Typically such patients are childish, and delusions 
are poorly organised and ill held. In paranoid schizophrenia, 
the clinical picture is dominated by well organised paranoid 
delusions; other disorders are minimal, and the patient may 
appear normal until the abnormal beliefs are uncovered. 
Simple schizophrenia is characterised by the insidious 
development of odd behaviour, social withdrawal and declining 
work performance. With the possible exception of the paranoid 
type, the subgroups are of doubtful validity because they 
cannot be distinguished clearly in clinical practice (Gelder et al., 
1983). Moreover, no support was found for the four subtypes 
of schizophrenia in the International Pilot Study of 
Schizophrenia (W. H. O., 1973). 
Subsequently E. Bleuler (1911) renamed the condition 
(previously known as 'dementia praecox') schizophrenia. He did 
this in order to emphasise what he regarded as its most 
important characteristic, that is, the disintegration of the 
personality resulting from the loosening of associations (Bentall 
et al., 1988). Bleuler was'concerned far less with prognosis than 
with the mechanisms of symptom formation, and he adopted a 
less precise approach to diagnosis than Kraeplin (Gelder et al., 
1983). In an attempt to make the diagnosis more reliable, 
Schneider (1959) identified a group of symptoms characteristic 
of schizophrenia, but rarely found in other disorders. These 
'first rank symptoms' were not presumed to have any central 
psychopathological role. It is important to note that Schneider 
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did not view his first rank symptoms as necessary for the 
diagnosis of schizophrenia. It was rather that the presence of 
first rank symptoms rendered the diagnosis of schizophrenia 
more reliable. 
'Schizophrenia' has become so pervasive that current 
estimates of its incidence suggest that between 0.5-1 per cent 
of people in developed countries will be diagnosed at some 
point in their lives (Torrey, 1987). Because of the enormity of 
the problem, a great amount of research has been directed 
towards finding the underlying cause (or causes) of 
schizophrenic breakdowns (Sarbin & Mancuso, 1980). However, 
whilst a multitude of variables has been implicated as causal 
agents, ranging from season of birth (Watson, Kacula, Anguluski 
& Bruun, - 1982), and life events (Brown & Birley, 1968), to 
genetic endowment (Gottesman & Shields, 1982), the nature of 
the condition is still not known precisely. This has given rise, to 
a great deal of dissatisfaction with the scientific value of the 
concept of schizophrenia. 
2.3. Criticism of the concept of schizophrenia. 
Criticism of the concept of schizophrenia is nothing new. 
In the 1960's psychiatrists like Szasz (1961) and Laing (1967), 
the champions of the anti-psychiatry movement, cast doubt 
upon the validity of schizophrenia as a disease entity; Szasz 
because there was no identifiable biological substrate, and 
Laing because he viewed schizophrenic symptoms as either a 
reaction to family persecution or a form of psychedelic healing. 
It should be noted that Szasz has since disclaimed allegiance to 
the movement (Szasz, 1977). The anti-psychiatry movement 
attracted a good deal of public attention and sparked off a hot 
debate as to what terms like illness and disease actually meant. 
Farrell (1979), for example, criticised the assumption made by 
both, both Szasz and Laing, that the term illness was parasitic 
upon there being some specifiable bodily state which could be 
called abnormal. Farrell observed that the concept of illness 
actually played a much wider role in medicine; often, as was 
the case with migraine, the term illness was employed even 
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though next to nothing was known of the bodily conditions 
involved. Furthermore, to use Farrell's example, were the 
pathological causality of Parkinsonism to be disproved 
tomorrow, one would no longer be able to classify it as an 
illness at all according to the definitions of both Szasz and 
Laing. 
In spite of the anti-psychiatry movement, psychiatric 
practice continued much as before (Bentall, 1989). Typically, 
psychiatrists argued Farrell's point that whilst the specific 
aetiology of schizophrenia was not known, this was also true of 
many medical concepts. Moreover, supporters of the concept of 
schizophrenia argued that there was sufficient indirect 
evidence of an aetiological link to suggest that the concept was 
still useful. This indirect evidence included the development of 
familiar patterns of chronic impairment, and a tendency for the 
disorder to be more common in relatives even where this was 
not obviously explicable in environmental terms (e. g. Wing, 
Cooper & Sartorius, 1974). However, in order to assess the true 
worth of the concept of schizophrenia (indeed of any 
hypothesised construct), the concept must be shown to be both 
reliable and valid, and it is precisely this which recent criticism 
has called into question. 
If the diagnosis of schizophrenia is to be reliable, it must 
be shown to be a clinically recognisable syndrome which all 
psychiatrists can agree upon and label in the same way (Wing 
Cooper & Sartorius, 1974). Historically reliability has always 
been poor, largely because no single system of classification has 
been agreed upon. For E. Bleuler (1911) thought disorder was 
the essential feature of schizophrenia; delusions and 
hallucinations were considered to be of only secondary 
importance. For Schneider (1959), however, it was the 
delusions and hallucinations which were of primary importance 
to the diagnosis; thought disorder was not even a prerequisite 
for diagnosis. There have been similar disagreements as to the 
precise symptornatology of schizophrenia between clinicians 
from the same school of thought (Koehler, 1979). The upshot of 
this-was that whether an individual was diagnosed as 
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schizophrenic depended not only on his or her presenting 
symptornatology but. ' on the clinician's particular diagnostic 
allegiance. Another problem with the diagnosis of schizophrenia 
is that the concept is disjunctive (Bannister, 1968). That is, the 
diagnosis of schizophrenia is dependent on the presence of 
some but not all of the defining attributes, and there is no 
common defining attribute. In other words, schizophrenia is an 
example of what Hempel (1961) polythetic classes. Thus, two 
people may receive the diagnosis of schizophrenia whilst 
sharing no common symptom. When one bears in mind that 
many of these symptoms are also common to other conditions, 
it is hardly surprising that the differential diagnosis of 
schizophrenia proved difficult (e. g. Kendell & Gouflay, 1970). 
These difficulties in defining schizophrenia have not gone 
unheeded by psychiatrists. Major efforts have been made to 
standardise the diagnosis. Thus, in Britain, the construction of 
the Present State Examination (P. S. E.: Wing, Cooper & Sartorius, 
1974) and its use in large multinational studies, such as the 
International Pilot Study of Schizophrenia (IPSS), has served to 
improve the reliability of the diagnosis of schizophrenia - and, 
of course, the reliability of the diagnosis of other clinical 
disorders which it measures. This improvement resulted in part 
from the precise nature of the PSE itself, and also because one 
of the benefits of the IPSS was to highlight the different 
diagnostic practices prevalent in countries such as Britain, 
America and Russia. In America too, efforts have been made to 
render psychiatric diagnosis more reliable, first with the 
publication of the third edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical 
Manual (DSM III, A. P. A. 1980), and subsequently of DSM HIR 
(A. P. A., 1987) which has helped to standardise the diagnostic 
process still further. 
Dissenters have argued (i) that this hard-won 
international agreement is hardly surprising when one 
considers that the individuals involved undergo similar 
training, are socialised in the same profession, etc., and (ii), that 
these diagnostiticians are assuming that they are identifying 
something with genuine scientific status (Bentall et al., 1988). 
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This second point relates to the validity of the concept of 
schizophrenia. Reliability is a necessary but not sufficient 
condition of validity - therefore, if a concept is not reliable it 
most assuredly is not valid. However, a concept can be reliable 
but invalid; reliability is no guarantee of validity (e. g. Spitzer & 
Fleiss, 1974). 
A concept's validity can be assessed in a number of 
different ways, and these will be dealt with in the order 
followed by Bentall et al. (1988). 
(i) Construct Validity. 
As Wing (1974,1978) observed, if the concept of 
schizophrenia is to be a valid one, the syndrome should 
manifest itself in a number of symptoms that tend to go 
together; moreover, these symptoms should not be common to 
a host of different syndromes. Yet the symptoms assumed to 
form the disease entity schizophrenia are by no means 
exclusive to the condition. Delusions are also common to 
affective disorders (Winters & Neale, 1983); thought disorder is 
common among patients diagnosed as manic (Andreasen, 
1979), and hallucinations are so common as to lead some 
authors to suggest that they should not be taken as pathogenic 
of schizophrenia (Asaad & Shapiro, 1986). 
Much of the work assessing the construct validity of the 
concept of schizophrenia has employed factor and cluster 
analysis, in the hope of demonstrating statistically the validity 
of the concept of schizophrenia. If schizophrenia was a valid 
disease entity, factor analysis would yield a common factor 
underlying various schizophrenic symptoms, and cluster 
analysis would identify a discrete group of people with similar 
schizophrenic symptoms (Bentall et al., 1988). Whilst factor 
analysis has yielded a common underlying factor corresponding 
to schizophrenia (e. g Trouton & Maxwell, 1956), it has also been 
found to yield separate factors corresponding to groups of 
schizophrenic symptoms (Blashfield, 1984). Moreover, Slade 
and Cooper (1979) identified a methodological flaw underlying 
any such attempt, namely, that because patients with fewer 
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symptoms are less likely to be hospitalised, factor analytic 
studies of hospital populations (such as Trouton and Maxwell's) 
run the risk of identifying invalid factors. This objection applies 
equally well to cluster analysis. 
The 
, 
case for the construct validity of schizophrenia is 
weakened further by the finding that people showing some 
schizophrenic symptoms, though insufficient for a firm 
diagnosis, are relatively common (e. g. Cochrane, 1983; 
Dohrenwend & Dohrenwend, 1974). Much recent research has 
focused on the existence of 'schizotypal' traits within the 
normal population. Results suggest that many normal people 
are willing to report psychotic-like experiences (Bentall & 
Slade, 1985a; Chapman & Chapman, 1980; Claridge & Broks, 
1984). Indeed, the American Psychological Association has 
introduced the notion of 'schizotypal personality disorder' to 
classify just such people who show a tendency towards 
schizophrenic symptornatology (DSM III: APA, 1980). Thus, the 
distinction between schizophrenia and the normal population, 
like the distinction between schizophrenia and other clinical 
syndromes, is blurred. 
(ii) Predictive Validity. 
Another requirement of a valid concept is that it enables 
one to make new predictions (Neale & Oltmanns, 1980). Within 
the clinical sphere this inevitably entails saying something 
about the likely prognosis, and about what kinds of treatment 
are most likely to be beneficial. Recent studies have suggested 
that not only is the outcome of schizophrenia highly variable, 
but so too is the course of the disorder (e. g. Bleuler & Bleuler, 
1986). Ciompi (1980) followed up a large group of 
schizophrenics over a period of more than thirty years, and 
found that 30% were judged completely recovered, 26% were 
said to be partially recovered, and only 20% were judged still 
severely chronically ill. In M. Bleuler's (1978) follow-up study, 
only 10% of the patients assessed showed the type of chronic 
disease course described as typical in the early writings of 
Kraeplin and E. Bleuler, and, of these, some may well have been 
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the product of custodial care. Variable outcome would be far 
less of a problem, if, on the basis of symptomatology, it could 
be predicted which prognosis was most probable for a given 
patient. However, Strauss and Carpenter (1977) found social 
variables (such as the client's work performance and social 
contacts) to be better predictors of outcome than the client's 
specific symptomatology. There is also evidence that the type 
of family setting can influence outcome (Vaughn & Leff, 1976). 
Clearly, recovery from schizophrenia is variable and dependent 
on a variety of both clinical and non-clinical factors. 
On the question of treatment, there is little to suggest that 
the diagnosis of schizophrenia is a valid predictor of response 
to treatment. The widespread use of neuroleptics with patients 
diagnosed as schizophrenic appears to benefit only a small 
proportion of those treated: typically, the differences in 
outcome between medicated and non-medicated patients are 
small (e. g. Crow, MacMillan, Johnson & Johnstone, 1986). There 
is also evidence that psychotherapy can be of benefit to people 
diagnosed as schizophrenic (Karon & VandenBos, 1981), as can 
family therapy (parrowclough & Tarrier, 1984) and cognitive- 
behavioural therapy (Watts, Powell & Austin, 1973). When one 
bears in mind the diversity of factors discussed above which 
have been found to influence the course of the disorder, it may 
come as little surprise that a number of different approaches to 
treatment may be of benefit to people diagnosed as 
schizophrenic. 
(iii) Aetiological specificity. 
A final indicator of the validity of the concept of 
schizophrenia is its aetiological specificity. In the the search for 
causal agents in schizophrenia, an enormous amount of data has 
been collected. The search for a genetic cause of schizophrenic 
breakdowns has long been a source of much controversy, and 
conclusive evidence of a genetic cause proved elusive (Lidz & 
Blatt, 1983; Lidz, Blatt & Cook, 1981; Rose, Kamin & Lewontin, 
1984). This debate recently came to life again with the 
findings published by a research team at the Northwick Park 
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Hospital in Middlesex who claimed to have demonstrated that the 
gene for schizophrenia was located on the sex chromosome (Crow et 
al., 1988, in Read & Ramsay, 1988). Crow argued that his theory 
might explain the close link between gender and schizophrenia: for 
example, although equal numbers of men and women are diagnosed 
as schizophrenic, in men the onset is earlier and the outcome worse. 
However, Crow's explanation was at odds with another genetic 
account for -the emergence of schizohrenia put forward recently by 
a research team at the Middlesex Hospital in London (Gurling et al., 
1988, in Read & Ramsay, 1988). This group proposed that the 
abnormality lies not on the sex chromosome but on chromosome 
five, and claimed to have identified a number of different varieties 
of schizophrenia. Gurling's results conformed to the model of a 
single dominant gene that is not completely penetrant, so that 
whether the disorder was manifested would depend on other 
genetic and environmental factors (Read & Ramsay, 1988). 
Consequently, not all individuals with the gene for schizophrenia go 
on to manifest clinical schizophrenia. Clearly the search for a 
genetic cause for schizophrenia remains very much alive. 
Although the specific physiological processes underlying 
schizophrenia remain elusive, it is widely held that schizophrenia 
reults from a form of altered brain function such as that produced 
by certain drugs (Oatley, 1985). One way of understanding 
particular schizophrenic experiences is to compare them to the 
experiences of people suffering from Parkinson's disease. It is well 
established that Parkinsonism. results from depletion of the 
neurotransmitter dopamine. To counteract the effects of 
Parkinsonism, many clients were given a precursor drug, L-dopa, 
which increases the availibility of dopamine. However, in a number 
of cases this was found to lead to psychotic-like symptoms. This led 
some researchers to propose that schizophrenia was the result of a 
hypersensitivity of doparnine synapses. Hence, it is often argued 
that the effect of antipsychotic drugs in schizophrenia is to change 
the availibility or effectiveness of transmitter substances. However, 
although biochemical research has suggested that dopamine over- 
activity plays some role in schizophrenia (Owen, Owen, 
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Poulter & Crow, 1984), even this has been disputed (Gattez, 
1983; Mackay, 1982). Clearly, this in no way shows that there 
is no biological cause, but simply that one has yet to be found. 
Attempts to explain schizophrenia as resulting from stressful 
life events have also led to similarly equivocal conclusions 
(Rabkin, 1980; Bentall et al., 1988). 
In summarising the quest for the cause of schizophrenia, 
Bentall et al. (1988) remarked that: 
, given that schizophrenia is an entity which seems to 
have no particular symptoms, which follows no particular 
course and which responds to no (or perhaps every) particular 
treatment, it is perhaps not surprising that aetiological research 
has so far failed to establish that it has any particular cause. ' 
It seems that while progress has been made towards 
making the diagnosis of schizophrenia reliable, the question of 
its validity remains at best open. Out of this confusion has 
emerged a number of diverse research strategies, each 
attempting to advance our current understanding of the nature 
and cause of the symptoms subsumed under the diagnosis of 
schizophrenia. These strategies are discussed in the next 
section. 
2.4. Possible future directions for research on 
schizophrenia. 
One response to these problems with the validity of the 
concept schizophrenia has been to continue to employ the 
concept on the grounds that it is still the best building block 
upon which to base future research efforts. In a response to the 
paper by Bentall et al. (1988), Wing (1988) -largely ignored the 
problems associated with the validity of the concept of 
schizophrenia, preferring instead to deal with issues relating to 
its reliability. Wing emphasised the need for the continued 
improvement of the concept's diagnostic reliability and for 
increased biological investigation in the hope of relating various 
combinations of symptoms to possible causes or pathologies. 
Wing gave schizophrenia as the starting point for a further 
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series of disease theories (most of which he suggested would be 
wrong) a good prognosis. Clearly others share Wing's view. 
,A 
recent document by the Medical Research Council (MRC, 1987), 
to which Wing contributed, concluded by offering ten 
recommendations for future research on schizophrenia: (i) 
genetic investigations; (ii) neuropathological studies of post- 
mortem brains; (iii) studies of synaptic connections, in 
particular brain regions; (iv) brain NMR and isotope imaging 
studies; (v) clinical trials of preventative medication and other 
care; (vi) clinical studies of abnormalities of thought and 
intention involving EEG and MEG; (vii) neuropsychological 
studies of dopamine pathways; (viii) evaluations of services to 
patients; (ix) more epidemiological studies; and (x) studies of 
symptom identification. This would suggest, that in spite of the 
growing call to dispense with the concept of schizophrenia on 
scientific grounds, schizophrenia research, and particularly 
physiological research, will continue to flourish. 
Another option open to clinicians is to adopt new ways of 
classifying abnormal states. Eysenck, for example, questioned 
the value of the 'traditional system of classification within 
psychiatry. He argued that there was no strong evidence to 
support the traditional grouping into discrete categories, and 
proposed a dimensional system of classification (Eysenck, 
Wakefield & Friedman, 1983). Eysenck offered three 
dimensions: psychoticism, neuroticism. and introversion- 
extraversion, with patients being located on each of these three 
axes. Thus, for instance, in the case of someone assigned to 
hysteria in a categorical system, Eysenck's theory predicts that 
he or she would have high scores on the axes of neuroticism 
and extraversion, and a low score on the psychoticism axis. 
However, subsequent research has not confirmed such specific 
predictions (Gelder et al. 1983). Alternatively, a hierarchical 
classification system may be preferred to the traditional 
categorical one (e. g. Foulds & Bedford, 1975), and it has even 
been proposed that psychiatric symptoms are distributed in a 
more or less random fashion (Slade & Cooper, 1979). 
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Whichever system is taken up, it seems likely that it will 
have to take account of the apparent continuum that exists 
between 
, psychotic and non-psychotic experiences. 
Research 
into schizotypal traits in normal individuals is already well 
underway, and results, though preliminary, have been 
encouraging (e. g. Chapman & Chapman, 1980; Miller & 
Chapman, 1983; Rawlins & Claridge, 1984; Bentall et al., 1988). 
The concept of schizotypy is not new. In a classic paper, Meehl 
(1962) addressed the issue of whether a genetic base to 
schizophrenia need undermine the importance of psychological 
factors. His point was that this need not be so, since 'clinical 
schizophrenia' as such, could not be inherited, containing as it 
did elements which were learned. Meehl proposed a genetic 
mutation as underlying schizophrenia, which produced a 
phenotypic- consequence Meehl labelled schizotaxia. The 
imposition of a social learning history on schizotaxic individuals 
resulted in the personality organisation schizotypy. Whilst all 
schizotaxic individuals became 'on all actually existing social 
learning regimes' schizotypic, only a small subset would 
actually go on to manifest clinical schizophrenia. In fact Meehl's 
discussion of the. possible nature of a genetic cause for 
schizophrenia, and its implications for psychological treatment, 
has close links with the findings published recently by Gurling 
et al. (1988) described in the above section on aetiological 
specificty. 
Subsequently Zubin and Spring (1977) posited a 
vulnerability model for the emergence of schizophrenia which 
was very close in kind to Meehl's conception of schizotypy. The 
authors proposed that each individual was endowed with a 
degree of vulnerability which, under certain circumstances, 
would express itself in an episode of schizophrenic illness. 
Zubin and Spring argued that vulnerability comprised two main 
elements: the inborn and the acquired. Thus, Zubin and Spring 
contended that 'the primary persistant characteristic of the 
schizophrenic was his vulnerability, not his disorder' (p. 117). 
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Drawing an analogy with the systemic diseases, Claridge 
(1985) argued that the underlying disposition to schizophrenia 
lay in a continuously variable set of characteristics (schizotypy) 
distributed in the population as a whole, and formed part of 
normal individual variation in personality and cognitive 
functioning. Claridge proposed that these characteristics were 
partly under genetic control, with schizophrenic disorders 
occurring as a psychological reaction to stress in certain highly 
predisposed individuals. Like other sources of variation, 
Claridge argued that these chracteristics were continuous in 
nature, had discernable correlates in the nervous system, and 
were probably under polygenetic control. Schizophrenia was 
thus construed as being a psychobiological reaction to stress, 
where in severe cases a discontinuity with normal functioning 
would be in evidence, whilst in less severe (i. e. borderline) 
cases, or in states of remission, there would be an apparent 
continuity with the normal. Significantly, there is already 
evidence to suggest that a multidimensional model is needed to 
account for individual variations in such schizotypal traits 
(Chapman, Chapman & Miller, 1982; Claridge, 1987). 
A final research strategy open to clinicians is to study the 
individual symptoms of psychosis, as opposed to the 
hypothesised psychoses themselves. This idea is by no means 
new (Bannister, 1968; Slade & Cooper, 1979). Single symptom 
research can be justified in either of two ways. One line of 
defence was spelled out by Persons (1986) who offered five 
distinct advantages to the study of single symptoms, 
irrespective of the validity of the syndromes to which they 
purportedly belonged. These were: 
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(i) the avoidance of problems of diagnosis and classification 
(ii) the focus of attention on phenomena that are usually 
ignored 
(iii) the facilitation of theoretical development 
(iv) the recognition that clinical phenomena are related to 
normal behaviour 
(v) the potential improvement in classification which might 
accompany a better understanding of individual symptoms. 
It is therefore quite possible to look at particular symptoms of 
psychoses, whilst retaining (and indeed hoping to confirm) a 
belief in the existence of psychiatric syndromes. Alternatively, 
single Symptom research has been promoted on the grounds 
that psychiatric diagnosis is scientifically untenable, and should 
be abandoned (Bentall, 1989; Bentall. et al., 1988). 
For whichever reason, single symptom research is now 
well underway. The study of hallucinations, for instance, has 
progressed steadily for the past two decades. A multitude of 
variables has been found to affect the probability that a person 
will hallucinate (Slade, 1976). These include: periods of stress, 
and environmental factors such as periods of sensory 
deprivation or periods of unpatterned stimulation (i. e. white 
noise). In spite of attempts to establish a perceptual 
abnormality underlying the experience of hallucinations, the 
evidence to date does not support such an account; research in 
this area is not clear cut and generally does not support the 
suggestion that hallucinations result from any such abnormality 
(Slade, 1976; Catts, Armstrong & McConaghy, 1980). An 
alternative approach has been to suggest that hallucinations 
result from a failure to distinguish internal from external 
events. Johnson and Raye (1981) argued that such distinctions 
are inferential in nature - that is, it is not immediately obvious 
whether a perceived event is self-generated, or generated by 
the external world. As such, a hallucination would be a kind of 
causal misattribution. There is already support for such a 
hypothesis: Heilbrun (1980) found that hallucinators were 
relatively poor at recognising their own previously recorded 
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thoughts, while Bentall and Slade (1985) used a signal detection 
analysis to demonstrate that haflucinators display a bias 
towards attributing experiences to an external source in 
conditions of uncertainty. In keeping with a continuum view, 
Slade and Bentall have also demonstrated that there is a 
varying tendency amongst the normal population to hallucinate 
under certain conditions. 
The progress made in the study of hallucinations testifies 
to the worth of a single symptom approach to research. A good 
deal of attention has also been directed towards the study of 
thought disorder, where results have been equally promising 
(e. g. Rochester & Martin, 1979; Harvey, 1983). If the research 
on hallucinations has a shortcoming, it may lie in the failure to 
address specifically the issue of content. It is valuable to know 
that there is nothing necessarily perceptually abnormal about 
somebody who hallucinates, and this is the merit of Slade and 
Bentall's contribution. But the content of hallucinatory 
experiences remains unaccounted for: the question then 
becomes not 'How is it that people hallucinate?, but 'Why is it 
that this particular client is reporting this particular 
hallucinationT. Some would undoubtedly say that the answer 
lay in the fact that the client was suffering from schizophrenia, 
thus drawing attention away from the need to explain the 
hallucination and towards the need to explain the 
schizophrenia. Others might wish to pursue a functional 
account, where links would be sought between the form and 
content of the hallucination, and some aspect or aspects of the 
client's life experience. 
In contrast to the extensive study of hallucinations and 
thought disorder, little research has been carried out into 
delusions (Winters & Neale, 1983; Hernsley & Garety, 1986). 
This is a somewhat surprising omission given the wealth of 
empirical data relating to belief formation and maintenance in 
normals. The paucity of experimental work in this area, 
therefore, makes the study of delusions a stimulating challenge. 
Chapter III introduces the topic of delusions, the focus of the 
subsequent experimental chapters. 
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CHAPTER 111. DELUSIONS 
0 3.1 Defining 
Delusions 
Modern understanding -of delusions has been most 
profoundly influenced by the writing of Jaspers (Garety, 1985). 
Jaspers identified three , defining - characteristics of a delusion: (i) 
being held with absolute conviction (ii) being maintained in the 
face of counter arguments and experience and (iii) being of 
impossible content. Jaspers further distinguished three subgroups 
of delusions: (i) delusional perception (ii) delusional idea or notion 
and (iii) delusional awareness. Delusional perceptions are based on 
primary experiences. Such befiefs cannot be understood as having 
arisen' in response to life experiences; that is, they are non- 
understandable. The oft-cited example, from Arthur (1964), is of a 
man who while looking at some marble tables in a cafeteria 
suddenly became convinced that' this signified that the end of the 
world was coming. Delusional ideas are beliefs which can be 
understood in terms of the client's life experience; that is, they are 
secondary to some other experience. A secondary delusion might 
be a belief formed to account for auditory hallucinations, such as 
the idea that a radio receiver had been implanted inside the 
client's head as part of an experiment. Delusional awareness refers 
to a vague, unelaborated knowledge of 'immense and universal 
hapennings' (Garety, 1985). 1. 
The Jasperian distinction between primary and secondary 
delusions is not still widely'held (Bleuler & Bleuler, 1986). 
However, the Jasperian legacy can be seen in more, recent 
attempts at defining delusions. For instance, the definition of 
delusions offered by, Gelder, Gath and Mayou (1983) included the 
notion of resistance to change; the person who believed that there 
were persecutors in the'adjoining house would not be persuaded 
otherwise by being informed that the house was empty, but more 
likely would counter that the persecutors left the house before it 
could be searched. The' following definition of delusions is 
representative of much current thinking: 
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,A delusion is an abnormal belief. Delusions arise from 
disturbed judgements in which the experience of reality becomes 
a source of new and false meanings. Delusions usually have 
attributed to them the following characteristics: 
(i) They are held with absolute conviction. 
(ii) They are experienced as self-evident truths usually of great 
personal significance. 
(iii) They are not amenable to reason or modifiable by experience. 
(iv) Their content is often fantastic or at best inherently unlikely. 
(v) The beliefs are not shared by those of a common social or 
cultural background. ' (Mullen, 1979, as quoted in Garety, 1985, 
p. 26). I 
However, such definitions are problematical; individually 
each criterion presents difficulties, whilst together the confusion is 
heightened still further (Hemsley & Garety, 1986). 
, 
Recent 
evidence has suggested that delusional beliefs are not always held 
with absolute conviction (Garety, 1985; Brett-Jones, Garety & 
Hemsley, 1987). Garety (1985), for example, demonstrated that 
the'degree of conviction with which delusions are held can 
fluctuate over a number of weeks. As for being unmodifiable, 
there is evidence to suggest that delusions can be challenged 
successully (e. g. Watts, Powell & Austin, 1973: this point will be 
discussed in more detail later in this chapter). Mullen accepted 
that total conviction and resistance to change alone did not serve 
to distinguish delusions. Rather, he argued that what was distinct 
about delusions was the idiosyncratic nature of the belief content, ' 
to which his last two criteria, i. e. (iv) and (v), referred. However, 
even here there are difficulties. 'Jaspers himself observed that any 
individual could assert a belief not shared by his or her peers. 
Furthermore, the concept of bizarreness appears to be difficult to 
measure reliably (Kendler, Glazer & Morgenstern, 1983). This 
issue is complicated further by the claim that what is unusual 
about'delusions is not simply the content, but that the belief 
fulfills a function which non-delusional beliefs do not. Jaspers 
(1913) stated that the delusional content was of 'vital necessity' to 
the individual, and without it he or she would 'inwardly collapse'. 
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A promising new approach to defining delusions was 
initiated by Strauss (1969). Strauss analysed 119 interviews made 
as part of the World Health Organization International Pilot Study 
of Schizophrenia (IPSS; WHO, 1973) and discovered a large 
number of cases where both delusions and hallucinations had 
been described adequately and yet neither symptom could be 
fitted into a dichotomous category. Consequently Strauss proposed 
that these symptoms should be thought of as points on continua 
with normal behaviour: 'schizophrenia and the symptoms that 
characterize it are understandable exaggerations of normal 
function-When the distortion and exaggeration of certain normal 
psychological functions reach a certain level of eccentricity or 
begin to impair social function they are called symptoms' (Strauss, 
1969, p. 585). This is consistent with the existence of schizotypal 
traits in the normal population, discussed in the previous chapter. 
In an attempt at operationalizing his position Strauss tentatively 
offered four criteria for determining the position of an experience 
on these continua. These were: (i) the degree of belief conviction, 
(ii) the lack of direct cultural determinants, (iii) the amount of 
time spent preoccupied with the belief, and (iv) the implausibility 
of the experience. Thus, the emphasis in defining delusions was 
changed from stating that conviction must be absolute, that the 
belief must be unshakable, etc., to finding out the client's degree 
of belief conviction, whether his or her belief was modifiable, and 
so on. 
3.2 The major types of delusion and their diagnostic 
importance 
In an early classification of delusions Kraeplin (1896) 
argued for their importance, and particularly the paranoid forms, 
as part of the primary sub-types of schizophrenia. Kraeplin 
organized delusions into the six subsets of sin, persecution, 
reference, influence, exaltation and sexuality. Subsequently, 
influenced by psychoanalytic thought, E. Bleuler sought a common 
core of symptoms which would tie down the different subtypes. 
To this end Bleuler offered the two categories of basic and 
elaborated delusions. A basic delusion was a core belief which 
developed primarily through affective influences. An elaborated 
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delusion was a basic delusion which extended its influence across 
many areas of thinking. 
As was discussed in Chapter II, far-reaching initiatives have 
been launched recently to improve the reliability of psychiatric 
diagnosis; inevitably this meant that the diagnosis of delusions 
improved. Information from the nine participating countries in 
the IPSS (WHO, 1973) yielded a high reliability for the diagnosis 
of all types of delusions among the different centres. Good 
reliability for the diagnosis of delusions has also been found 
among individual diagnosticians (e. g. Endicott & Spitzer, 1972). 
The IPSS also suggested that the diagnosis of individual types of 
delusion (persecution, grandeur,.. ) was highly reliable, with 
correlations ranging from 0.93 to 0.95. Table 3.1 summarizes the 
major types of delusion. 
Third Party Material excluded from digitised copy. 
Please refer to original text to see this material. 
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However, the question remains as to whether identifying 
delusions reliably is of diagnostic value; that is, does the presence 
of a particular type of delusion influence the clinical diagnosis? 
Whilst there is no one-to-one relationship between different types 
of delusions and diagnoses, there are suggestive- links. In the IPSS 
96% of clients iwho reported delusions of control were diagnosed 
as suffering from schizophrenia or paranoid psychosis, whilst 92% 
of those clients who reported grandiose delusions were diagnosed 
as suffering from manic psychosis (Winters, & Neale, 1983). 
Indeed, it does appear to be the case that certain types of 
delusions are of ý diagnostic significance. The diagnosis of 
schizophrenia, for example, is heavily influenced by the presence 
or absence of delusions. In the Research Diagnostic Criteria (RDC: 
Spitzer, Endicott & Robins, 1978) four of the eight symptoms for 
an active phase of schizophrenia are types of delusions. In DSM 
III three . of the six criteria for an active phase of schizophrenia 
refer to ý delusional thinking. Differences in the nature of delusions 
may also beý of value in the differential diagnosis of schizophrenics 
and non-schizophrenics. Carpenter, Strauss and Bartko (1974) 
found that the delusional beliefs of people diagnosed as 
schizophrenic tended to involve many areas of their lives, 
whereas the delusions common' in psychotic depression and mania 
tended to - be less pervasive. 
3.3 Theories of Delusions: a selective review 
Although there is a lack of empirical research investigating - 
delusions, there is no such dearth of theoretical speculation. In an 
attempt at organizing the multitude of theoretical explanations of 
delusions, Winters and Neale classified them, into two broad 
groups. The first of these they termed motivational. Central to 
these theories is the notion that delusions come about through 
some underlying psychological motivation. In the present review 
two types of motivational account will be discussed with 
examples: attributional theories, and relief from aversion theories. 
The discussion will then move on to the second class of theoretical 
explanations of delusions - those Winters and Neale termed defect 
theories. Theories will be discussed which have postulated defects 
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in reasoning ability, brain structure, attention and information 
processing. 
Maher (1974) proposed that delusional clients suffer from 
basic perceptual anomalies which are essentially biological in 
nature. These anomalies leave the individual prone to experience 
abnormal perceptual experiences in the form of intense and vivid 
sensory input. On the face of it Maher's theory may seem to 
belong more in the section on defect theories, but Maher argued 
that the unusual content of delusions was not due to any defect in 
reasoning ability but to the nature of the perceptual experience: 
abnormal perceptions demanded abnormal explanations. 
According to Maher, the reasoning processes by which delusions 
are formed do not differ from those underlying normal beliefs. 
Thus, to Maher delusions were attempts on the part of individuals 
experiencing unusual percepts to make sense of their experiences. 
Maher argued that the motivating force behind the formation of 
delusions was the psychological need to account for the unusual 
perceptual experiences - that is, the primary underlying 
motivation was attributional. The view of delusions as 
explanatory devices which though incorrect are not pathological in 
and of themselves has since been adopted by Nisbett and Valins 
(1972). In fact Nisbett and Valins moved further away from the 
defect theorists than Maher, by observing that one could view a 
delusion -as a way of accounting for particular experiences without 
assuming that those experiences arose due to some biological 
anomaly. -Rather they argued that it might be the social context in, 
which the individual interacted which was peculiar; just as 
sensory deprivation can lead to minor delusions, so to 'the 
isolated, -distrustful individual who persistently ignores consensus 
information would be apt to develop bizarre explanations for his 
"normal" behaviour. ' (p. 141). 
A different king of motivational explanation of delusions 
was forwarded by Freud (1915). In seeking to explain the 
emergence of persecutory and grandiose delusions, Freud shifted 
the emphasis away from description and classification towards 
one of genetic endowment and personal significance (Winters & 
Neale, 1983). Freud suggested that both persecutory and 
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grandiose delusions stemmed from deni , al and projection of homosexual wishes (and, in later accounts, aggression). The 
psychological motivation behind the formation of delusions 'was 
the need to avert the anxiety inherent in acceptance of these 
homosexual wishes. Freud argued that as a defense mechanism to, 
protect the ego these unnacceptable feelings of homosexual love 
were distorted and projected. In the case of persecutory delusions, 
for example, the thought 'I, a man, love him', was transformed 
initially into the thought ' I, ' a man, hate him, and finally, into 'He 
hates me, so I am justified in hating him' (Winters & Neale, 1983, 
p. 238). Central to Freud's position was the notion that delusions 
were functional reconstructions of reality motivated by the need 
to protect the ego. Although Freud's theory of the development of 
persecutory and grandiose delusions has not received empirical 
support, its central tenets can be seen in many subsequent 
theories of delusional thinking. 
Strongly influenced by Freud, Cameron (1959) forwarded a 
detailed developmental theory of paranoia. As in the account put 
forward by Freud, the underlying motivation behind the 
formation of delusions was assumed-to be the need to protect the 
ego from unmanagable anxiety, and the mechanisms through 
which this was achieved were assumed to be denial and 
projection. Cameron's developmental model comprised the 
subsequent stages of withdrawal, followed by a period of 
unstructured anxiety, and finally a focusing of the projection in 
the formation of a paranoid pseudo-community. Cameron 
contended that the initial period of withdrawal takes place as a 
consequence of the unsatisfactory nature of the individual's social 
interactions. During his or her period of withdrawal, Cameron 
argued that the individual experiences anxiety inducing 
phantasies and conflicts, which subsequently are denied and 
projected. It is the projection of these anxiety arousing conflicts 
which Cameron suggested form the beginnin I gs of paranoid 
thinking. This projection freed the individual from inner turmoil 
and anxiety, but had the effect of making the 'ego-threatening 
anxiety seem to be coming from the outside. Cameron argued that 
following the withdrawal phase, the individual seeks to renew' 
contact with the environment. However, the coupling of projected 
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blame and prolonged social inadequacy meant that he or'she did 
so with increased vigilance and anxiety. As projections 'of mistrust 
became more frequent, the individual was led to form preliminary 
persecutory hypotheses. ' Within Cameron's theory, - I some clients 
are described as remaining at this stage of paranoid development, 
whilst others 'go on to develop full-blown paranoid theories 
revolving around the pseudo-community. 
Cameron's theory of the'development of paranoia is an, 
attractive blend of the' psychological and social. The formation of 
delusions is understood functionally in terms of anxiety-reduction 
through denial and projection. Although the beliefs formed are 
paranoid, their sequential crystallization is also functional in that 
it enables the individual to renew contact with his or her 
environment. In structuring and guiding cognition a delusion 
provides stability and permits meaningful and interrelated 
interpretations of experience; the tragedy is that -these 
interpretations are 'persecutory in nature. Like Freud, Cameron 
also implicated a failure to test reality effectively as being 
responsible, ' at least in part, for, the formation of paranoid 
delusions-' both argued that an individual who was competent at 
reality testing'would recognize the falsity inherent in an early 
paranoid hypothesis. In both theories the developmental origins 
of the paranoid individual's failure to reality-test were assumed 
to be poor levels of premorbid socialization and identification. 
Unfortunately, again like Freud, Cameron's theory has not been 
born out empirically. When paranoid and non-paranoid 
individuals are compared on premorbid adjustment indices the 
paranoids actually show a better premorbid adjustment (Zigler & 
Levine, 1973). 
In'- the early and somewhat primitive behavioural theories of 
delusions the motivation was supplied by a simplistic application 
of the reinforcement principle. Ullman and Krasner (1969), for 
instance, proposed that bizarre and unusual speech in psychotic 
clients was maintained by positive reinforcement, and that a 
history of this allied to a lack of reinforcement for appropriate 
behavioural responses could explain the syndrome. Such claims 
were theoretically weak, as they were based on the finding that 
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schizophrenic behaviours could be altered ý by the application of 
simple reinforcement and punishment procedures. The fact that a 
condition can be treated in a certain way does not therefore entail 
that it was also acquired in a particular fashion (London, 1970). A 
similar theoretical leap from treatment to aetiology was seen in 
some of the theoretical explanations of depression discussed in 
Chapter 1. 
Subsequent behavioural theories of delusions have been 
more sophisticated. Haynes (1986), concentrating on the paranoid 
behaviours, still argued that delusions were learned but adopted 
an interactional model which allowedfor multiple causality. Layng 
and Andronis (1984) conceptualised both delusions and 
hallucinations as instances of verbal behaviour (Skinner, 1957). 
Following on from, Salzinger (1974) they observed that functional 
relations could be seen among many psychotic behaviours and the 
social environment. Whilst acknowledging that delusions 
frequently involved huge personal 'costs', they argued that 
delusions could still be maintained through positive reinforcement 
if the alternative behaviours were more maladaptive, still (cf. 
Goldiamond, 1975). The behaviourist position is unusual and 
beneficial on two counts. First, it prevents the theorist from 
viewing delusions in isolation; the extent to which delusions are or 
are not maintained by the environment is an empirical question 
and one which needs to be addressed. Second, the clinician is 
required to consider explicitly what might happen if the 
individual did not behave in a delusional fashion; what are the 
alternative tacks, open to the client and are they more or. less 
aversive than the delusional one? 
In contrast to motivation theories, defect theories propose 
that 'delusions occur because of some type of fundamental defe6t 
in the individual' (Winters & Neale, 1983). Whilst motivational 
and anxiety-reducing factors may be present they are considered 
to be of secondary importance. 
E. Bleuler (1911) proposed that delusions came about 
through an underlying defect in thinking, which Bleuler believed 
to be the central feature of schizophrenia. This thought disorder 
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took the form of a breakdown in the associative pathways and 
resulted in the loss of coherent and goal-directed thought and 
speech. This disruption in thinking led in turn to an increase in 
the strength of the affective influences, which Bleuler defined 
broadly to include emotions such as anger and fear, and drives 
such as sexual satisfaction and power. The overactive affective 
influences undermined further the faculty for logical reasoning 
and produced delusional ideas. Thus delusions were seen as the 
product of the interaction of formal thought disorder and affective 
disturbances (Winters & Neale, 1983). However, this theoretical 
account could not explain the emergence of all delusions. In the 
first instance not all delusional clients have thought disorder 
(ibid. ), and second it is not sufficiently common for there to be an 
increase in the affective influences during delusion formation 
(Spitzer et al., 1978). 
Another way abnormal reasoning has been implicated in the 
development of delusions is in terms of, attributional style. As was 
seen in Chapter 1, Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale (1978) 
postulated that depressed individuals ý tended to make internal, 
stable, and global attributions about negative events. Kaney and 
BentaIl (1989) investigated the attributional style of clients with 
persecutory delusions, and discovered a tendency to make 
external, global and stable attributions for negative events. That 
is, like depressives the paranoids viewed the causes of bad events 
as both wide reaching and permanent, but whereas the 
depressives saw 'these causes as reflecting personal shortcomings.. 
the paranoids saw them as reflecting the failure of others. Kaney 
and Bentall further found that the paranoid clients tended to 
make excessively internal attributions for good events, leading the 
second author to suggest 'that paranoid and grandiose delusions 
might result from the same cognitive traits' (Bentall, 1988, p. 24). 
In another study, Bentall and Kaney (1989) investigated the 
attributions made' by clients with persecutory delusions for social 
events that did not involve themselves. Clients were asked to 
make judgments about a number of actor-victim interactions. 
Paranoid clients were found to make more person attributions (i. e. 
to blame'the actor) than the controls. However, although the 
paranoid clients tended to be more confident in their judgements, 
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they were found to be just as sensitive to contextual clues as the 
controls. 
Pavlov (1934) proposed a defect in brain structure to 
account for delusions of both influence and reference. 
Extrapolating from his animal studies Pavlov argued that certain 
cells in the sensory cortex may have a 'pathological inertness' 
which created an excitatory process in the brain. This excitation 
led to the activation of cells from this region of the cortex, which 
were responsible for sensations, feelings and perceptions, to be 
activated (Winters & Neale, 1983). Thus, Pavlov argued that 
delusions were formed when the normal flow of thought was 
disturbed by the activation of irrelevant material. Although 
Pavlov's theory has not been subjected to empirical test, the key 
notion of unimportant information interrupting the flow of 
thought has since been adopted by a number of theorists. For 
instanc'e, the 'defective filter' theory of schizophrenia proposed 
that schizophrenic symptomatology stemmed from a defect in the 
filter which separated relevant from irrelevant stimuli (e. g. Payne 
et al., 1964; Cromwell, 1968). Also Frith (1981) proposed that 
schizophrenia was the result of a defect in the process whereby 
behaviour became automatic and unconscious. ' Whereas in normal 
behaviour a variety of mature skills, including motor abilities like 
riding a bicycle and perceptual abilities such as reading, 
underwent such automation, this 'fossilization of behaviour' 
(Vygotsky, 1962) was disrupted in schizophrenics. Delusions of 
thought insertion, for instance, were thus seen as resulting from 
an awareness of processes which were normally unconscious. 
Anscombe (1987) also suggested that the delusional beliefs 
of those people diagnosed as schizophrenic stemmed from an 
inability to sustain an intentional focus to attention. Anscombe 
argued that the schizophrenic's attention typically was captured 
and often held for many minutes by incidental stimuli (p. 247). 
That is, the schizophrenic's attention was caught not by something 
of particular relevance or salience, but because, attention did not 
shift back to what he or she had been attending to. Effectively the 
process ran backwards, with stimuli appearing to be significant 
simply because they caught attention. Delusional thinking came 
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about when, the salience of' the -attention -capturing stimuli was 
then interpreted to 'mean something. That is, delusions were a 
reaction to a radical change of experience brought about by the 
'capturing of attention, the apparent role of external 
circumstances in assigning meaning, and the "glow" of significance 
emitted by objects' (p. 250). Like Maher, Anscombe argued that 
delusions were essentially attempts at making sense of abnormal 
experiences. However, unlike Maher, Anscombe did not accept the 
view of delusions as 'sane explanations' of abnormal experiences. 
Rather, 'ýknscombe' argued that the sane conclusion for the client to 
draw was that he or she' was suffering from 'schizophrenia, or 
something like it' (p. 250), although there may be some clinicians 
who would not accept that this explanation was any more rational 
than a bizarre delusion! (cf. Bentall et al., 1988 'discussed in 
Chapter II). 
ý Heilbrun (1973,1975) offered a defect theory of paranoia 
couched in the terminology of social learning theory, which 
suggested that persecutory delusions stemmed from defective 
information processing. Heilbrun argued that when faced with 
maternal rejection children adopted either of two adaptive' styles, 
open or closed. Whereas the open adaptive style was 
characterized by attempts at initiating social contact, the closed 
style was marked by social withdrawal and perceptual defence. 
Heilbrun proposed that individuals with open and closed adpative 
styles processed information in different ways, and that these 
different modes of information processing led to the formation of.. 
different types of delusions. Open style thinkers processed 
evaluative information in an intricate and biased manner 
involving denial, projection and the making of premature 
attributions. This way of acquiring information led to an 
'information overload', and resulted in anxiety-invoking 
disorganized thinking. Heilbrun suggested that in an attempt to 
reduce their confusion -and anxiety, open style thinkers simplified 
their information. processing by organizing it around a delusional 
premiss. In contrast, the closed style thinker avoided the 
processing of evaluative information in an active effort to protect 
his or her fragile self-esteem. Through projection the outside 
came to be seen as a threat, initially to the individual's seclusion 
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and subsequently to the individual's self-esteem. Finally, 
Heilbrun -argued, these paranoid thoughts were consolidated when 
the threat to the ego led the individual to look for information to 
confirm his or her paranoid ideas. 
One of the motivations behind Heilbrun's model was his 
objection to the view of delusions as anxiety reducing, on the 
grounds that paranoid delusions frequently generated as much 
anxiety as, they were- supposed to alleviate. It was this objection 
which led Heilbrun to postulate an additional source of anxiety, in 
terms of information processing overload. However, if one, thought 
in attributional terms it may be that persecutory delusions reduce 
not so much the overall amount of anxiety, as the nature of the 
anxiety. For instance, it may be that anxiety attributed to the 
failings and misdeeds of others is less threatening to an 
individual's self-esteem than anxiety attributed to his or her own 
shortcomings. 
The literature on delusions is marred by an imbalance in 
favour of theory. More data are called for to assess the 
parameters of the different theoretical accounts for the formation 
of delusions. However, it does seem unlikely that one theory will 
emerge to account for all types of delusions; indeed, it may be that 
no single theory will account for all delusions of one type. Perhaps 
theoretical explanations of the different types of delusion will 
move away from accounting for delusions per se, towards a more 
individualistic. approach. Certainly, justification for this position 
can be found. First, the recent attempts at defining delusions, 
discussed earlier, pointed to the degree of individual variability 
between individuals with delusions. Second, attempts at 
measuring delusions have revealed these beliefs to be (i) complex 
multidimensional phenomena and (ii) subject to a good deal of 
intra- and inter-personal variation. These latter developments 
will be discussed in the next section. 
3.4 The measurement of delusional beliefs 
As was discussed in Chapter 11, over the past two decades 
psychiatric diagnosis has been made far more reliable. 
Consequently, to the extent that particular diagnostic systems 
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measure the presence and absence of delusions, the measurement 
of delusions can. be said to have improved. However, diagnostic 
systems such as DSM III and the PSE focus primarily on the 
dominant theme of delusions; that is, whether they are 
persecutory, grandiose, and so on. Such diagnostic tools are not 
concerned primarily with the measurement of the different 
dimensions of delusional experience. 
To develop further the view of delusions as 
multidimensional phenomenon (Strauss, 1969, discussed in the 
section on defining delusions), Kendler, Glazer and Morgenstern 
(1983) developed a rating scale to assess five dimensions of 
delusional experience. These dimensions were: conviction, that is, 
'the degree to which the patient is convinced of the reality of the 
delusional beliefs'; extension, that is, 'the degree to which the 
delusional belief involves various aspects of the patient's life'; 
bizarreness, that is, 'the degree to which the delusional belief 
departs forn culturally determined consensus'; disorganization, 
that is, 'the degree, to which the delusional beliefs are internally 
consistent,, logical and systematized'; and pressure, that is, 'the 
degree to which the patient is preoccupied and concerned with the 
expressed delusional belief. Specifically, Kendler et al. addressed 
themselves to three questions. First, could their five chosen 
dimensions be measured reliably? Second, would high inter- 
correlations emerge between these dimensions, suggesting that 
they were not independent? Third, would factor analysis group 
the five dimensions into a small number of underlying factors that 
could further the understanding of delusional experience. 
Of the five dimensions, only bizareness proved difficult to 
rate reliably, with inter-observer agreement just . 52. The inter- 
correlations among all five dimensions were 'uniformly low', 
leading Kendler et al. to conclude that 'none of the five dimensions 
measures the same basic phenomenon to any substantial extent'. 
This finding also offered support for the multidimensional view of 
delusions. Factor analysis of the five dimensions isolated two 
factors - involvement and construct. Involvement was so-named 
because it was linked both to degree of conviction and pressure. 
Construct, the second factor, was concerned with the way the 
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delusions. were organized, and involved the degree of 
disorganization and bizarreness. Degree of extension was highly 
loaded on both factors. 
Kendler et al. 's study raised two general issues about the 
nature of delusional behaviour. First, it is disturbing that the 
concept of bizarreness should prove difficult to measure, as 
bizarre content has been cited as one of the few points of 
demarcation between delusional and non-delusional beliefs (see 
the section on defining delusions). Furthermore, in DSM III 
diagnostic importance is attached to the distinction between 
bizarre, and and non-bizarre delusions. Second, the preliminary 
support offered for a multidimensional view of delusions 
complicates the issue of 'recovery' considerably, because it raises 
the question of which dimensions are to be the major indices of 
clinical improvement. Would a reduction in any of Kendler et al. 's 
five dimensions be taken as a sign of recovery? This issue is 
complicated still further by the possibility of a decrease on one 
dimension coinciding with an increase on another ( Kendler et al., 
1983, p. 468). 
Hole, Rush' and Beck (1979) demonstrated that the different 
delusional dimensions do change independently of one another 
during the course of a psychotic episode. They conducted a series 
of interviews with eight delusional clients, two females and six 
males, each of whom satisfied research diagnostic criteria for 
schizophrenia (Feighner et al., 1972). Four dimenninn. q nf 
delusional experience were measured. These were: conviction, 
accommodation, pervasiveness and encapsulation. Belief 
conviction was measured by asking the client to rate how strongly 
the belief was held on a scale from 0 to 100 per cent. 
Accommodation considered the degree to which the belief was 
modified by external events. Pervasiveness referred to the degree 
of preoccupation with the belief, and the extent to which the client 
was, motivated to act upon the belief. Both pervasiveness and 
accommodation were assessed on the basis of the client's. self 
reports. Encapsulation referred to a decrease in preoccupation 
without a decrease in conviction. (In fact encapsulation is not an 
independent dimension, but rather is dependent on both 
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convictiori and pervasiveness). Hole et al. were not interested 
primarily in 'challenging delusions, but rather in understanding 
the phenomenology of delusional thinking. In particular they 
wanted to know whether delusional beliefs rested on current 
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how clients dealt with instances of 
disconfirmation. Furthermore, if there was a change in some 
aspect of the delusion, they wanted to know how the client 
accounted for this change. 
Four clients (Group 1) showed no significant change. Two 
(Group 2) of the four clients who demonstrated clinical 
improvement encapsulated their beliefs; that is, they experienced 
a major reduction in degree of pervasiveness but no change in 
conviction. Two clients (Group 3) experienced marked changes in 
both pervasiveness and conviction. Thus, although in two cases 
(Group 3) a major reduction in the amount of time spent dwelling 
and acting upon the beliefs went hand in hand with a significant 
drop in belief conviction, in two other cases (Group 2) 
pervasiveness changed independently of belief conviction *(i. e. the 
beliefs were encapsulated). One of the Group 2 clients provided a 
stark example of. encapsulation. At the start of the study he was 
spending '16 hours a day amassing evidence for several law suits 
he intended' bringing against the government for having caused 
his nervous breakdown. However, two weeks after the close of the 
study, even though his belief conviction remained at 100%, this 
client announced that he had decided not to act upon several of 
his law suits because they were a 'waste of time. 
There were also individual differences in the extent to 
which clients both sought disconfirmation. Only the Group 3 
clients subjected their beliefs to reality-testing, and even here 
reality-testing was only undertaken after these two clients had 
begun to doubt their beliefs. There were differences too in the 
extent to which clients accommodated disc onfirmation. For 
example, in the case of one Group 3 client an instance of 
disconfirmation led her to reduce her degree of belief conviction: 
she was led to doubt her belief that the police were trying to kill 
her when she saw a policeman without anything bad happening. 
However, in stark contrast was the behaviour of one Group I 
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client with whom Hole et al. implemented a reality-test to 
discover whether he could be made to accommodate 
disconfirmation. The test, which was unsuccessful, involved asking 
the client to demonstrate his alleged telepathic powers by 
identifying a written word that the interviewer (Hole) was 
concentrating on. The client accommodated his failure on this test 
without altering his belief in any way by attributing it to 
interference from the devil. These findings led Hole et al. to 
conclude that some delusional clients play an active part in 
assessing the truth of 
I 
their beliefs. 
Another study to look at ways of measuring delusional 
beliefs reliably was reported by Garety (1985). Garety measured 
belief conviction over a number of weeks using Phillips' (1977) 
modification of Shapiro's Personal Questionnaire (PQ: Shapiro, 
1961). The PQ is a way of measuring changes in symptom 
intensity specific to an individual client, and has been used to 
measure a number of different symptoms. Garety was the first to 
use the PQ in its modified form to measure delusions; an earlier 
version of the PQ was used to measure delusions by Shapiro and 
Ravenette (1959).. A PQ comprises a construction stage and an 
administration stage. At the construction stage the client and 
researcher define the belief in question and agree upon the 
wording for five successive statements of symptom intensity. In 
Garety's study, therefore, she and the client established the 
wording for the delusional beliefs, and for five successive 
statements of degree of belief conviction. In fact, two different 
sets of statements were employed to see if one was more sensitive 
to change. Both sets of, wording are shown in the following 
example taken from the study: 
Form (i) 
That dogs avoid me is definitely true 
probably true 
may be true or false 
probably false 
definitely false 
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Form (ii) 
I know that dogs avoid me 
I believe very strongly that dogs avoid me 
I believe that dogs avoid me 
I have a few doubts that dogs avoid me 
I doubt that dogs avoid me 
Each statement was written on separate pieces of card, 
together with two further cards, one displaying the printed word 
MORE and one the word LESS. At the administration stage each of 
the cards was presented randomly and the client was required to 
say whether at that point in time he felt MORE or LESS certain of 
the belief than was stated on the card. This procedure was 
followed with each set of statements once a week for a total of ten 
weeks. The possibility. of a client feeling that the symptom 
intensity stated on-a particular card matched exactly his degree of 
conviction (i. e. he was neither MORE nor LESS certain than was 
stated on the card) was discussed by Phillips (1977). Whilst such 
instances may lead to error, the distortion would be only slight 
and the response pattern would still be consistent. As a reliability 
measure an identical procedure was conducted with control belief 
statements, such, as 'I exist' and 'the sun will rise tomorrow'. 
Two clients took part in the study. Responses on the PQ were 
scored on a six point ordinal scale, ranging from 0 (on those 
occasions when the client responded LESS to each of the five 
statement cards) to 5 (on those occasions when the client 
responded MORE to each card). Whilst the first client's responses 
to the control -statements remained constant over the 
full ten 
weeks, responses to the delusional statements showed a fair 
degree of fluctuation. This was true for both sets of wording, 
although the second-form proved more sensitive to subtle changes 
in conviction. The second client's responses to the control 
statements were also constant. However, his responses to the 
delusional statements showed considerable fluctuation - far more 
so than was the case with the first client. In the case of the 
second client, two of the three delusional beliefs being measured 
went from being rated as being definitely true at the start of the 
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study to being scored definitely false by the end of the ten weeks. 
This client's degree of belief conviction in his third delusion also 
fluctuated a great deal over the course of the ten weeks. 
, 
Garety's study demonstrated that quite subtle changes in 
belief conviction can be measured reliably over a number of, . 
weeks using a PQ. Clearly these results do not support either the 
notion that delusions are invariably fixed, or that they are always 
held with absolute or total conviction (cf. the section on defining 
delusions). The study suggested that far from being black , and 
white, delusions are complex phenomena. For instance, whilst an 
increase in the second client's medication at week, 6 appeared to 
have a, major effect on the client's belief conviction, only two out 
of the three delusional beliefs were rejected. Ironically it was the 
belief held with least conviction during the first half of the study 
which, though held with reduced conviction, was not rejected by 
the close of the ten weeks. Moreover, the study is consistent with 
the view of delusions as being on a continuum with normal 
functioning, and does not support the view of delusions as 
discontinuous all-or-nothing phenomenon. 
In a subsequent study Brett-Jones, Garety and Hemsley 
(1987) developed and extended this approach to measure five 
aspects of delusional thinking over time. These five dimensions 
were (i) fixity, that is, the extent to which belief conviction was 
stable over time (ii) preoccupation, that is, the amount of time 
spent thinking about the belief (iii) degree of interference, thit is, 
the extent to which the belief impinged upon everyday living, ana 
(iv) and (v) reaction to hypothetical contradiction and 
accommodation - two separate measures of susceptibility to 
change. 
Conviction and preoccupation were measured using the 
modified version of the PQ ( see Table 3.2.1 for details of 
wording). Interference was defined as 'those acts committed or 
ommitted that were attributed directly to the delusional belief by 
the subject' (p. 258). In practice interference was measured by 
asking clients the extent to which they felt that their beliefs 
directed and inhibited their behaviour. Responses to these 
i 
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questions were ordinally rated on a four point scale ranging from 
no interference to severe disruption to normal activities (see 
Table 3.2.1)., Accommodation measured both the clients' 
awareness of actual occurrences that were contradictory to their 
beliefs, and how these occurrences affected their beliefs. 4- 
Accommodation was measured at the start of every session by 
asking the client whether anything had happened over the past 
week to alter his or her belief in any way. Reaction to hypothetical 
contradiction (RTHQ, evaluated the client's potential for 
accommodation, by posing a hypothetical but plausible and 
contradictory occurrence and asking the client how this would 
affect the belief. The interviewer classified the responses to both 
accommodation and RTHC into the categories shown in Table 3.2.2. 
4 
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Table 3.2.1 Summary of scales and categories: Conviction, 
preoccupation and interference 
CONVICTION PREOCCUPATION INTERFERENCE 
Scale 6 pt ordinal 6 pt ordinal 4 pt ordinal 
-------------------------------------------------------------------- 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
Do not believe 
I doubt these 
things not at 
all.... 
I have a few 
doubts that... 
I feel fairly 
sure that... 
I believe very 
strongly that... 
I know/am 
absolutely 
certain that.. 
I think about 
these things 
not at all.... 
................. 
occasionally 
.... some of 
the time 
0 None at all 
I Minor change 
e. g. smoked a 
cigarette 
2 Disruption to 
hospital routine 
3 Severe disrup- 
tion eg violence 
..... most of the 
time 
... absolutely all 
the time 
NB. Scores on conviction and preoccupation fall between two 
verbal descriptions. 
Third Party Material excluded from digitised copy. 
Please refer to original text to see this material. 
r 
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Eight males and one female took part in the study, each of 
whom had a hospital diagnosis of schizophrenia or schizo-affective 
psychosis. Clients had a mean age of 39 years and each was being 
treated with major tranquillizers at the time of the study. At an 
initial interview a maximum of three delusional beliefs was 
agreed with each client. A separate PQ was constructed for each 
belief to measure conviction; preoccupation was measured for all 
three beliefs together. Clients were interviewed weekly for either 
six months, ', or until they, were discharged if this came sooner. 
Other than when administering the five measures, each of which 
was taken at each interview, discussion of the delusions was 
avoided. Follow-up meetings Iwere conducted 
between four and 10 
weeks after discharge. 
The reliability of each of the five measures was satisfactory, 
although the test-retest reliability of preoccupation was lower 
than that for conviction. Brett-Jones et al. speculated that this may 
have been caused by the retrospective nature of the 
preoccupation measure (see Table 3.2.1). Overall conviction was 
rated at 4 or 5 on 49 per cent of PQ administrations. Responses to 
preoccupation 'were biased in favour of the middle range; no client 
rated preoccupation at the, maximum level of 5, and 59 per cent of 
the scores were either 2 or 3. Interference scores were'also low, 
with no interference at all being reported at 61 per cent of 
interviews and the maximum score of 3 not being reported at all. 
Although an analysis of covariance among the measures of 
conviction, preoccupation and interference revealed that the 
conviction- preoccupation correlation was significant, Brett-Jones 
et al. observed that close inspection of the graphical evidence was 
more suggestive of an asynchrony between these two dimensions. 
Accommodation was rated zero at 69 per cent of interviews, 
although at some point each client did report an occurrence which 
led them either to reject their belief altogether or to lower their 
conviction in that belief. RTHC was rated either 0 or I on 76 per 
cent of administrations, indicating a general unwillingness to 
recognize hypothetical contradiction. 
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The study offered further support for a multidimensional 
view of delusions. First, for most clients there was an asynchrony 
between changes on the different measures, and second, different 
patterns of 'recovery' were observed. For example, as in Hole et 
al. 's study, in some cases' conviction and preoccupation scores both 
fell; in other cases only conviction scores fell. Moreover, one client 
rated conviction at high levels throughout the study even though 
there were major reductions in both preoccupation and 
interference. Results on the accommodation measure did not 
support the view that delusional clients typically seek to 
disconfirm their beliefs. In many cases instances of 
disconfirmation did not occur naturally, and most clients did not 
actively seek such contradiction. Brett-Jones etal. reported that 
those client who did look to test their beliefs displayed a 
'confirmation bias' reminiscent of normal behaviour (see Chapter, 
I) - that is, they were far more willing to acknowledge 
confirmatory experiences such as hallucinations than they were to 
recognize occurrences that were disc onfirmatory. This finding is 
consistent with the theoretical position that there are common 
processes underlying the formation and maintenance of normal 
and delusional beliefs (cf. Maher, 1974; Nisbett & Valins, 1972). 
Analysis of * 
the responses to the reaction to hypothetical 
contradiction measure revealed that those clients who ultimately 
rejected their delusions responded to instances of hypothetical 
contradiction in a more rational way than those who did not. This 
led Brett-Jones et al. to speculate that this measure might be of 
valuc I J*kr. 
prcd-Acting the probable outcome of a cognitive therapy 
designed to challenge delusions. 
0 
3.5 The Modification of Delusions 
One of the first reported studies which attempted to modify 
delusional beliefs was a case study by Shapiro and Ravenette 
(1959). The client, a 38 year old male with a diagnosis of paranoid 
schizophrenia, believed that an association of people was 
attempting to change and punish him because of his history of 
pacifismý and sexual, misdemeanors. The modification procedure 
implemented jointly by Shapiro and Ravenette had three aims: (i) 
to show the palpable falseness of- the beliefs through guided 
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discussion, (ii) to demonstrate that holding the belief was a sign of 
illness, and (iii) to show how people might come to have such an 
illness. As a control condition the authors also challenged the 
client's guilt feelings in a similar fashion. Four measures of change 
were used: a 20 point questionnaire to measure paranoid thinking, 
a 10 point questionnaire to measure guilt feelings, and two 
further 10 point questionnaires to measure depression and 
hostility respectively to see whether the discussion of the 
paranoid and guilt feelings affected these variables. The paranoid 
questionnaire, was a mixture of items included specifically on the 
basis of the client's beliefs and items from a current rating scale 
(Sandler, 1954). 
In total 16 interviews were conducted at a Tate of four a 
week. The paranoid ideas and guilt feelings were each challenged 
at eight sessions; feelings of depression and hostility were not 
challenged directly. The total number of items on all four 
questionnaires was 50 and these were Written on separate pieces 
of, card. In an early form of Personal Questionnaire (PQ) the client 
was required to place each card under one of five headings, either 
'This is definitely the case', 'This may be--the case', 'I am not sure', 
'This may not be the case' and 'This is definitely not the case'. 
Cards placed under these headings were scored 4,3,2,1 and 0 
respectively. Unfortunately results on, the depression and hostility 
questionnaires were confounded by the client responding to the 
specific wording of the questions rather than to their content. 
There was no clear change in the scores on the guilt questionnaire. 
However, there appeared to be a -change in, the client's paranoid 
thinking, with the client losing 'all tendencies towards the 
unqualified acceptance of his persecutory delusions' (p. 309). 
Whereas at the first testing, the client rated eight paranoid items 
as 'definitely the case' (category 4), by the sixteenth and last 
testing no items were placed in, this category. This change 
suggested -that paranoid beliefs are open to modification. Given 
that the marked change in the client's degree of belief conviction 
was achieved in only eight sessions, Shapiro and Ravenette 
speculated that belief content, rather than resistance to change, 
might be the distinguishing feature of delusions (cf. Mullen, 1979, 
discussed in the section on defining delusions). 
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Watts, Powell 'and Austin (1973) argued that a very real 
danger with belief modification was what Brehm (1966) called 
'psychological reactance', where too direct an approach served 
simply to reinforce the 'belief. Watts et al. offered four guidelines 
designed to keep reactance to a minimum. First, they 
recommended that the modification begin with those beliefs, 
which are the least strongly held. In practice, Watts et al. 
advocated discussing as many counter arguments as possible; for 
example, where the paranoid belief concerned the behaviour of 
others to the subject, non-paranoid' interpretations of people's 
intentions would be discussed (p. 360). Second, they advised that 
clients be. asked only to consider, and not to adopt, an alternative 
to their belief. Third, they proposed that the evidence for the 
belief. be challenged, as opposed to the belief itself. Finally they 
recommended that the, client be encouraged to voice the 
arguments against his or her belief. 
Initially Watts et al. conducted a single case pilot study in 
order to asses's the utility of their modification guidelines. The 
client was a 35 year old male with a 12 year psychiatric history 
and a' diagnosis 'of schizophrenic with an immature personality. 
The client believed that people could see that he looked 'odd' and 
'ill' and that this led them to provoke and annoy him deliberately. 
The problem wasý particularly acute with women and strangers. 
One of the consequences of this belief was that the client led a 
very restricted life: therefore, as well as the belief modification 
procedure, graded reintroduction to avoided social situations was. 
instigated. An initial list of 20 situations was drawn up in which 
the client believed that he was provoked intentionally. The client 
rated each statement on a five point scale in accordance with how 
strongly he believed it to be the case. The statements were then 
discussed in the non -confrontational manner prescribed. Following 
the modification phase the beliefs were once again rated. Part way 
through the modification phase an additional list of paranoid 
statements relating to employment was drawn up. The second list 
of paranoid statements was rated and discussed in an identical 
fashion to the first list. To assess for more general clinical 
improvement a nine point PQ was drawn up which covered the 
full range of the client's complaints. 
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Res 
' 
ults from the pilot study were encouraging. The ratings 
given to the first list of paranoid statements were significantly 
lower following the modification treatment. The ratings given to 
the second list of paranoid beliefs were also lower following the 
41 intervention, although the difference fell short of significance. 
Each of the PQ items was rated at the maximum level of intensity 
for the first few weeks of the study, but by the end of the 
modification all but one of the complaints was given the minimum 
score. However, because of the lack of experimental control these 
changes could not be attributed to the modification procedure. For 
this reason two controlled replications were performed. 
In the replications three treatments were used sequentially. 
The modification procedure was preceded by a muscular 
relaxation technique and followed by brief in vivo desensitization 
to avoided social situations. Both clients were male and were 
diagnosed as schizophrenic. MW, the first client, believed that he 
looked unduly feminine and this led him to avoid mixing with 
people lest they should recognize this. A similar belief was also 
held by GS, the second client. As in the pilot trial, a list of the 
client's beliefs was constructed and rated on degree of belief 
conviction; the statements were re-rated at the end of each the 
three subsequent treatment phases. The treatment phases 
consisted of six sessions conducted over a three week period. 
Table 3.3 summarizes the effect of the interventions on these 
ratings. 
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Table 3.3 Mean ratings (0-4) of strength of abnormal 
beliefs. 
mw GS 
Before treatment 2.4 1.4 
After relaxation 2.6 1.6 
After belief modification 1.9 0.9 
After desensitization 2.0 1.0 
(From Watts et al., 1973). 
I. 
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In both cases the drop in mean ratings of the beliefs at the end of 
the modification treatment was significant, suggesting that the 
belief modification had produced a 'significant decrease in the 
strength of abnormall beliefs'. Moreover, these effects were 
achieved in only six sessions. 
Milton, Patwa and Hafner (1978) also hoped to modify 
delusional beliefs, with the added intention of demonstrating, as 
opposed to assuming, that a directive confrontational approach did 
indeed lead to increased psychological reactance. Sixteen clients 
were selected on the criteria of having 'consistent, systematized 
delusions of at least 5 years' duration, in the absence of any other 
major psychological or behavioural disturbance' (p. 127). Ten 
delusional ideas were elicited from each client. Delusional 
intensity (conviction) was scored on an equal interval nine point 
scale, ranging from 'I definitely do not believe this' (0) to 'I am 
absolutely certain this is true' (8). Data analysis was based on each 
client's mean, ratings of his or her 10 delusional ideas. Two 
secondary measures of change were employed, the Brief 
Psychiatric Rating Scale (BPRS: Overall & Gorham, 1962) and a 
modified version . of a Social Anxiety Questionnaire (Fal. loon, 
Lindley, McDonald & Marks, 1977). Clients were allocated 
randomly either to a 'confrontation' or 'modification' group. In the 
confrontation group the most strongly held beliefs were 
challenged first, and the therapist denied continually the belief's 
validity in. a. polite but firm manner. Attempts were made to 
persuade the clients that they must be , 
mistaken in their beliefs or 
they would not be in hospital. By contrast, in the modification 
group the discussion followed the guidelines prescribed by Watts 
et al. The modification began with those beliefs which the clients 
held least dogmatically, and whenever possible the therapist 
avoided disagreeing with the clients. The prevailing atmosphere 
was one of considering other possible explanations. For both 
groups the conversation was moved to a neutral topic either if the 
attempt failed or the client became too agitated. Each treatment 
lasted for five weekly sessions and a six week follow-up session 
was conducted with each client. 
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Results were based on the seven clients in each group who 
completed all the measures. Both treatments produced a slight but 
non significant fall in the degree of belief conviction after five 
sessions. However, subsequently at the six week follow-up there 
was a statistically significant fall in belief conviction for the 
modification group. This further reduction was also significantly 
greater than the fall- observed in the confrontation group at the six 
week follow-up. The BPRS yielded similar results: scores for the 
modification group dropped significantly by the six week follow- 
up, although in this instance while the change was' larger than the 
one observed in the confrontation group the difference was not 
significant. The social anxiety scores showed an opposite trend: it 
was the confrontation group whose scores dropped significantly 
by the six week follow-up, though the difference in change scores 
for the two groups was not significant. 
Overall the study suggested that a confrontational style of 
belief modification did lead to increased levels of psychological 
reactance. For instance, while the conviction scores of four clients 
in the confrontation group were higher at the end of the 
treatment phase than 'at the start, no client in the modification 
group recorded higher conviction ratings at the close of the study 
than at the outset. Most of the reduction in belief conviction for 
the modification group took place between the close of the 
intervention phase and the six week follow-up. This suggests that 
non-confrontational verbal interventions initiate changes which 
continue after their conclusion. Not one of the clients in the 
modification group showed increased BPRS scores either at the 
close of the intervention phase or at follow-up. Higher BPRS scores 
were recorded by three clients in the confrontation group at the 
close of the treatment, and in two of these cases this increase was 
still in evidence at the six week follow-up. This led Milton et al. to 
conclude that 'the fall in strength of delusions appears to be 
associated with a worthwhile reduction in overall psychiatric 
disturbance' (p. 127). 
In Chapter I an example of attribution therapy was reported 
which successfully allayed a young man's fear that he was a 
homosexual. The goal of the study was to, replace existing 
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maladaptive attributions by more rational and adaptive ones. This 
approach is consistent with the recommendation by Maher (1974) 
that the correct way to challenge a delusional belief is to 
acknowledge the reality of the person's experience and to offer a 
normal explanation in place of the delusion. In essence Maher's 
contention was that such a tactic may, reduce psychological 
reactance. Johnson, Ross and Mastria, (1977) adopted just this 
strategy in attempting to modify the delusional belief of a 37 year 
old male client who had been diagnosed tentatively as a paranoid 
schizophrenic. The client reported having had sexual intercourse 
twice with a 'warm form'. The first instance took place eight days 
before the client was admitted. He had been sitting naked on his 
bed when his penis became erect and he experienced a warm 
object pressing against his genitals which culminated in him 
ejaculating. This was followed by a similar experience the 
following week. Whilst the client was aware of the unusual ''nature 
of his claim he insisted that the experience was real and was 
frightened that the 'warm form' would occur again, possibly even 
at work. There were no other presenting problems. 
On the third day of hospitalization an attempt at 
reattribution was begun. The client was assured that his problem 
was 'real' and every effort was made to view the experience with 
the warm form as normal instead of abnormal. It was suggested 
that it would be helpful to measure the presence of the warm 
form, so it was agreed that when next it occurred a penile strain 
gauge attached to a voltmeter would be fitted. Subsequently the 
form was reported and the gauge was fitted for fifteen minutes, 
during which no electrical, potential was recorded. It was observed 
that throughout the trial the client lay on his side and moved his 
legs in a fashion sufficient for penile stimulation. A discussion of 
the episode followed at which both the lack of electrical 
stimulation, and the leg movements were made known to the 
client. The client's feelings were then reattributed to a buildup of 
sexual tensions as a result of a prolonged period of abstinence and 
to the inadvertent masturbatory leg movements. It was further 
suggested that the client's abnormal explanation of the feeling 
may have arisen due to the shameful nature of the experience, 
allied to his limited contact with male peers. The client was 
satisfied with this explanation and he Te-labelled the experience 
as a feeling. Three follow-up meetings were conducted over a six 
month period and on each ocasion the client reported a return to 
normal functioning both socially and at work. Over the follow-up 
period the client experienced several spontaneous erections that 
would previously have been attributed to the 'warm form. 
Furthermore, over the same period the client resisted the 
suggestions from members of his family that his experiences 
indicated the presence of supernatural forms such 'as demons. 
. Hartman and Cashman (1983) conducted a belief , 
modification which, they claimed, offered tentative support for 
the efficacy of a cognitive-behavioural approach to the 
modification of delusional thinking. Their claim was by necessity 
tentative because the study was plagued by methodological , 
diffuculties. Three clients took part in the study, 'which employed 
a crossover treatment design. The first client began a drug 
treatment for one month prior to beginning cognitive-behaviour 
therapy for a further month; medication was continued, 
throughout the month of cognitive-behaviour therapy. ' The second 
client began treatment with four weekly, sessions of cognitive- 
behaviour therapy, after which she felt that further treatment 
was not necessary and declined medication. The third client began 
with cognitive-behaviour therapy and then moved on, to the drug 
treatment. Clearly employing a crossover design with, effectively 
only two subjects renders firm conclusions impossible. In addition 
there was no direct measure of belief conviction, but only a 
measure of the extent of preoccupation and the degree to which 
the client felt able to regulate and control his or her delusional 
thinking. The study was further complicated by the extremely 
wide range of techniques employed under the rubric of cognitive- 
behaviour therapy. This included: non-confrontational discussion 
of the beliefs a la Watts et al.; techniques of modelling, flooding, 
thought blocking, behavioural rehearsal and reinforcement; and 
implosion or satiation training (Rachman, 1976). The authors ' 
summarized their cognitive-behaviour treatment as a coping skills 
approach designed to help the clients to identify and regulate 
problematic thoughts. It should be noted that in so far as this 
study was able to state 'that the interventions had been effective, 
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this statement applied equally well to the drug treatment as to 
the cognitive therapy. 
Alford (1980) conducted a single case belief modification 
study on a 22 year old male with a diagnosis of paranoid 
schizophrenic (DSM III). The client believed that a 'haggly. witch' 
followed him wherever he went; the client also reported hearing 
infrequent auditory hallucinations, and made reference to 
apparent visual hallucinations. The delusion had been present for 
over three years. The study employed, an ABAB design (cf. Ifersen 
& Barlow, 1976), where A refers to the baseline phase and B 
refers to the intervention phase. The treatment used by Alford 
borrowed heavily from the modification package designed by 
Watts et al. Alford challenged the client's belief by focusing 
discussions on the validity of the client's evidence for his belief. 
Alford encouraged the client to generate plausible alternative 
interpretations of the evidence for his belief, both during and in 
between therapeutic sessions. The client recorded his attempts at 
generating new interpretations of the evidence for his belief in a 
log book. The effect of the intervention was assessed by asking 
the client to rate both his degree of belief conviction and the 
extent of his preoccupation with his belief. Conviction was 
measured by asking the client to give a percentage rating, on the 
scale of 'certain it's just my imagination' (0%) to 'certain it's 
reality' (100%). In addition, informal external validation was 
gathered from nursing staff involved with the client who were 
unaware of the nature of the experiment. 
During the baseline phase belief conviction fluctuated 
between 45 and 80% certainty. Over the course of the 15 day 
intervention phase conviction fell steadily, and the belief was 
rejected completely at the closing session. During the return to 
baseline conditions the effect was well maintained; conviction was 
rated at low levels at each of the seven sessions in this phase. 
During the final phase of the study, when the intervention was re- 
introduced, conviction ratings were extremely low, never going 
above 5% certainty. The preoccupation scores followed a similar 
pattern. There was an overall downward trend in the client's 
reported frequency of delusional thoughts, although the effect was 
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not so striking as the clear cut reduction in conviction scores. A 
three month follow-up meeting revealed that the benefits of the 
intervention were still in partial evidence. The client attributed 
his delusional ideation concerning the witch to his imagination. 
However, although during the intervention phases the client was 
encouraged to view the hallucinations as being his own thoughts, 
at the follow-up meeting he reported that he was not sure that 
this was the case and harboured thoughts that the source of the 
voices might be people from another dimension. Comments from 
the nursing staff suggested that the client was able to monitor and 
regulate his delusional thinking more effectively as a consequence 
of the intervention. 
Design considerations. I 
In a section on the essential. requirements of experimental 
design Shapiro set out the criteria that he thought ought to 
characterize any potential belief modification procedure (Shapiro 
& Ravenette, 1959). The first of these requirements was that the 
strength and quality of the delusions should be shown to vary 
systematically in accordance with experimental manipulations of 
the client's life situation. That is, changes in both the independent 
variable (the setting) and the dependent variable (the delusion) 
should be clearly identifiable and measurable. In addition to 
demonstrating experimental control, Shapiro also recommeded 
that an experiment be an attempt to explain something. Thus, the 
changes made to the independent variable should be based on a 
theoretical, position from which the subsequent changes observed' 
in the dependent variable can be predicted. In short, predictable 
changes in the dependent variable should follow systematic and 
theoretically based changes in the independent variable. 
The first consideration in terms of experimental design is to 
gain a measure of belief conviction (along with any other 
dependent variables) before the intervention is introduced. 
Typically researchers have administered each of their measures 
once just prior to the introduction of the interventions. The study 
by Alport (1980) was the only one to gather baseline data. 
However, even if the belief to be modified has been present for a 
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number of years a baseline is still required because the 
researcher needs -to know what kind of responding is typical on 
the specific measures being employed. This requires a number of 
baseline data points before the intervention is introduced; one 
datum point is insufficient for this purpose. As was discussed in 
the previous section, great advances have been made recently in 
measuring delusions. The work of Garety (1985) and Brett-Jones 
et al. (1987) offers a reliable way to gain an ongoing measure of 
various aspects of delusional thinking. The PQ would seem to be 
the best measure of delusional dimensions currently available. 
The second task facing the researcher is to demonstrate that 
any change observed in the dependent variable is due to the 
intervention. By the authors' own admissions the studies by 
Shapiro and Ravenette (1959) and Hartman and Cashman (1983) 
lacked such control. The two controlled replications by Watts et al. 
(1973) went some way towards meeting this requirement. Their 
measures, including, one of belief conviction, were employed at the 
start of the study and at the conclusion of each of the three 
subsequent intervention phases. Watts et al. stated that as no 
significant change in belief conviction was observed following the 
two control treatments, and as a significant change in belief 
conviction was observed following the modification treatment, the 
observed change could safely be attributed to the belief 
modification. However, whilst this remains the most likely cause 
of the reduction in belief conviction, the effect might have been 
due to a variable other than the modification package. For 
instance, bearing in mind that the measures were employed only 
at the close of each intervention phase, it is possible that the 
effect observed during the modification phase was a delayed one 
from the prior relaxation treatment. This objection could have 
been offset in one of two ways. First, the order of the two control 
treatments could have been reversed, so that for one client the 
modification was preceded by relaxation and for the other by 
desensitization. Alternatively weekly data points could have been 
gathered during a baseline condition and throughout the 
intervention phases. In this latter, these data might have shown a 
continuation of baseline rate throughout the first intervention 
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phase, with an immediate change following the introduction of the 
modification intervention. 
Another important issue concerns the need for 'an 
intervention to adhere to a well specified procedure. Only then 
can a component analysis be undertaken. When too many 
techniques are combined in one treatment it becomes 'impossible 
to say which 'intervention' produced a change in belief conviction. 
Thus, for example, even had the study by Hartman & Cashman 
(1983) involved a more rigorous experimental design, it would 
still be impossible to determine which of the multitude of 
interventions used was most effective in reducing delusional 
belief conviction. The component analysis begun by Milton et al. 
(1979) needs to be continued to tease out the most effective 
means of modifying delusional beliefs. A final design issue 
concerns follow-up data. The studies reviewed are mixed, ranging 
from no follow-up data (Watts et al., 1973) to six months (Johnson 
et al. 1978; Shapiro & Ravenette, 1959). Long term follow-up data 
is an essential requirement of clinical research, as the issue of the 
permanence of an effect is of critical interest clinically. 
Drawing on this analysis, and the earlier discussion of the 
measurement of delusional beliefs, a number of' key factors 
emerge which need to be included in modification research. These 
are: 
(i) That a number of delusional dimensions be measured., 
(ii) That a baseline phase be run prior to an intervention. 
(iii) That adequate experimental control of the dependent 
variables be established. - 
(iv) That an intervention is specified clearly. 
(v) If -more than one intervention is employed a component 
analysis be undertaken. - 
(vi) That long-term follow-up data be collected. 
One way of satisfying these criteria is to run an ABAB design 
(cf. Alport, 1980, discussed earlier). However, the prospect of 
withdrawing a successful intervention poses an ethical and clinical 
dilemma. Fortunately in multiple -baseline methodology there is 
an alternative to the ABAB design which also satisfies the above 
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design criteria. Kazdin (1982) offered the following introduction to 
multiple -baseline methodology: 
The effects are demonstrated by introducing the 
intervention- to different baselines (e. g. behaviours or people) at 
different points in time. If each baseline changes when the 
intervention is introduced, the effects can be attributed to the 
intervention rather than to extraneous events. ' (p. 126). 
For example, in a multiple-baseline across behaviours 
design, two or more independent behaviours are measured until 
stable baseline performance is obtained for each. At this point the 
intervention is introduced to the first behaviour only and data are 
still gathered on all behaviours. If the intervention is effective the 
first behaviour ought to show some change; the remaining . 
behaviours, if they are independent of the first behaviour, ought 
to show a continuation of baseline rate. Although this would 
suggest that it was the intervention which had produced the 
change in the first behaviour, to confirm this the intervention 
would then be applied to the second behaviour. The second 
behaviour ought now to show a change to go with that in the first 
behaviour; again, any other behaviours should remain at baseline 
rate. This pattern is repeated with each of the behaviours. 
The essential feature of a multiple -basel i ne design is to 
show that an intervention is effective by demonstrating that 
behaviour changes when it is applied. The different baselines 
serve as control conditions to evaluate what changes can be 
expected without the application of the treatment. In this way 
multiple -baseline designs ckeck for the possible effects of 
extraneous variables. For example, a subject's behaviour might be 
influenced by a change in his or her life situation, or even the 
simple passage of time, yet one would not expect this to affect 
only one of the behaviours and at the exact point that the 
intervention was introduced (Kazdin, 1982, p. 128). There are no 
hard and fast guidelines as to how many baselines to use. 
Obviously a minimum of two baselines is necessary and whilst in 
practice three or more are favoured it is possible to give a clear 
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demonstration of an effect with only two (e. g. Kandel, Ayllon & 
Rosenbaum, 1977). 
3.6 Conclusions from the literature review 
The three introductory chapters were aimed at presenting 
an introduction to some of the factors which influence the ways in 
which beliefs are formed, and the way these beliefs subsequently 
exert a potent influence on behaviour. Although particular types 
of belief held by the clinical population have been discussed in 
detail, the intention was not to set them apart from other beliefs: 
emphasis has also been given to the bias and error inherent in the 
way all people form and evaluate beliefs and hypotheses. Indeed, 
a theme running through chapters I and III has been the extent to 
which the beliefs held by particular clinical groups can be thought 
of as being alike the beliefs formed by the non-clinical population. 
Certainly, in the case of delusions - the focus of the present 
research - there are good grounds, both theoretical and empirical, 
for viewing delusions as being on a continuum with normal 
functioning. What remains is to investigate more precisely the 
characteristic behaviour of people with delusions. The present 
empirical work, reported over the subsequent four chapters, 
marks an attempt at identifying some of these characteristics. 
I. 
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CHAPTER IV: ExPeriment 1 
Introduction 
In spite of the central role played by the notion of a cogntive 
41 deficit in a number of theories of 'schizophrenic' behaviour, the 
precise nature of the deficit or deficits is still unknown (Rund, 
1988). No -deficit has emerged which is common to all 
schizophrenics; moreover, ' an individual's cognitive performance 
may change over time. The performance of groups of 
schizophrenic subjects is also typically more varied than the 
performance of other matched groups (Leonhard, 1987). This 
would suggest that as a group they are less homogenous. 
Typically experiments investigating possible cognitive 
deficits in people diagnosed as schizophrenic have employed 
designs which match schizophrenic and normal groups for 
performance on a control task and then compare them on an 
experimental task. That is, researchers typically look for a 
differential deficit. This is because schizophrenics will 
underperform as compared with normals on almost any task that 
requires a voluntary, response (Chapman & Chapman, 1973a; 
1973b). Therefore, the researcher hopes to show that the 
schizophrenic's performance is significantly worse on one type of 
task than on another; that is, that he or she has a differential 
deficit. However, such designs are fraught with difficulty. In the 
first instance they run the risk of statistical regression, a problem.. 
first identified by Francis Galton (1889). Although on almost any 
problem-solving task disturbed schizophrenics as a group perform 
less well than normals, the performance scores of the two groups 
do overlap. That is, the high scoring end of the schizophrenic 
group and the low scoring end of the normal group are 
comparable. Therefore, subjects matched on a particular task will 
be unrepresentative of their respective groups; if they are from 
the schizophrenic group they will be above average and if they 
are from the normal group they will be below average. Statistical 
regression states that subjects who deviate from the mean 
performance of their parent group on one task, will tend to score 
closer to the group mean on the second task. Now because hormals 
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outperform schizophrenics, this means that the normals matched 
for their 'poor' performance on the control task will tend to 
perform better on the experimental task. The schizophrenics who 
performed unusually well on the control task will return to their 
mean group performance too, so they will tend to perform less 
well on the experimental task. Hence, on the experimental task the 
two groups will tend to yield highly disparate performances. The 
upshot of this is that the experimenter is duped into believing that 
there is a greater schizophrenic deficit on the experimental task 
than on the control task - that is, that he or she has demonstated a 
differential deficit in the cognitive performance of schizophrenics. 
Another potential source of error is matching groups of 
schizophrenic and normal subjects on current functioning IQ. 'Not 
only does this run the risk of statistical regression, but given that 
many schizophrenic's IQ is impaired, it means that schizophrenics 
of an equivalent functioning IQ to a group of normals would have 
higher premorbid IQ scores. For this reason, Chapman and 
Chapman (1973b) recommended matching subjects on premorbid 
functioning. Because most schizophrenics achieve a similar 
education to normal subjects of a similar social class, Chapman and 
Chapman recommended using number of years in education as a 
measure of premorbid functioning. Matching on premorbid 
functioning avoids the problem of unmatching' on other variables. 
Also, because premorbid functioning and performance on the 
experimental task would not be compared directly, the danger of 
statistical regression is avoided. % 
There is a wealth of experimental data relating to the 
performance of schizophrenics on a whole host of problem-solving 
tasks. However, in addition to the methodological problems 
discussed iboVe, the'large degree of variability and change in' 
diagnostic practices often renders generalization between studies 
difficult. This point relates to problems with the reliability of the 
concept of schizophrenia, discussed in'Chapter 11. Furthermore, 
the relevance of studies of 'schizophrenic' cognitive performance 
has been called' into"question by doubts cast over the validity of 
the concept of' schizophrenia. Recently attention has been directed 
not at undifferentiated' groups' of schizophrenics, but at subgroups 
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sharing a common symptom (see Chapter 11). Thus, a number of 
studies have compared the functioning of paranoid schizophrenics 
with various clinical, as well as non-clinical, controls. 
The literature comparing paranoid schizophrenics with non- 
41 paranoid schizophrenics is divided: there is evidence both to 
support and to refute the contention that the paranoid's 
functioning is preserved better., Payne (1960,1968) concluded on 
the basis of two reviews of the available literature that there was 
less intellectual deterioration, in paranoid schizophrenics than in 
other types of schizophrenia. In contrast, Furth and Youniss 
(1969) found no significant differences between a group of 
paranoid and non-paranoid schizophrenics on a variety of non- 
verbal problem-solving tasks. In a particularly relevant study, 
Young and Jerome (1971) compared the performance of paranoid 
with undifferentiated schizophrenics on a series of problem- 
solving tasks. The authors reported that the paranoid's 
performance generally was poorer. Two specific differences were 
identified. First, the problem-solving behaviour of the paranoid 
subjects revaled a tendency towards forming atomistic models (i. e. 
rules directed towards the more concrete aspects of the problem). 
Second, the paranoids were more rigid in, their thinking - that ýis, 
they appeared to be less sensitive to environmental cues, which 
indicated that a change of problem-solving strategy, was required. 
This second finding could be interpreted as reflecting. a general 
tendency on the part of paranoid schizophrenics to adhere to a 
rule in the face of environmental change. That is,, this finding % 
might reflect a general rigidity of thinking, of which the adherence 
to paranoid ideas was only one instance. 
Two features commonly included in the definition, of a 
delusion are the bizarre content and the notorious resistance to 
change (see Chapter III). In attempting to, account for, the 
formation of delusions, one school of thought states that delusions 
are rational explanations, either for abnormal experiences (Maher, 
1974) or for, normal experiences (Nisbett & Valins, 1972). This 
argument is based on the finding that there is no evidence of 
illogical thinking in paranoid subjects (Williams, 1964). Maher 
and Ross (1984) described a number of case studies which support 
102 
the idea of the deluded individual as a 'good scientist'. This 
position is consistent with the notion of delusional thinking being 
on a continuum with normal functioning (Strauss, 1969: see 
Chapter III). In contrast to the view that the belief formation 
processes underpinning delusions are normal, *a number of 
theorists have described a delusion as the product of faulty or 
abnormal reasoning (see Chapter III). This school of thought 
states that people with delusions have a cognitive deficit of some 
form. The notion of a cognitive deficit is at odds with the 
continuum view, because it proposes a difference in kind rather 
than degree. That is, delusions are seen as differing qualitatively 
from other beliefs. In seeking to account for the maintenance of 
delusions, Hernsley and Garety (1986) have argued that delusional 
beliefs may result from an inability to weigh up new evidence and 
adjust beliefs or rules accordingly. However, as the authors 
acknowledge, a failure to modify beliefs in the face of new or 
contradictory evidence is a charge which could equally well be 
levelled at the non-clinical population: it may be tautologous to 
state that strongly held beliefs are resistant to change. This stance 
is clearly in accordance with the continuum view. 
, From a behavioural perspective a delusion could be thought 
of as a core rule formed in response to a particular environmental 
history. Those subsequent behaviours which were guided and 
influenced by the delusion could then be seen as instances of rule 
governed behaviour (see Chapter 1). An initial question to ask 
would be whether the verbal rule was an accurate description of.. 
the environment, or whether -a delusion by definition represented 
a misconstrual of events. Thus, in behavioural terms, the debate as 
to whether a delusion was the product of rational or irrational 
thinking hinges on the extent to which a delusion was a rule which 
reflected,. the contingencies of reinforcement. The persistance of a 
delusion in- the face of changing environmental circumstances 
could be thought as a case of 'behavioural rigidity', a familiar 
feature of the performance of normal subjects in human operant 
research (see Chapter I), whereby a rule survives because it 
proves insensitive to environmental change. 
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If a delusion did result, at least in part, from a cognitive 
deficit, the deficit ought to be in evidence in a variety of 
behaviours other than the delusion itself. Thus, if delusions are 
formed because certain individuals display abnormal reasoning, it 
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be expected that the abnormality would be evidenced in 
other beliefs or rules they formed. Separating the issue of 
formation from maintenance, a potential general deficit which 
might be implicated in the formation of delusions is an inability to 
form rules or verbalizations which reflect the environmental 
conditions. A potential general deficit which might be implicated 
in the maintenance of delusions is the inability to reject a rule in 
the face of environmental disconfirmation (cf. the study by Young 
& Jerome, 1971, described earlier). Thus, it might be the case that 
the rules or verbalizations formed by deluded people rarely bear 
a strong relation to the environmental contingencies: equally, it is 
possible that having formed rules of all types deluded peopleý are 
particularly prone to behavioural rigidity. In both cases the 
bizarre'content and fixity of a delusion would be only one instance 
of a more general phenomenon. 
In order to assess these two possibilities empirically a 
problem-solving task was devised which analysed both the ability 
to form appropriate rules and subsequently to discard these rules 
in the face of disconfirmation. The Wisconsin Card Sorting Test 
(WCST) was developed originally by 'Berg (1948) to measure both 
the abstraction ability of normals and their ability to make a shift 
of set (i. e. to adopt a new problem-solving strategy in response to,. 
changed experimental conditions). Subsequently, the WCST gained 
popularity as a clinical neuropsychological instrument, because of 
its proven sensitivity to brain lesions of the frontal lobe (e. g. 
Robinson, Heaton, Lehman & Stilson, 1980). An advantage of the 
WCST is that it provides an objective measure not only of overall 
success, but also of particular sources of difficulty on the task. 
Thus, it is possible to see how many trials it takes the subject to 
discover the initial problem-solving rule. ' It is also possible to 
evaluate how 'quickly subjects are able to discard a rule once the 
experimental conditions supporting it change. In this sense the 
WCST measures both the ability to form a rule which reflects the 
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environmental conditions, and the ease with which the rule is 
discarded subsequently. 
The WCST has been used to compare the performance of 22 
young schizophrenics with 47 young normals (Fey, 1951): of the 
subjects diagnosed as schizophrenic, three were diagnosed 
paranoid sub-type. In total, subjects were required to make five 
category shifts. Six of the subjects diagnosed as schizophrenic 
completed the task, as opposed to 39 of the normal control 
subjects. The study revealed that the schizophrenic group 
achieved significantly fewer categories than the control subjects. 
The schizophrenic group also displayed more 'perseverative 
errors'; that is, they were more likely to adhere to a problem- 
solving rule even after responses based on it were no longer being 
reinforced by the experimenter. Unfortunately, Fey did not 
compare the speed with which the two groups were able to form 
the initial response category. Changes in diagnostic practice since 
1951, together with changes in the administration of the WCST, 
render firm conclusions about Fey's study impossible. However, 
the study demonstrates how the WCST has been used to measure 
rule formation and maintenance in a general problem-solving 
situation. 
In the present study the WCST was employed to assess the 
ease with which a group of ten individuals diagnosed as paranoid 
schizophrenic and manifesting clear delusional thinking (Group 1) 
was able both to form an appropriate problem-solving rule or 
category and subsequently to change the rule a number of times 
in the light of changing experimental conditions. Because the WCST 
has been standardized for a range of educational levels, the 
present study did not run a normal control group. A psychiatric 
control group (Group 2) was included, comprising of individuals 
diagnosed as schizophrenic who did not show any delusional 
thinking. Group I and Group 2 subjects were matched on 
premorbid level of education, as measured by the number of 
years schooling received. No assumptions were made as to the 
degree of homogeneity of these Group 2 subjects; they were 
included simply as an identifiable psychiatric control group. The 
comparison of particular interest was between the deluded 
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subjects and the normative data - that is, whether in keeping with 
a continuum view the performance of the deluded subjects would 
compare favourably with the performance of normal subjects of a 
similar educational background. 
I 
4 
Method 
Subjects. 
Participation was on a voluntary basis and subject to the 
approval of each subject's key worker and psychiatrist. Group I 
consisted of 10 clients (8 male and 2 female) each of whom had 
held long-term delusional beliefs; these subjects satisfied DSM III 
criteria, for paranoid schizophrenia as determined by case note 
data and present symptomatology. The mean age of Group I 
subjects was 39 years 6 months. Apart from delusions, three 
Group I subjects experienced auditory hallucinations; no Group I 
subject was thought disordered. Group I subjects had on average 
recieved 11.8 years of eduation: 8 subjects left school at 16 or 
under, one subject went on to do 'A' levels and one held a, 
University degree. Group 2 consisted of 10 subjects who, on the 
basis of, case notes and present symptomatology, satisfied DSM III 
criteria for schizophrenia in the absence of delusions. This group 
comprised of 6 males and 4 females. Four Group 2 subjects 
reported hearing auditory hallucinations. The average age of 
Group 2, subjects was 36 years 4 months. Group 2 subjects had on 
average received 11.4 years of schooling: 9 subjects left school at 
16 or under, and one subject went on to University. All Group I 
and Group 2 clients were out patients either living in sheltered 
accommodation or attending a day hospital. Clients were 
interviewed on an individual basis in one of these settings. 
Materials., 
The WCST pack included: four stimulus cards, two identical 
decks of 64 response cards, and recording forms. All stimulus and 
response cards have systematic figure configurations, and are 
numbered to indicate the standard order. In this order, no two 
successive response cards have the same colour, form or number. 
Procedure. 
The WCST uses stimulus cards that display varying forms 
(crosses, circles, squares or triangles), colours (red, green, blue or 
yellow), and numbers (one, two, three or four). Four stimulus 
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cards with the following characteristics were placed in front of the 
subject: one red triangle, two green stars, three green crosses and 
four blue circles. The subject was then handed a deck of 64 
response cards and instructed to place each consecutive card from 
the deck in front of one of the four stimulus cards, wherever he or 
she thought it ought to go. The subject was informed only whether 
each response was right or wrong; subjects were not told the 
correct sorting principle. Once the subject made ten sorts 
according to colour - the initial correct principle - without warning 
the criterion principle was changed from colour to form. Following 
ten sorts made according to form the criterion was changed again, 
this time to number. Following ten consecutive sorts according to 
number, the criterion was changed to colour once again and the 
cycle was repeated. The test proceeded in this manner until either 
the specified cycle (colour, form, number, colour, form, number) 
was completed successfully, or until all 128 response cards were 
used. Alternatively, the test was stopped if a subject either 
completed 64 trials (i. e. went through one entire deck of cards) 
without achieving the initial category, or subsequently completed 
64 trials without achieving the particular category stage he or she 
was at in the sequence. 
The subjects were given the following instructions: 
, This test is a little unusual, because I am not allowed to tell 
you very much about how to do it. You will be asked to match 
each of the cards in these decks to one of four cards. 
[Experimenter lays out the four stimulus cards in the standard 
order] You must always take the top card from the deck, and place 
it below the key card you think it matches. [Experimenter points 
to the stimulus cards] I can't tell you how to match the cards, but I 
will tell you each time whether you are right or wrong. If you are 
wrong, leave the card where you've placed it, and try to get the 
next card correct. Use this deck first [Experimenter hands the first 
deck to the subject, and places the second deck to the side] and 
then continue with the second deck. There is no time limit on this 
test. ' 
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Subjects' responses were recorded on the forms provided. At 
the top of the form the experimenter marked off each category as 
the subject, completed it (CFNCFN; C=colour, F=form, N=number). 
The recording form had 128 response items, each one "CFNO", 0 
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being 'other. The experimenter recorded the subject's response by 
making a slash through those dimensions which were the same on 
the response and stimulus cards. Thus, for example, on those trials 
when the response card and stimulus card were identical, the 
experimenter put a slash through the C, F and N. When the 
response card had the same colour and number of figures as the 
stimulus card, the experimenter placed a slash through the C and 
N only. When the response card did not match the stimulus card 
on either colour, form or number, a slash was placed through the 
Results 
(a) Number of correct categories. 
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Table 5.1 shows the number of correct categories achieved 
by the Group I and Group 2 subjects. As is shown, seven of the 
Group I subjects completed all six categories: not one of the Group 
2 subjects managed six categories. The mean number of categories 
completed by Group I subjects was 4.8, as opposed to a mean of 
1.7 for group 2 subjects. A Wilcoxon matched pairs sign-test 
revealed this difference to be significant at the 1% level. That is, 
the ten deluded schizophrenic subjects achieved a significantly 
greater number of categories than the ten non-deluded 
schizophrenic subjects. 
4. 
I 
Table 5.1 Overall number of categories achieved by the 
deluded 'schizophrenics' (SI-SIO) and the non-deluded 
Ischizophrenics' (SII-S20). 
0 
Groupl Categories Group 2 Categories 
Achieved Achieved 
------------ sl ------------ 6 -------------- Sil ---------- 3 
S2 I S12 3 
S3 .6 S13 5 
S4 3 S14 0 
S5 6 S15 0 
S6 6 S16 4 
S7 2 S17 0 
S8 6 S18 0 
S9 6 S19 0 
sio 6 S20 2 
------------------------------------------------ Mean 4.8 (1.7) 1.7 (1.95) 
Note: Standard deviations appear in brackets after the means. 
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Normative data are available for the performances of 150 
subjects on the WCST. These results, presented by Heaton (1981), 
represent the findings from the 123 normal controls in the study 
by Robinson'et al. (1980) and 27 normal subjects run by Heaton. 
These subjects covered a range of educational and intellectual 
abilities. Heaton gave a break down of these normative data in 
terms of a number of variables, including IQ scores and number of 
years in education. For the present purposes, all comparisons with 
the normative scores are based on normal subjects grouped 
according to number of years of education. Heaton identified three 
groups of subjects on the basis of number, of years of education. 
These were: those with less than 12 years of schooling (n=20), 
those with between 12 and 15 years of schooling (n=77) and those 
with more than 15 years of schooling (n=53). Table 5.2 presents a 
summary of, those normative results used to make comparisons 
with the Group 1 and Group 2 subjects in the present study. 
When comparing the Group I subjects to the normative data, 
it was necessary to consider the two Group I subjects (S3 and S8) 
with more than . 
12 years education separately: these two subjects 
were compared to the normative data from the highest 
educational group. The mean number of categories achieved by 
the eight Group I subjects with less than 12 years of education 
was 4.5 with a standard deviation of 2.1. It should be noted that 
five of these eight subjects achieved all six categories. Both S3 and 
S8 achieved all six categories. Thus, in terms of the number of % 
categories achieved the performance of the Group I subjects is on 
a par with the normative data: the Group 2 subjects performance 
falls well below that predicted by the normative data. 
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Table 5.2. Selected' results from the normative study 'of 
three educational groups: those with less than 12 years 
of education (<12), those with 12 to 15 years of schooling 
(12-15) and those with more than 15 years (>15). 
<12 12-15 >15 
No. of categories. 5.1 (1.4) 5.2 (1.5) 5.7 (1.0) 
Trials to Ist 16.1 (9.3) 14 (13.8) 11.4 (1.6) 
Category 
% perseverative 15.1 (7.8) 12.5 (7.4) 9.5 (5.6) 
errors 
Note: Standard deviations appear in brackets after the means. 
1 
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(b) Number of trials to completion of the first category. 
Table 5.3 shows the number of trials each subject required 
to complete the first category that is, the number of trials that 
elapsed before he or she recorded ten consecutive correct sorts 
according to colour. In the cases of five Group 2 subjects the test 
was terminated following 64 trials (i. e. one complete deck of 
cards) without ten consecutive correct sorts according to colour. 
For statistical purposes the comparison of Group I with Group 2 
scores was based on these five subjects having taken 74 trials to 
complete the first category - the minimum number of trials 
required had the test been continued. (This provision cannot 
magnify the difference between Group I and Group 2 subjects, 
and in all likelihood provides a conservative estimate of the 
difference. ) A Wilcoxon test revealed the difference between the 
two groups to be just short of significance at the 5% level. Thus, 
there was no significant difference between the number of trials 
the deluded and non-deluded subjects took to achieve the first 
category. 
The normative data for the 20 subjects with less than 12 
years education yielded a mean of 16.1 trials to complete the first 
category, with a standard deviation of 9.3. The mean number of 
trials taken by the eight Group I subjects of comparable 
educational status was 20 trials with a standard deviation of 10.3. 
The number of trials taken by the two Group I subjects in the top 
educational bracket was 14 and 11 resp. -ctively: the corresponding 
normative data yielded a mean of 11.4 trials to complete the first 
category with a standard deviation of 1.6. As was the case with the 
overall number of categories completed, the performance of the 
deluded subjects falls within the limits of the normative data, 
whereas the Group 2 subjects performed well below this level. 
Table 5.4. Number of trials taken by Group I and Group 
2 subjects to record ten correct sorts according to colour. 
0 
Group 1 Trials to 1st Group 2 Trials to 1st 
Category Category 
si 12 Sil 12 
S2 30 S12 24 
S3 14 S13 12 
S4 32 S14 12 
S5 11 S15 
S6 11 S16 
S7 34 S17 41 
S8 11 S18 
S9 11 S19 
sio 19 S20 
An asterisk indicates that the test was terminated following 64 
trials without the subject achieving the first category. 
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(c), Npmber of perseverative responses and perseverative 
errors. 
Table 5.5 shows the percentage number of responses made 
by each subject that were perseverative (% PR) and the 
percentage number of these perseverative responses that were 
errors (% PE). These scores were calculated by dividing the total 
number of trials by the number of perseverative responses and 
perseverative errors respectively. Percentage scores were used in 
preference to raw scores to control for the different number of 
trials the subjects received. A Wilcoxon two tailed test yielded a 
significant difference at the 0.02 level of significance, confirming 
that the group of deluded subjects made significantly fewer 
perseverative responses than the non-deluded group. A Wilcoxon 
two tailed test on the percentage number of perseverative errors 
made by Group I and Group 2 subjects was significant at the 5% 
level. That is, the ten subjects diagnosed as schizophrenic in the 
presence of delusions made significantly fewer perseverative 
errors than the ten subjects diagnosed as schizophrenic in the 
absence of delusions. 
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Table 5.5. Percentage of perseverative responses (PR) and 
perseverative errors (PE) for the deluded (SI-SIO) and non. 
deluded (SII-S20) schizophrenics. 
Group I% PR % PE Group 2% PR % PE 
--------- si --------- 32 --------- 26 --------- Sil --------- 69 ------- 53 
S2 38 26 S12 41 34 
S3 17 12 S13 14 12 
S4 21 16 S14 27 24 
S5 12 11 S15 89 67 
S6 18 14 S16 55 45 
S7 39 33 S17 28 22 
S8 9 8 S18 95 70 
S9 15 9 S19 25 16 
sio 17 16 S20 87 66 
Mean 21.8 17.1 53 40.9 
Standard 
deviation 10.67 8.4 30.23 22.28 
4. 
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Although the normative data for the WCST provided both 
the raw and percentage number of perseverative errors, only the 
raw number of perseverative responses is provided. This is 
unfortunate, because raw number of perseverative responses does 
not control for the inter-subject variability in terms of the overall 
number of trials. Thus, only percentage perseverative error scores 
will be considered. In Table 5.2 the mean number of percentage 
perseverative errors for the 20 normal subjects in the lowest 
educational bracket was 15.1 with a standard deviation of 7.8: the 
mean number of perseverative responses for the top educational 
bracket was 9.5 with a standard deviation of 5.6. The mean 
number of percentage errors for the eight Group I subjects of low 
educational status was 18.88; S3 and S8 recorded mean 
percentage perseverative error scores of 12 and eight 
respectively. The mean perseverative error score for the nine 
Group 2 subjects of low educational status was 44.1; S3 recorded a 
mean perseverative error score of 12. Thus, only the performance 
of the Group I subjects was consistent with the normative data; 
the Group 2 data was far outside the range of scores for the 
normal control group. 
(d) Verbal reports. 
Having completed the test each subject was asked what they 
thought had been going on and what he or she had been trying to 
do. The examiner made no mention of colour, form or shape, and 
number; nor was any mention made of category switching or 
changing. Table 5.6 describes which, if any, of the three categories 
the subject identified and whether the subject made any mention 
of switching or changing the category. These verbal reports serve 
to reinforce the impression created by the statistical analyses - 
that overall the ten deluded schizophrenics' performance was 
more sensitive to the task conditions than the performance of the 
non-deluded schizophrenics. 
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Table 5.6. Subjects post-experiental verbal reports. 
------------------------------------------------------ Group I Group 2 
Sl: mentioned colours, shapes 
and numbers. Changed when he 
'started getting them wrong'. 
S2: 'trying to sort out colours, 
shapes and counting'. No mention 
category change. 
SI mentioned colour, shapes 
and numbers. 'you were changing 
the pattern'. 
S4: mentioned colour and 
number. No mention of shape 
or category change. 
S5: 'When you were telling me 
I was wrong I wasn't really wrong 
but you were changing it from 
colours, shapes and numbers'. 
S6: mentioned colour, shape and 
number, and category changes. 
S7: mentioned colour and shape. 
No mention of number or of 
category changes. 
S8: mentioned switching 
different categories. 
S9: mentioned colour, shape 
and number, and category 
changes. 
S10: mentioned colour and shape. 
Mentioned change 'after so many 
of each'. 
S11: mentioned colour 
and shape. No mention of 
change or number. 
S12: colour, shape and 
number, but not change. 
S13: mentioned colour, 
shape and number, and 
changing category. 
S14: mentioned colour, 
shape and number. 'When I 
was getting to a certain stage 
you were changing them. ' 
S15: mentioned shape 
only. 
S16: 'I didn't know 
whether it went by colour 
or counting' 
S17: mentioned colour, 
shape and number, and 
order of category change. 
S18: matching on shape 
only. 
S19: mentioned number 
only. 
S20: matching on shape. 
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Discussion 
The most immediate conclusion to be drawn from the present 
study is that the subjects diagnosed as schizophrenic and showing 
delusions outperformed the non-deluded schizophrenics significantly 
on almost every measure. This difference was reflected in the clients' 
verbal reports made at the end of the test. The only exception to this 
rule was the number of trials to completion of the first category, 
where the difference fell just short of statistical significance. 
However, these results should be interpreted with caution. The 
observed differences in problem-solving performance between the 
Group I and Group 2 subjects are open to a number of different 
interpretations. If matching on level of education is a good measure 
of premorbid ability, then on the basis of the present study it would 
seem that in paranoid schizophrenics those aspects of problem- 
solving behaviour measured in the present study are preserved 
better. This conclusion is consistent with the view advanced in the 
introduction, that cognitive functioning in paranoid schizophrenics is 
preserved better than in the other subtypes of schizophrenia (e. g. 
Payne, 1968). Alternatively, it may be that years in education is not 
a good measure of premorbid ability and that the differences 
observed in the present study would, have been observed before the 
onset of the 'illness'. Another possible interpretation of these 
present findings is that the Group 2 performance scores reflected the 
presence of thought disordered subjects. However, the case notes for 
only one of the Group 2 subjects made a clear reference to thought 
disorder. A more fundamental reservation about the present study 
concerned the use of a group of undifferentiated schizophrenics. The 
major problems with the validity of the concept of schizophrenia 
discussed in Chapter II dictate that any comparison involving an 
undifferentiated group of people diagnosed as schizophrenic be 
interpreted cautiously. Indeed, the large standard deviations 
observed in the scores of the Group 2 subjects as compared with the 
Group 1 subjects lend support to the contention that undifferentiated 
groups of schizophrenics are of questionable homogeneity - although, 
conversely, the degree of homogeneity in the performances of the 
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deluded subjects offers support for the single symptom approach to 
psychosis. 
However, the real purpose of the present study was not to 
learn something of the functioning of non-deluded schizophrenics, 
but rather to learn something of the characteristic behaviour of 
people with delusions as compared with other psychiatric and 
normal individuals. In this respect the psychiatric control group was 
useful: Group 2 subjects constituted a clinical control group who did 
not showý delusional thinking. The normative data were considered 
for the same reason; to shed further light upon particular behaviours 
of people with clear delusional beliefs. In particular two aspects of 
the functioning of the deluded subjects were under scrutiny. These 
were: the ability to both form rules which were in touch with the 
environmental contingencies and to 'abandon these rules in the light 
of changing environmental conditions. The deluded subjects proved 
as able as the normal controls in discovering the particular problem- 
solving rules, and in changing these rules in response to new 
experimental conditions. This claim is based not only on the overall 
means and, standard deviations reported earlier, but also on the fact 
that the full range of normative scores was sufficiently diverse to 
incorporate all the deluded subjects. For instance, although rare, 
some normals made more than 46 perseverative responses on the 
WCST (Heaton, 1981): S7, with 50 perseverative responses, was the 
only Group 1 subject to record more than 46 perseverative 
responses. The comparability of the deluded and normal subjects' 
performance suggests that people with delusions do not have general 
deficits in those aspects of belief formation and maintenance 
measured by the WCST. In other words, it would appear that 
delusions do not result from an inability to form rules which reflect 
the environmental conditions. Equally, the maintenance of delusions 
would appear not to result from an inability to abandon rules of any 
description in the face of a changing environment. 
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In summary, the deluded subjects formed problem-solving 
rules as competently as normal subjects of comparative schooling, 
and with far more ease than a non-deluded psychiatric control group. 
The same finding applies to the ease with which the deluded subjects 
were able to abandon these rules in the light of changing 
experimental feedback. These data are in accordance with the view 
of delusional functioning as being on a continuum with normal 
behaviour: they are also consistent with the view, put forward by 
Maher, that there are common processes underlying the formation 
and maintenance of deluded and non-deluded beliefs alike. Clearly, 
the present study does not warrant the conclusion that delusions do 
not reflect an underlying cognitive deficit. However, the study does 
provide evidence against the existence of one possibile deficit, and in 
so doing it contributes to the body of empirical support for the 
continuum view. Moreover, establishing that people with delusions 
are able to form and subsequently to abandon at least some rules 
was a first step toward the subsequent examination of delusions 
themselves. If delusions prove resistant to a belief modification 
package, for example, it might be argued that this reflected a general 
unwillingness on -the part of deluded individuals to modify their 
verbal rules. Given the present findings this seems unlikely. Having 
covered for this possible objection, the stage is now set for the 
subsequent three chapters in which the measurement and 
modification of delusional beliefs is investigated. 
I. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE MEASUREMENT AND MODIFICATION OF 
DELUSIONAL BELIEFS: EXPERIMENT 2(a), AND 2(b). 
General Introduction. 
The following introduction refers back to those studies 
discussed earlier which particulary influenced 
' 
the approach 
towards the measurement and modification of delusions adopted 
in the present research. 
Although some recurrent themes have emerged from 
attempts to define a delusional belief, it has not proved possible to 
tie down the individual criteria. There is reason to suppose that 
there are common processes involved in the formation and 
maintenance of delusional and normal beliefs alike: thus, for 
example, there appears to be little out of the ordinary in "normal" 
people disregarding information at odds with their strongly held 
beliefs (Hernsley & Garety, 1986). This is consistent with the 
approach to defining and measuring delusional beliefs reported by 
Strauss (1969, discussed in Chapter 111). Strauss proposed that 
delusions should be thought of as points on a continuum with 
normal functioning, position on this continuum being determined 
by dimensions such as the client's degree of belief conviction and 
the amount of time spent preoccupied with the belief. There has 
thus been a shift of emphasis away from defining a delusion 
according to whether conviction was absolute, or the belief 
unmodifiable, etc., towards determining for a given individual the 
degree of belief conviction, the extent to which the belief is 
modifiable, and so on. Preliminary support for a multidimensional 
view of delusions was provided by Kendler et al. (1983) Further 
support came from Garety (1985), and Brett-Jones et al. (1987), 
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who pioneer6d a reliable methodology for measuring over time 
different aspects of delusional thought, and found no consistent 
pattern of change among the different dimensions (see Chapter 
III). 
- One of the first reported studies in which an attempt was 
made to modify a delusion (see Chapter 111) was a case study by 
Shapiro and Ravenette (1959). Their procedure had three aims: 
(i) to show the palpable falseness of the belief through guided 
discussion; (ii) to demonstrate that holding the belief was a sign of 
illness; and (iii) to show how people might come to have such an 
illness. Watts et al. (1973) argued that a very real danger with 
any belief modification package would be what Brehm (1966) 
called 'psychological reactance', where too direct an approach 
might serve simply to reinforce the belief: a subsequent study by 
Milton et al. (1978) offered empirical support for this contention. 
Watts et al. drew up four guiding principles designed to keep 
reactance to a minimum. They recommended: firstly, that the 
modification begin with those beliefs which are the least strongly 
held; secondly, that clients be asked only to consider an 
alternative to their belief, rather than being specifically requested 
to adopt the alternative; thirdly, that the evidence for the belief 
be challenged, as opposed to the belief itself; and, finally, that the 
client be encouraged to voice the arguments against his or her 
belief. Applying these guidelines, Watts et al. were able to report 
a substantial reduction in belief conviction in each of their three 
subjects. % 
One shortcoming common in the modification literature'is a 
lack of 'baseline' data. Even if the belief to be modified has been 
present for a number of years, baseline data are still required 
because it is important to establish prior to any intervention how 
the delusional thinking and other relevant behavioural indices 
vary over time. Only then can changes following an intervention 
be weighed against any previous baseline variability. Multiple- 
baseline methodology (Kazdin, 1982) is therefore appropriate for 
research of this kind, and was employed in the present 
experiments. Another feature of previous studies is that 
interventions have not always been systematically evaluated; 
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often a number of diverse and undifferentiated techniques have 
been employed. By way of component analysis, the present 
studies employed a clearly specified structured verbal challenge. 
Assessment of the maintenance of behaviour change following the 
41. 
introduction of an intervention, an issue which again has all too 
often been neglected, was addressed in the present study by 
conducting follow-up meetings after one month, three months and 
six months. 
In accordance with the continuum view of delusions, and in 
deference to the growing dissatisfaction with the concept of 
schizophrenia (see Bentall et al., 1988, discussed in Chapter II), a 
feature of the present research was that clients were not told that 
their belief was a sign of illness. Rather, the beliefs were 
interpreted as having developed in reaction to, and as a way of 
making sense of, specific experiences the clients had encountered. 
As in all the modification studies reviewed, degree of belief 
conviction was used as the major measure of recovery from 
delusional thinking. However, in keeping with a multidimensional 
view of delusions, several secondary measures of change were 
also included. 
Two single case studies are reported in the present chapter, 
each of which employed a multiple-baseline design across three 
delusional beliefs - that is, each client held three delusions which 
were challenged separately. In each study the intervention was 
introduced to the three beliefs at four week intervals following a 
minimum of five weeks of baseline. The two experiments 
reported in the present chapter thus provide a detailed picture of 
the nature of delusional thinking before, during and after an 
intervention designed to modify the beliefs. 
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General Method 
Procedure* 
Sessions lasting approximately one hour each were 
conducted once a week throughout the study. All the arguments 
put forward when challenging the beliefs were constructed solely 
by the author. , 
Phase 1. Preliminary Interviewing 
Two interviews were conducted with each client and these 
served the dual function of defining the belief to be modified and 
of establishing rapport. 
Phase 2: Baseline. 
Throughout this phase as much relevant data as possible on 
the nature of the belief was collected, with special interest being 
paid to the evidence, both past and presentý which had helped ýto 
establish and maintain the belief. During the final baseline 
session clients were presented with each piece of evidence they 
had cited for their beliefs and asked to rank them in order of 
importance to the belief system. At no point during the baseline 
phase was the client's belief or reasoning challenged in any, -way. 
Phase 3: Verbal challenge. 
Throughout the ýinterventlr%. - 0 1- . the client was encouraged to 
view a deluded belief as being, only one possible interpretation of" 
events. The clients were not told that their interpretation was 
wrong, but simply that there, was an alternative and they were 
asked to consider critically the two accounts. Initially, following 
Watts et al. (1973), the evidence for the belief was challenged in 
inverse order of importance. In each case the researcher argued 
for a non-deluded interpretation of events against the client's 
delusional explanation. An integral part of this discussion involved 
making clear to the client the way beliefs can exert a strong 
influence over the interpretations placed on events - that is, the 
client was made aware of the regulatory function of Janguage. 
A manual providing a fuller description of the modification 
procedure is available from the Department of Psychology, 
Universiý College of North Wales, Bangor. 
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Once- all the evidence had been dealt with, the discussion 
was moved on to challenge the belief itself. Again, the stance,, was 
non-confrontational. Challenging the belief was carried out in 
three stages, although in practice they overlapped. First, any. 
inconsistency and irrationality within the client's belief system 
was pointed out; this was tantamount to posing the, question 
"Would it make sense for things to be as you say they are? " This 
done, it was then shown that there was a viable alternative 
explanation for what had been happening to the client, namely, 
that the belief had come about in response to a particular set of 
events the client had experienced. Finally, it was argued that the 
researcher's account was the better explanation of the client's 
experiences. 
Phase 4: Follow-Up. 
To assess for maintenance of behaviour change, I -month, 3 
month and 6 month follow-up meetings were conducted. At these 
sessions all the measures were administered (with the exception 
of RTHQ in the order and manner described earlier. 
Measures. 
Following Brett-Jones et al. degree of, belief, conviction and 
degree of belief preoccupation were measured using a 
modification of Shapiro's (1961) Personal Questionnaire (PQ) 
technique, described by Phillips (1977)- as the Ordinal, Personal - 
Questionnaire (see Chapter III). This technique was also employed 
to measure the degree of anxiety experienced by thesubject 
whilst thinking about his or her belief. The PQ is-a means of 
measuring changes in. symptom intensity specific to an individual 
subject and, in its modified form, was first-employed to measure 
delusions by Garety (1985). A PQ comprises a construction stage 
and an administration stage. Construction entails coming to an 
agreement with the client as to the wording for the expression of 
differing levels of symptom intensity. In the present research, 
each client was offered five statements of intensity of belief 
conviction, preoccupation and anxiety, respectively, and in each 
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case . the client accepted these statements as valid 
descriptions. 
Table 5.1 details the specific wording used for each client and 
shows that, whilst the conviction measure was concerned with 
how certain the client was feeling at that particular point in time, 
41 the preoccupation and anxiety statements referred 
to the level of 
symptom intensity experienced over the preceding week. The 
five statements for each measure were written on separate pieces 
of card and ranked by the client. At the administration stage each 
card was presented randomly, and the client was required to say 
whether the intensity was more or less than was stated on the 
card. For instance, in the case of belief conviction, when faced 
with the card 'Almost definitely true', the client was required to 
say whether his or her degree of belief certainty was more (i. e. he 
or she was definitely sure of the belief) or less (i. e. he or she felt 
less than almost certain of the belief). The score on each occasion 
was provided by the number of cards to which the client replied 
that the symptom intensity was greater than that stated on the 
card. The resulting six point ordinal scale allowed for comparisons 
to be made for each subject across time. 
Following Hole et al. (1979), degree of conviction was also 
measured by asking. for a percentage rating of conviction, and this 
was taken after the conviction score. Both measures of belief 
conviction, and the PQ measures of preoccupation and anxiety 
were administered at the close of every session throughout the 
entire study. 
Again, in keeping with Brett-Jones et al., accommodation and 
reaction to hypothetical contradiction (RTHC) were assessed. The 
accommodation measure was concerned with the awareness that 
the client demonstrated of actual occurrences that were 
contradictory to his or her belief, and how these had affected the 
belief. Accommodation was measured at the start of every session 
by asking the client whether anything had happened over the 
past week to alter his or her belief in any way. RTHC was 
measured following accommodation at weeks two and four of 
baseline to evaluate the client's potential for accommodation of 
evidence at odds with his or her belief. A plausible but 
contradictory occurrence was posed to the client and he or she 
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was asked how, if at all, this would change the belief. Examples, of 
accommodation and RTHC are given in Table 5.1. 
0 
I. 
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Table 5.1. Examples of the different measures and when 
they were administered. 
Accommodation. Administered at the start -of every,, session 
throughout the study: e. g. 'Has anything happened over the last 
week to alter your belief that you can communicate with people in 
the past and change the course of historyT I 
Reaction to hypothetical contradiction (RTHC) ,- 
Following accommodation at week 2 and 4 of baseline: e. g. 'Would 
it alter your belief, in, any way if you were given the chance to try 
to change history and it, did not work? ' 
Beck Depression Inventory (B. D. T. ) & Symptom 
Checklist. Administered -prior to the PQ measures at the final' 
baseline session, the final intervention session, and at each follow- 
up. I 
PQ Measure of Conviction, Preoccupation and Anxiety. 
Administered at the close 'of every session throughout the study. 
Conviction Preoccupation- A nxiety 
0 1 My belief is Over the last week Thinking about 
' almost definitely I thought about my belief I get very 
false belief once slightly anxious 
... probably false 
3 times ... slightly anxious 
2 
... May or may ... Once a day ... fairly anxious 
not be true 
3 
... probably true ... 
4 times a day ... very anxious 
4 
... Almost definitely .... 
Once an hour ... extremely 
true anxious 
5 
N. B. PQ scores fall between two verbal descriptions; one might 
respond -more to probably true but less to almost definitely true. 
Percentage Conviction. Following the PQ conviction measure, 
clients were asked to give their degree of belief conviction in 
percentage terms. 
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Given that little is known about the potential effects on 
other behaviour of the loss, or partial loss, of a delusion, it seemed 
desirable to cover at least some of the possible clinical -, 
ramifications. This was done in two ways. First, the Beck 
Depression Inventory (BDI) was administered (Beck, 1967). Also, 
selected items from Wing's Present State Examination (Wing, 
Cooper & Sartorius 1974) were combined to form a short 
Symptom Checklist, which covered the various forms of - 
schizophrenic delusions and hallucinations. The Symptom 
Checklist is shown in Table 5.2. It should be 'emphasised that the 
Symptom Checklist was not employed in any diagnostic capacity, 
but solely for descriptive purposes. The symptom checklist was 
conceived as an additional measure of change, with the emphasis 
placed on whether responses to particular questions changed over 
the course of the study. For all subjects the BDI and Symptom 
Checklist were administered at the final baseline session (i. e. the 
final session prior to the introduction of the intervention), the 
final session of the intervention phase, and at each follow-up. In 
Experiments 2(a) and 2(b), where three beliefs were challenged 
per client,. these measures were administered prior., to the 
introduction of the intervention to each of the three beliefs 
challenged. Thus, in these two studies, the BDI and Symptom 
Checklist were also given at weeks 9 and 14. 
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Table 5.2. The symptom Checklist 
1. Can you think quite clearly or is there any interference with 
your thoughts? Can people read your mind? Is anything like 
telepathy going on? yes/no Specify: 
2. Do you ever hear noises or voices when there is no one about 
and nothing else to explain it? Does it sound like muttering or 
whispering? Can you make out the words? yes/no Specify: 
3. Have you ever had visions or seen things which other people 
couldn't see? yes/no Specify: 
4. Do you sometimes notice strange smells which other people 
don't notice? yes/no Specify: 
5. Do you feel under the control of some force or power other 
than yourself? yes/no .' Specify: 
6. Is anyone deliberately trying to harm you? Is there any other 
kind of persecution? yes/no Specify: 
7. Do you have any special abilities or powers? yes/no Specify. 
8. Are you a very prominent person? yes/no Specify. ' 
9. Are you a very religous person? Are you specially close to 
Christ or God? Can God communicate with you? yes/no Specify: 
10. Have you had any unusual experience or adventures 
recently? yes/no Specify: 
11. Do you think your appearance is normal? yes/no Specify. 
12. Have you ever felt that something was the matter with your 
head or with your brain? yes/no Specify: 
13. Do you feel that you have committed a crime, or sinned 
greatly or deserve to be punished? Have you felt that your 
presence may contaminate or ruin other people? yes/no 
Specify: 
14. Do you have any reason to be jealous of anybody? yes/no 
Specify: 
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EXPERIMENT 2(a) 
Unless stated otherwise, all details are as for the general 
method. 
Subject , BP : -date 
of birth 4-4-58. 
In 1982 PB withdrew markedly from friends and family and 
displayed grossly deluded ideation. This led to his being admitted 
to hospital in 1983, where after what the case notes describe as 
'long and careful consideration' he was given the diagnosis of 
paranoid schizophrenia (DSM III). At this time BP presented with 
delusions of thought insertion, thought broadcasting, reference, 
grandeur 'and influence. There had been three subsequent 
admissions, the last being some eight months prior to the onset of 
the current study. At the time of the study BP was single and 
unemployed and had been on a stable drug regime for the past six 
months. 'BP reported three distinct delusional beliefs, which he 
stated having held for between two and four years (in the case of 
each belief the case notes supported this claim). These beliefs 
were: 
Belief 1. That a girl called Amanda,, whom - BP had not been 
in contact with for many years, was reading his mind and 
influencing his life by controlling some of the things that 
happened to him. 
BP believed that Amanda was doing these things because she and. 
BP were to be married 'when the time was right', until when it 
was her task 'to ensure that he did not forget her. Thus, BP 
believed that Amanda sent him constant reminders. For 'example, 
BP reported experiencing a pulsating feeling in his temple , 
frequently, ý which he took to be caused by Amanda reading his 
mind. On these occasions, as well as the pulsating BP often 
experienced the smell of 'a 'female scent', which he believed to be 
Amanda's: BP took this to be Amanda's way of letting him know 
that it was "she who was reading his thoughts and thinking of him. 
Another typical reminder occurred at a time when BP was 
developing an interest in another woman. BP chanced to buy a 
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record which contained a song entitled,. 'Amanda' - BP interpreted 
this coinicidence to be evidence that Amanda was aware of his 
new-found interest and was reminding him that he was meant for 
her. BP reported forming his belief about Amanda in 1983 
following his discharge from hospital. He stated having held a 
similar belief once before about a different girl: however, he felt 
that this girl had caused his breakdown and had not been the 
right one for him. 
Belief 2. That he had been Jesus Christ in a prior life. 
This belief was the most recent of the three, being formed when 
BP was in hospital over the Easter weekend in 1985. At this time 
BP reported becoming aware of similarities between his life and 
the life of Jesus. For instance, he felt that he too was being 
crucified, and that both he and Jesus were having their minds 
read by millions of people. Another parallel concerned BPs belief 
that Jesus was a schizophrenic. This notion stemmed from BP's 
observation that Jesus' claims to having performed miracles were 
akin to the claims made commonly by 'schizophrenics'. . BP 
reported that since 1985 there had been numerous occurrences 
which had reinforced his belief. A typical example took place at a 
church service BP attended, where-the at the end of his sermon 
the vicar said that he had sensed the presence of Jesus in the 
church. 
Belief 3. That BP had been Leonardo de Vinci in a prior 
I ife. % 
BP reported forming this belief -in 1983. Evidence'for the'belief 
was varied. On the one hand BP believed that information from 
Leonardo, 's mind was seeping through into his own consciousness. 
Thus, for example, he (i) had pictures of designs for helicopters, 
rockets and submarines imprinted on his mind, and (ii) claimed to 
be privee to secret knowledge about Leonardo, such as his having 
invented an elixir of life. On the other hand, BP claimed that both 
he and Leonardo had experienced phases of creative genius, 
during which they had determined the course of history for the 
coming thousand years. BP believed that Leonardo had been able 
to see into the future and that this explained how Leonardo was 
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able to draw designs for things, such as helicoptors, that had yet 
to be built. BP believed that Leonardo and the Mona Lisa had 
looked into the future and seen BP in his own phase of creativity 
and that this explained the infamous smile. 
Procedure 
In order to clarify the nature of the first stage of the verbal 
challenge, there follows a description of the alternative 
interpretation the experimenter put forward to account for the 
piece of evidence BP rated as most important to his belief that he 
had been Leonardo in a prior life. This evidence was that BP had 
pictures of Leonardo's designs for helicopters and space ships 
imprinted on his mind. BP interpreted this in the following way. 
He believed that all the experiences people had in their prior lives 
were retained in, what he called their 'subconscious'. BP believed, 
therefore, that. Leonardo's designs had been present in his own 
subconscious, from where they had filtered through to imprint 
themselves on his conscious mind. As such, BP took, the designs to 
be conclusive proof that he had been Leonardo in a prior life., 
Without being requested to do so, BP drew these designs. 'The 
counter argument put forward by the experimenter. was based on 
BP's drawings. First,, the experimenter pointed out that whereas 
BP's drawing of a helicoptor included a contemporary rotary , 
propellor, Leonardo's sketches showed an entirely different screw 
shaped propellor, ýdemonstrating clearly that BP's drawings were 
not Leonardo's. Second, the nature of -Leonardo's screw shaped 
propellor, which was far less efficient that the modern rotory 
type, showed clearly that Leonardo had not been able to see into 
the future. I 
A second piece of evidence, this time for BP's Amanda belief, 
is reported in order to illustrate how the experimenter made clear 
to BP the way in which beliefs could influence subsequent 
behaviour. BP reported one occasion when a dishevelled, scruffy 
looking girl came up to him at a bus stop and asked him for some 
money. Although at the time BP di&not recognize the girl,, he later 
'realized' that the girl had in fact been Amanda who had planned 
the meeting in order to remind him that-she was still waiting for 
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The experimenter 'described to BP the way in which beliefs him. 
led people to interpret events in - particular ways, and suggested 
that BP's core belief 'about Amanda had led him, to' interpret the 
encounter as he did. The experimenter emphasised that there was 
nothing in the situation itself to justify BP's interpretation. 
, Having discussed the evidence for each belief, the second 
stage of the verbal challenge involved challenging the belief itself. 
Details follow of the, verbal challenge put forward to combat BPs 
belief that he was Jesus in a prior life. (When discussing BP's 
beliefs that he had been both Jesus and Leonardo the 
experimenter stressed that it was not BP's belief in reincarnation 
per se which was under scrutiny, but his conviction that he knew 
who he had been in his prior lives. ) . 
Two examples are given of inconsistency and irrationality 
inherent within BP's belief that he had been Jesus in a prior life. 
First, BP argued that whiIst in hospital over the Easter period he 
felt that he was having his mind read by 'millions of people' and 
he claimed that a similar thing had been experienced by Jesus. In 
Support of his claim BP pointed to Jesus' foreknowledge of both 
his subsequent betrayal by Judas and his being denied three 
times by Peter. The experimenter pointed out to BP that, if 
anything, these instances suggested that far from having his own 
mind read by others Jesus was in fact reading the minds of others, 
or at the least was foretelling the future: they certainly did not 
suggest that lie was having his mind read by 'millions of people'. 66 A second instance of irTationaility concerned BP's belief that Jesus 
was a schizophrenic. BP's contention was that Jesus' claims to have 
performed miracles were akin to the-claims made by those 
schizophrenics BP had come. across in hospital. The experimenter 
argued, however, that a key element in the New Testament 
miracle, stories was that there were witnesses. As such,. the 
biblical miracle Stories differed qualitatively from an unsupported 
claim to have performed similar., deeds. 
The essential feature of the alternative interpretation put 
forward by the experimenter, to account for BP's 'Jesus' belief, was 
that the belief arose in response to and as a way of making sense 
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of BP's experiences leading up to and- during ýhis stay in hospital 
over the Easter weekend -in 1985. BP, described these experiences, 
which included feeling that his 'head was on fire', as 'like being 
crucified'. The experimenter, suggested that the experience of 
being crucified, together with the other similarities BP observed 
between his own, life and the life of Jesus, led BP to form his belief 
that he had -been Jesus. In support W this alternative 
interpretation 6f -BP's belief, the experimenter drew attention to 
particular manipulations BP made to his Jesus belief in order for it 
to be compatible, with his other beliefs. For example, initially BP 
stated -that Jesus developed schizophrenia because his 'mind 
became tired; BP believed that Jesus lost his mind completely by 
the time of his crucifiction. BP used the notion of minds becoming 
tired to explain why he himself was a 'schizophrenic' - that is, 
because he and Jesus were one and the same person. In effect, BP 
argued that he was born with a tired mind and that this explained 
his subsequent breakdowns. However, this presented BP with 
something of a dilemma because he did not believe that Leonardo 
had a tired mind; on the contrary, BP believed that Leonardo had 
a great mind. Therefore, BP changed his position. Having stated 
that minds became tired over time, BP introduced the idea that 
they could also recover over time. Hence, he argued, the mind 
recovered in between the lives of Jesus and Leonardo, and 
subsequently tired again in between the lives of Leonardo and BP. 
(This particular argument was put forward by the experimenter 
on the basis of comments made by BP during the baseline phase: 
clearly BP himself, did not report hisýchange in opinion in these 
terms. ) 
The experimenter suggested that in allowing BP to make 
sense of his experiences in hospital over the Easter weekend, BP's 
belief could be seen as functional. Furthermore, the experimenter 
suggested that the belief might also be seen as functional in that it 
explained why BP was 'schizophrenic'. BP reported that when first 
admitted to hospital although he was told that he was a 
schizophrenic, no attempt was made to explain to him what this 
meant. It should be emphasised that the experimenter did not tell 
BP that he was a schizophrenic; rather the experimenter suggested 
that BP's need to understand why he was a schizophrenic may 
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have contributed to his forming the belief that he had been Jesus. 
The experimenter raised this possibility with BP by observing that 
his belief that, he had been Leonardo pre-dated his belief that he 
had been Jesus by some two years, and by asking the question of 
what the latter reincarnation belief added. In answer to this 
question the experimenter suggested that, ý among other things, ý the 
Jesus belief offered BP a way of understanding why, he was "ill'; 
neither BP's Leonardo belief nor his Amanda belief addressed this 
issue. Thus, the experimenter argued that BP's, belief that he been 
Jesus could be seen as both a reaction to and a way of making 
sense of his experiences over the Easter weekend of 1985.1 , 
In support of the alternative explanation the experimenter 
pointed out that the notion of Jesus having returned at least twice 
went against traditional Christian teaching. The idea of the Second 
Coming was a key one in Christian thought and was at odds with 
BP's belief that Jesus already, had returned at least twice. 
Moreover, the experimenter suggested that BP's belief that in one 
of these subsequent lives Jesus had designed, submarines, guns 
and rockets, might also raise a few Christian eyebrows. The 
experimenter also questioned why BP should remember a good 
deal about his life as Leonardo and yet nothing about his life as 
Jesus. The experimenter reminded BP of his report of having, in 
1983, met and believed a man in hospital who claimed to be Jesus. 
Phase 5: Independent Assessment. 
. After the final Jollow-up, an independent clinical 
psychologist interviewed BP to assess his degree conviction in 
each of his delusional beliefs at that point in time and to obtain 
his observations on the study. 
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Results 
(a) Delusional Dimensions. 
IF Degree of 
belief conviction was the major measure of 
recovery from delusional thnking. Figure 5.1 shows BP's degree, of 
percentage belief conviction in his three, beliefs during each phase 
of the study. Percentage belief conviction and PQ conviction score 
correlated very closely (a Pearson's r of . 98) so the PQ score is not 
presented separately. Belief conviction in all three beliefs was 
very stable during the first five weeks of the study. At week 6 the 
verbal challenge was introduced in the case of BP'S first belief 
('Amanda'); there was an instant drop, in -degree of conviction in 
belief I to only 50% certainty. Over the next three sessions of 
verbal challenge conviction in Belief I fell further to only 10% 
sure. Degree of conviction in Belief 2 ('Jesus) and belief 31 
('Leonardo') remained at the baseline level of 100% until week 10 
of the study, when belief 2 was challenged. Following two sessions 
of verbal challenge with Belief 1, BP reported having . reality- 
tested' his belief about Amanda. He once told one of his friends 
about his belief that Amanda was reading his mind, and 
influencing his life, and the friend had 'seemed to understand'. BP 
interpreted his friend's understanding as further evidence, that 
the belief was true. Duing the verbal challenge BP asked the 
friend, whom he saw frequently, whether in fact he had 
understood and believed what BP told him. The friend said that he 
remembered the conversaton well but had neither fully 
understood nor believed what BP had said. ' Discussion of belief I 
was continued throughout the intervention phase; this 'belief was 
rejected totally at weeks 12,13,15,16,17,18 and 20. 
At week 10 the verbal challenge was introduced in the case 
of the second belief, producing an immediate fall in conviction to 
only 70% certain and prompting BP to say 'I do feel a bit 
separated from the fact that I was Jesus'. There was no change in 
conviction in Belief 3. However, at week 11, conviction in Belief 3 
fell to 80% certain and conviction in Belief 2 rose slightly, also to 
80% certain. At the next session conviction in Belief 2 fell again, to 
only 50% certain; conviction in Belief 3 rose slightly to 90%. At 
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week 13, the. fourth at which Belief 2 was challenged, Belief 2 was 
41 rejected totally. Of his belief that he had been Jesus, BP said 'I 
was believing things that I'd wanted to believe and not things that 
were true. BP also displayed an insight into the interpretation of 
his belief as an explanation for his experiences in hospital over 
Easter, saying 'I was ill and I was looking for a reason why I was 
ill ... I was just thinking, if I'd been ill over Christmas I'd probably 
have believed I was Santa Claus'. At week 13 there was also a 
substantial drop in degree of conviction in belief 3, to 65% 
certainty: at this session BP stated 'before I thought if we went 
into this too deep I'd stop believing in reincarnation -I still 
believe in it, but just not so much who I was'. Because of this 
apparent generalization effect the introduction of the intervention 
to belief 3 was delayed to determine whether the fall in degree of 
conviction in belief 3 -would -continue. This caution was justified 
fully; at session 14 conviction in belief 2 remained at 0% (i. e. the 
belief was definitely false) and conviction in belief 3 fell to only 
10%. BP stated at week 14 '1 feel a lot better ... I feel I'm making a 
lot more sense, a lot more rational'. Time constraints meant that 
the intervention could not be delayed any longer, so the verbal 
challenge was introduced in the case of Belief 3 at week 15. By the 
close of week 15 Belief 3 was rejected completely - indeed this 
was true of all three beliefs. BP's degree of belief conviction in 
each belief remained at 0% for the remaining four sessions of the 
verbal challenge phase. 
Over these concluding four sessions there was much % 
evidence to suggest that BP was taking an active part in regulating 
his thinking. For instance, at week 20 BP said of the pulsating 
sensation in his head; 'when it happens mind reading is the first 
thing I think - then I think "Don't think such stupid things" '. At 
the penultimate session of the intervention phase BP reported 'I 
feel absolutely great, like I felt before my illness': he reported 
similar feelings at the concluding session also. 
0 
Figure 5.1. 
BP's percentage, degree of belief', conviction in each of his three 
beliefs during each phase of the study: B (baseline), VC (verbal 
challenge) and FU (follow-up). 
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Degree of belief conviction in Beliefs 2 and 3 remained at 0% 
at each of the follow-up meetings. However, at the one month 
follow-up conviction in Belief I returned to the baseline level of 
100% (i. e. the belief was definitely, true). In fact the, Amanda 
belief came back as part of a larger belief system which had 
developed over the previous month. , 
This was: first, that he and 
Amanda had not married because his brother had discovered 
their relationship and had 'screwed things up', and second, that he 
was now intended for a famous sportswoman, not Amanda. In - 
1983 BP held a similar persecutory delusion regarding his family, 
when his brother and father were held responsible for the failure 
of an earlier relationship. At the one month follow-up BP stated 
that the reason he was not married was because in the past his 
brother had always had the upper hand and had therefore been 
able to mess things up; BP also held his brother responsible for his 
breakdowns. Whilst BP's belief that in the past Amanda had, read 
his mind and influenced his life remained intact, he no longer 
believed that he and Amanda were meant for one another. Rather, 
BP stated that he was meant for the sportswoman and it was she 
who was reading his mind and influencing his life currently. BP 
believed that he and the sportswoman had met once to make their 
betrdhals, but in order to prevent BP's brother from discovering 
this and interfering it had been 'fixed' so that BP would remember 
nothing of the meeting and betrothal. Indeed, he only 
'remembered' the meeting and what had been said when he saw 
her on television two weeks before the I month follow-up and 
everything came 'flooding back'. This explained why he had 
known nothing at all of the sportswoman before. BP said of his 
new belief: 'That's the truth, that's reality, I've come to my senses 
now', and of his brother 'It'll just eat his guts out when he finds 
out who she is. BP was certain that the sportswoman would come 
for him soon and take him away. 
At the three month follow-up BP expressed his 
disappointment that the sportswoman had not come to him. 
However, he said he now realized she had 'done the right thing' by 
staying away a little longer to train for the Olympics. As had been 
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the case with Amanda, BP was now getting the sportswoman's 
scent when he experienced the pulsating in his head. He was still 
certain that in the past Amanda had read his mind and influenced 
his life, although as at the one month follow-up he stated that no 
longer believed that they were meant for one another. However, 
by the six month follow-up BP reported having rejected 
completely his belief about the sportswoman; he was also only 
50% certain of his belief about Amanda. BP reported having 
challenged these beliefs in the same way as his beliefs had been 
challenged during the intervention. Unfortunately, he seemed 
quite depressed, saying 'I can't do bugger all for myself, and then 
I start blaming other people for it. 
(b) Secondary measures of change. 
Personal Questionnaire Measures. The PQ SCores-f6r the 
degree of preoccupation with the beliefs and the amount of 
anxiety experienced at such times are both shown in Figure 5.2. 
As is shown, there was no consistent relationship between these 
two PQ measures across the three beliefs. For example, alth ough 
in the case of the 'Amanda' belief' baseline preoccupation scores 
were stable and anxiety scores varied, in the case of the two 
reincarnation beliefs it was anxiety which was stable and 
preoccupation which varied. 
6. 
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Figure 5.2. 
Preoccupation and anxiety scores for- each of BP's three beliefs 
during the three phases of the study: B (baseline), VC (verbal 
challenge) and FU (follow-up). 
Note. Because both measures are retrospective, applying to 
behaviour in the week prior to when the measure was taken (see 
text), the shading to mark the introduction of the intervention 
appears one week later than in Figure 5.1. 
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While Figures I and 2 provide a detailed picture of changes 
in the three PQ measures throughout the study, Table 5.3 shows 
the results of an analysis of covariation between the PQ measures 
of conviction, anxiety and preoccupation. Five separate 
correlations were calculated. First, the degree of covariation 
between the three PQ measures was calculated for each of BPs 
beliefs separately, to determine whether the relationship was 
dependent on the belief. Pearson's correlation coefficients were 
calculated. Second, two correlational analyses were conducted on 
scores from all three beliefs. The degree of covariance was 
calculated between the three PQ measures for the baseline 
sessions only, and finally the covariance between all PQ scores 
was calculated. In the cases of the last two analyses, partial 
correlations were calculated. When calculating the 'covariation 
between any two of the three PQ scores the correlation may be 
affected by the third PQ measure. Thus, for example, the 
correlation between conviction and anxiety may be influenced by 
the correlations between conviction and preoccupation and 
anxiety and preoccupation. Partial correlations establish the 
correlation coefficient between any two PQ scores while 
controlling for the third. (Partial correlations were not calculated 
for the belief-by-belief analyses because of the lack of variation 
in anxiety scores in the cases of Beliefs 2 and 3. ). 
"1 
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Table 5.3. Analyses of covariance scores between the three 
PQ measures: for each belief individually (Pearson's r) and 
for baseline scores and all scores (partial correlations). 
Conviction & Conviction Preoccupation 
Preoccupation & Anxiety & Anxiety 
Belief 1 . 731** . 197 . 069 
Belief 2 . 204 aa 
Belief 3 . 385 aa 
Baseline -. 02 -. 26 . 288 
All data . 307* . 034 . 275* 
P<05 
** P<01 
a indicates that a correlation could not be calculated because there 
was no variation on one of the measures. 
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There was a highly significant correlation between 
conviction and preoccupation scores for belief 1, which was solely 
responsible for the significant overall relationship between these 
two measures. The significant correlation between all 
preoccupation and anxiety scores is rendered highly dubious by 
the complete lack of variation in anxiety scores for beliefs 2 and 3. 
In the case of the scores on baseline sessions there was no 
significant correlation, suggesting that the significant correlations 
observed when all data points were considered were due to the 
intervention. However, when drawing any conclusions about 
these results, it must be remembered that Belief 2 and 3 appeared 
to be dependent (see Figure 5.1). This is particularly relevant to 
the 'baseline only' correlations, because by the close of the 
baseline phase in the case of Belief 3, conviction had fallen to only 
10% certainty. 
Beck Depression Inventory. The first clinical measure, the 
BDI, was included to assess whether the loss or partial loss of a 
strongly held long-term belief would have a detrimental effect on 
the client. The BDI was administered seven times: the week before 
the verbal challenge was introduced in the case of each of the 
three beliefs (i. e. at weeks 5,9 and 15), at the close of the 
intervention (week 20) and at each of the follow-up meetings. 
According to the severity of the symptom each item on the BDI is 
scored 0,1,2 or 3. A score of 18-24 constitutes mild depression, 
25-29 moderate depression and 30 and above severe depression. 
As is shown in Table 5.4, there was a steady downward 
trend in BDI scores over the course of the intervention phase. This 
trend suggests that the loss of the three delusions had a general 
beneficial impact on BP. Although at the one and three month 
follow-up meetings the Amanda belief had returned and there 
was some persecutory ideation the BDI scores remained low: this 
may well reflect BP's great sense of optimism concerning his 
future with the famous sportswoman. This would also explain why 
the BDI score rose very sharply at the six month follow-up 
meeting, by when BP had rejected his belief about the 
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sportswoman entirely and was becoming far less sure of the 
Amanda belief again. 
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Table 5.4. Beck Depression Inventory Scores at weeks 4, 
9,15 and 20 and at the I month, 3 month and 6 month, 
follow-ups. 
WEEK MONTH 
49 15 20 136 
13 445,2 6 24 
4. 
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Symptom, Checklist. The Symptom Checklist was included to 
assess whether the loss or partial loss of one delusional belief led 
to the formation of another. In the present study BP did report a 
new belief following the loss of his three beliefs. The fact that the 
new belief shared many common features with the Amanda belief 
makes it*a'reasonable assumption that it was the loss of the 
Amanda belief in'particular which led to the sportswoman belief. 
Accommodation. In response to the accommodation 
measure at no point did BP report an experience of 
disconfirmation for a beliefwhich had not already been subjected 
to the verbal challenge. Thus, for example, it was not until week 
nine of the'study that BP reported an experience which he 
interpreted as, contradicting his belief about Amanda. He had 
been expecting to see Amanda on television on a specific day and 
her non-appearance was interpreted as evidence that the belief 
was false. Also, as was stated earlier, at week eight BP reported 
having 'reality-testing' his Amanda belief. At week 17 of the 
study BP also reported an experience of disconfirmation 
concerning his belief about having been Jesus. He actually 
remembered that he had been born on Good Friday and that he 
been very conscious of this whilst in hospital when he formed the 
Jesus belief. He took this to be another factor which may have 
been bubbling under in his mind and have contributed to his 
forming the belief that he had been Jesus in a prior life. 
Reaction to hypothetical contradiction. RTHC, the second 4 
measure of susceptibility of change, was measured at week 2 and 
4 of the study. RTHC was only performed for the first of BP's 
beliefs. BP was asked how if at all his belief about Amanda would 
be affected if he met her and she said that none of it was true. On 
'both occasions BP stated that such an occurrence would lead him 
to reject the idea that he and Amanda were meant for one 
another, and to doubt that she had ever read his mind or 
influenced his life. 
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(c) External Validation. 
BP was interviewed shortly after the final follow-up 
meeting by an independent clinical psychologist, to assess the 
degree of belief conviction in each of the three delusions and to 
gain his comments on the study. BP confirmed that the 
intervention had led him to reject his beliefs, adding 'I was able to 
sort things out ... I was clearer in my mind'. At the time of the 
independent assessment he was still untroubled by any thoughts 
of being either Jesus or Leonardo. He reported that his Amanda 
belief had started to bother him again soon after the close of the 
intervention. However, he was very positive about the long-term 
usefulness of the intervention: although the ideas about Amanda 
were still present he reported coping better with them again by 
employing arguments and techniques employed during the 
intervention. He reported that this process was ongoing'and that 
he was able to control his thinking when the beliefs troubled him 
most. When asked to rate the extent of his present conviction in 
these beliefs, BP reported 30%. 
S. 
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Discussion 
In the present experiment three delusional beliefs which 
had been held for between two to five years were challenged over 
between six and 14 sessions. Each belief was rejected totally over 
the closing four sessions of the intervention phase. In two out of 
three. cases maintenance was good; however, at the first follow ' -up 
meeting conviction returned to the baseline rate for one of the 
beliefs. 
I 
Although the I challenge put forward against the Amanda 
belief had no effect upon either of the two reincarnation beliefs, 
there appeared to be a generalization effect between these latter 
two beliefs. By the time the delayed verbal challenge was 
introduced in the case of the Leonardo belief conviction had fallen 
to only 10% certainty. On one level this generalization was to be 
expected; both Belief 2 and Belief 3 concerned the person BP 
claimed to have been in 'a prior lifetime. However, there was ''good 
reason for viewing the two beliefs as independent. First, the two 
beliefs were formed at corýpletely different points in time. 
Second, they shared no common evidence. Third, the two beliefs 
may have differed functionally; BP's belief that he had been Jesus 
in a prior life might have been formed in order to explain why he 
was a 'schizophrenic'. Fourth, when challenging BP's Jesus belief it 
was made explicit that the possibility of reincarnation per se was 
not in question; rather what was being discussed was BP's claim to 
know that he had been Jesus. Indeed, in support of the decision t6 
treat the two beliefs separately, the observed generalization effect 
was neither immediate nor consistent. At the close of the first 
session at which the Jesus belief was challenged (week 10), 
although BP's degree of conviction that he had been Jesus fell his 
conviction that he had been Leonardo remained unchanged. At 
the subsequent session (week 11) conviction in each belief was 
scored, at 80%; . 
however, at the close of week 12 BPs conviction 
that he had been Jesus fell to only 50% and his conviction that he 
had been Leonardo rose to 95% certainty. Only at weeks 13 and 
14, when BP rejected entirely his belief that he had been Jesus in 
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a prior life, was there a strong and clear generalization effect to 
his belief that he had been Leonardo. 
In the cases of the two reincarnation beliefs maintenance 
was good. However, in the case of the-Amanda belief at the one 
and three month follow-up meetings degree of conviction was 
once again scored at 100% certainty. In fact the Amanda belief 
came back in an encapsulated form as part of'a new belief system. 
That is, although BP reported' being absolutely certain that 
Amanda had read his mind and influenced his life in the past, he 
no longer believed that she was still doing these things. Rather, 
these functions were now being carried out by another woman, a 
famous sportswoman. Thus, BP's new' belief system retained the 
central notion of a woman controlling aspects of his life 
preparatory to marrying him. In addition, to account for the 
failure of his prediction that Amanda and he were to be married, 
BP also reported persecutory ideation hitherto unseen during the 
course of the study. Similar, paranoid beliefs about his brother 
had been expressed in 1983 to account for the failure of an earlier 
relationship. Thus, once again the failure of a relationship to come 
to fruition was explained by the idea that his family was 
interfering deliberately to prevent him from finding happiness 
through marriage. 
The present study suggested a number of ways in which the 
weakening or rejection of a deluded belief following a belief 
modification treatment might be of benefit. First, during the 
verbal challenge phase, as BP became less sure of his belief about 
Amanda, so he became progressively less preoccupied with the 
belief. Second, the rejection of his three beliefs might have been 
responsible for the more general. improvement observed on the 
Beck Depression Inventory at the close of the intervention phase. 
Third, the intervention empowered BP to regulate his own 
thinking more effectively as evidenced by both the final follow-up 
meeting and the independent assessment. Experiment 2(a) offered 
sufficient promise to merit replication, which, with some 
procedural variation, was attempted in Experiment 2(b). 
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EXPERIMENT 2(b). 
Introduction. 
A direct replication of experiment 2(a) was undertaken: the 
measures, procedure and intervention were very similar. The most 
significant change concerned the manner in which the independent 
assessment was conducted. Whilst in Experiment 2(a) the 
assessment was conducted by an interview shortly after the final 
follow-up, in the replication formal ýassessments were conducted 
prior to, during and following the intervention. 
Subject BG: date of birth 18-8-36 % 
The client involved in the second study, BG, was a 51 year old 
married woman with a psychiatric history going back over 20 
years. This included: frequent auditory hallucinations, an 
attempted suicide and extensive delusional thinking. The three 
beliefs challenged in the present study had been held for the past 
ten years at least, as evidenced by the case notes and workers who 
had been involved with BG over this time. 
Belief 1. That she was only in her late teens. 
Although BG was in fact 51 she believed that she was not yet 
twenty. Her voices told her that she had been given, a 'body skin' 
with wrinkles which made her look much older than she actually.. 
was; she also had a microphone fitted, to give her a Lancashire 
accent. BG believed further, that all the memories she had, of her 
life over the past 50 years had been fed in by what she called 
#autosuggestion' - that is, she was made to watch hundreds of video 
tapes. 
Belief 2. That she was Fiona Heidi, Kirsty Montague, the, 
daughter of Lord and Lady Montague, who were actually Princess 
Anne and Marc Phillips. 
BG believed that the royals, had placed her in the care of her 
mother shortly after her birth. Although the royals wanted her, 
back, the Queen would not let her return until she had done certain 
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things; for instance, BG had to find ; C100,000. On one occasion on 
television Princess Anne had waved at BG, and the Queen looked 
very concerned about her on another occasion. 
Belief 3. That her life was being planned and controlled by 
top politicians and gentry. 
This included 'breeding' with her; BG believed she had been raped 
numerous times and had six children, who were being looked after 
by the Pope. The people controlling her life also determined that 
her husband should not have sex with her; only the young man who 
raped her and she was to. marry subsequently was allowed to have 
sex with her. To ensure that she was faithful to the young man, a 
camera and poison tipped claw were fitted in her vagina. They also 
tried to get her to commit suicide to 'see how her mind worked'. 
The culmination of the process was her being crowned Queen of 
England. 
Procedure 
There were two procedural changes in the manner in which 
three of the dependent variables were administered; otherwise, the 
experiment followed an identical procedure to that of Experiment 
2(a). First, the external validation was ongoing: BG was interviewed 
between sessions 4 and 5,9 and 10,13 and 14, and 20 and 21. 
Also, as in Experiment 2(a), a final assessment was conducted 
following the 6 month follow-up. The second difference concerned 
the administration of the two clinical measures, the BDI and 
Symptom Checklist. In the present study these measures were 
administered at week 4,9,13,20, and at each follow-up meeting: in 
Experiment 2(a) a delay in challenging the third of 
' 
BPs beliefs 
meant that the BDI and. Symptom Checklist were administered at 
week . 
4,9,15 and 20, and at each follow-up. 
There 'follows'a summary of the verbal challenge put forward 
to counter evidence for BG's royalty belief and her belief that her 
life was being controlled. In the case of Belief 1, that she was only 
in her teens, BG cited as evidence having been told that she had a 
'step brain'. This was literally a step in the brain; the voices said the 
Queen also had one. When the person with such a brain reached 
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thirty they would have an outstanding brain; until then they would 
be an absolute imbecile. This piece of evidence was challenged by 
pointing out, the following. First, there was no medical knowledge of 
a step brain., Second, ý the Queen was crowned before her thirtieth 
birthday; she was not imbecilic. Third, BG herself stated on many 
occasions that her own mind was far better when she was younger, 
and that she felt her-mental ability was deteriorating. 
, 
The experimenter made clear to BG how beliefs direct the 
way all people interpret particular, situations. One of the many 
examples the experimenter employed to make this point concerned 
the way BG now viewed her attempted suicide. BG reported that at 
first she believed that she had been driven to attempt suicide by a 
number of distressing life events, including the death of her 
mother. Only subsequently did BG realize that the government had 
driven her to attempt suicide in order to 'understand how her mind 
worked'. The experimenter suggested that BG's re-interpretation of 
her attempted suicide 
* 
was motivated by her core belief that the 
government was influencing her life, rather than by any feature of 
the situation itself. 
The second stage of 'the verbal challenge involved challenging 
the belief directly. In the case of BG, the three beliefs challenged 
were clearly identifiable and distinct; they also shared no common 
evidence other than the experience of auditory hallucination (the 
possibility that the voices were in BG's own head was not raised 
until the third of BG's beliefs was discussed). However, on 'another 
level the three beliefs were all part of one very elaborate belief 
system; that BG was being manipulated and controlled by the 
government and royalty. Thus, when challenging BG's third belief 
the experimenter drew heavily upon the prior discussions of Belief 
I and 2. In order to describe the argument put forward against 
BG's belief that th 
,e 
government was controlling her life, it is 
necessary first to summarize the earlier discussion with BG of her 
belief that she was only in her teens. 
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The challenge put forward to counter BG's belief that she was 
not yet twenty began with the experimenter pointing out instances 
of inconsistency and irrationality within this belief system. For 
instance, in addition to telling BG that she was in her teens and the 
daughter of Anne and Marc, the voices also told BG that she was the 
Queen of Denmark and in her 50's. A more fundamental - 
inconsistency concerned BG's belief that her knowledge of her 
upbringing and marriage had been fed , 
into her mind by what she 
called autosuggestion - watching endless video tapes. BG believed 
that those friends who shared some of these memories had been 
hypnotised by government agents and made to concur. Thus, BG's 
contention was that what she thought had been her life was not in 
fact so; from her childhood, through her marriage and the death of 
her mother, to the present had all been invented by the 
government and the information fed into BG. Yet many of the 
central facets of her belief that she was being controlled by the 
government took place during just this period. For example, BG's 
attempted suicide, the purported rape and her having children, all 
followed her marriage and the death of her mother. Thus, although 
on the one hand the voices told BG that this whole period of her life 
was fictitious, on' the other hand they told her that events from this 
period formed an integral part of the government's plans for her. 
The experimenter pointed out this inconsistency to BG, and 
emphasised that, the voices could not have it both ways. Either this 
period of her life was fed in by autosuggestion, in which case she 
was not raped and had, not had six children, or she was raped and 
had six children and this period of her life was not fed in by 
autosuggestion. Equally, the voices told her that the government 
had led, her to attempt suicide in order to 'find out how her mind 
worked' - yet according to other information from the voices this 
event never took place. 
Discussion of BG's belief that she was being controlled by the 
government began by highlighting instances of inconsistency and 
irrationality. One such example concerned BG's story about how she 
became a barrister - an occurrence which she believed was to play 
a significant part in her return to the royals. The voices told her 
that in order to become a barrister one had first to be sacked from 
one's job. BG herself was sacked from a secretarial post, thus 
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establishing her as a barrister. She held that this was part of the 
government's plan, because as a barrister she was now entitled to 
claim houses and so make the E100,000 the Queen demanded she 
acquire, before returning to the palace. The experimenter 'made 
clear to BG that not only did being sacked from one's job not 
automatically make one a barrister, but also barristers were not 
entitled to claim houses from people. 
On the basis of BG's comments during the baseline phase, 
together with the case notes and discussion with professionals 
involved, it was possible to piece together, a developmental account 
for BG's beliefs. Over the years BG's marriage had been a cause of 
great strain; she had only learned following the wedding that her 
husband was impotent. BG was very close to her mother and 
described hermother as being her only confidant. BG reported first 
hearing voices following the death of her mother, whorn she nursed 
through a long and painful illness. It was following the death orl 
her mother that BG began to hear voices. To account for the 
auditory hallucinations BG assumed that a radio -transmittor- had 
been implanted inside her head., BG developed her beliefs gradually 
from this point onwards. BG stated that many of the central aspects 
of her. beliefs she thought of herself; others were provided by the 
voices. 
As in Experiment 2(a) the essential feature of the argument 
was that the beliefs had come about in reaction to and as a way of 
making sense of particular experiences. One of BG's experiences 
which required an explanation was hearing voices inside her head, 
and another was the content of what the voices said to her. The 
experimenter argued that, BG's beliefs developed in response to 
these two factors in particular. The experimenter pointed out that 
the experience of hearing voices was a real one, but that it was 
quite possible that the 'voices' were coming from BG herself. The 
experimenter observed that many people reported similar 
experiences, often following a breakdown. In some cases the 
breakdown followed shortly after a traumatic event: Jt was- 
suggested that the death of BG's mother, coming on top of the long 
standing strain caused by her marital difficulties, may have, acted 
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as just such a trigger. - The experimenter thus contended that the 
voices BG heard were her own thoughts. 
In support of this contention the experimenter suggested that 
the voices often fulfilled a compensatory function, possibly in order 
to make BG's life more bearable. Each of the major stressors that 
BG reported as having 'eaten away' at her, over the years was 
alleviated directly through her beliefs. These main stressors were 
the painful death of her mother, her feeling of having 'wasted her 
life', her bitter disappointment about having no children, and her 
lack of a sex life. According to her delusions: (i) her mother had not 
died of cancer, and, indeed, was not her mother at all (ii) far from 
having wasted her life she had hardly begun it (iii) she had six 
children (iv) she was enjoying an active sex life with the man 
whom the government intended her to marry. What was 
noteworthy, and the experimenter pointed out to BG, was that the 
voices often fulfilled this compensatory role on a day to day level. 
For instance, when one of BG's relatives, who lived with her and her 
husband, was particulary hurtful, the voices would tell BG that the 
relative was fatally ill and would soon be dead, or would be moving 
house soon, and so on. On another occasion BG became concerned 
when out on a day trip that she had left the cooker switched on. 
However these concerns were allayed by the voices, who told her 
that she switched the cooker off before leaving her house - yet 
when she returned home she discovered that the cooker had been 
left on. 
In support of the alternative interpretation of BG's beliefs the 
experimenter made a number of points, including the following. 
First, the fact that much of what the voices told BG was inconsistent 
and incompatible suggested that BG was the source of the voices 
rather than government intelligence forces. Second, some of what 
the voices told BG was untrue; autosuggestion, for instance, is not a 
process whereby people are brainwashed by excessive exposure to 
video recordings. Moreover, to watch a lifetime's worth of 
memories on video would take a lifetime in itself. Once again the 
experimenter made the point that this type of mistake is not what 
would be expected from top government intelligence officers. Third, 
the experimenter drew BG's attention to the unanswered questions 
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of why on earth Princess Anne should choose to send one of her 
children away, and why the government was expending so much 
time and energy in moulding her before she was allowed to return 
to the royals. Fourth, the fact that BG had been waiting to be 
returned to the royals for considerably more than 10 years cast 
further doubt upon the validity of her belief system. Indeed, BG 
reported tragically that twice in the past the voices had told her 
that they were coming to take her back to the royals; on both 
occasions she had packed her bags, collected her jewelry from the 
solicitors and waited to no avail. This too wa s consistent with the 
view that BG's beliefs, though understandable within the context of 
her experiences, ' were false. 
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Results 
Conviction. 
Degree of belief conviction was employed as the major 
measure of recovery from delusional thinking. Figure 5.3 shows 
BG's percentage conviction scores in each of-her three beliefs during 
each, phase of the study. In the case of Belief 1, that BG was only in 
her late teens, -belief conviction fluctuated ý between 80 and 100% 
certainty during the baseline phase. On the introduction of the 
verbal challenge at week 6, there was an immediate and substantial 
drop in belief conviction to 25% certainty: BG stated 'Well, I look 50 
and I tire more quickly than I used to; I must be 50'. Conviction 
remained at this level at week 7. At week 8, in spite of observing 
an instance of disconfirmation -during the preceding week, BG's 
conviction rose very slightly to 30% certainty. At weeks 9 and 10 
conviction fell to only 10% sure of the belief; BG stated at week 9 
'18 is what they want me to believe ... looking 
in the mirror and 
weighin Ig everything else up, I believe I'm 50', and at week 10 'I'm 
getting more certain every time ... It's a good sign'. 
At week 11, when 
the belief was rejected totally for the first time, BG said of the 
possibility of her being in her late teens 'It would be very nice, I 
know, but' its'not true'. Over the subsequent six sessions conviction 
was rated at between 0 and 10% certain; at the closing three 
sessions of the verbal challenge conviction was rated 0%. This was 
maintained at each of the three follow-up meetings. At the three 
monthly follow-up BG said 'I look in the mirror and I can't possibly 
be twenty - the mirror doesn't lie'. 
, In the case on BG's belief that she was the daughter of Lord 
and Lady Montague, alias Princess Anne and Marc Phillips, belief 
conviction was stable ý over the first six sessions of the study. At 
weeks 7 and 8 conviction-fell to 80% and 70% respectively. BG 
attributed this drop in belief conviction to the effect of the 
intervention on her belief that she was only in her late teens: she 
now felt that it was probably the case that she was 51, years old, 
and Princess Anne appeared to be younger than this. At week 9 
conviction that she was the daughter of Princess Anne returned to 
the baseline rate of 100% certainty. At week 10 BG's belief that she 
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was of royal blood was challenged. . By the close of this session the 
belief was rejected totally; indeed the belief was rejected at all 
subsequent sessions with the exception of weeks 14 and 16, when 
BG expressed her opinion that it,, was just possible that the belief 
was true and rated conviction at 10% certainty. At the one and 
three month follow-up meetings BG stated that she was absolutely 
certain that she was not the daughter of Princess Anne. ý At the final 
follow-up meeting, in spite of saying 'I can't possibly see how I can 
be anything to do with Princess Anne because she's years younger 
than me. That's gone by the board', BG gave a percentage conviction 
rating of 20%. 
In the case of BG's third belief, that her life was being 
controlled by the government, belief conviction remained at 100% 
throughout the thirteen week baseline phase. On one occasion BG 
stated 'I've been coming here [the day hospital] for years now, and 
I still believe all these things are true'. On the introduction of the 
verbal challenge at week 14 there was a drop in belief conviction to 
80%. BG stated of her belief 'It's like a shield ... I've got to try to face 
up to what I'm hiding from'. At the subsequent session conviction 
fell again, to 70%: BG once again demonstrated an insight into the 
possible functional nature of her beliefs, saying 'It's like a 
justification ... you're hurt and you seek solace'. At week 16 there 
was a substantial drop in belief conviction to only 10%; BG stated 
that she accepted the alternative interpretation of her beliefs, 
adding 'I think you're doing me good talking to me'. At the 
following session BG rejected entirely her belief that her life was 
being controlled by the government; in fact BG's belief conviction 
was 0% in each of her three beliefs. In this session BG stated that 
she was 'definitely getting over it' and added that 'realization is half 
the cure, isn't it'. Each of the three beliefs was rejected at the 
remaining two sessions of the intervention phase. At week 19 of 
the study BG gave a clear example of self-regulation: over the 
preceding week the voices told her that she was Sarah Ferguson's 
mother - however, BG refused to believe this news, telling herself 
that this could not possibly be true and not to be 'so stupid. In the 
final session of the intervention phase BG offered the following 
explanation for the emergence of her beliefs: 'I think I made a 
mistake, I misinterpreted the whole thing'. At the one month 
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follow-up BG was still absolutely sure that her life was not being 
controlled by the government: at this meeting BG said 'I'm 
certainly a lot better than I was-I'm not all dreaming about the 
place'. At the three month follow-up meeting BG stated that she 
thought it just possible that the government was controlling her life 
and gave a percentage conviction rating of 5% certainty. At the 
final follow-up BG stated that she was absolutely certain that the 
government was not controlling her life. She provided further 
evidenceý of self-regulation, adding that on those occasions when 
she thought about the belief 'logic always come to the fore'. 
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Figure 5.3. BG's percentage degree of belief conviction in each of 
her three beliefs during each phase of the study: B (baseline), VC 
(verbal challenge) and FU (follow-up). 
4. 
166 
100 
80 
60 
40 u 
20 
0 
Im 
vc FU 
WEEK MONTH 
100 
80 
60 
40 
20 
0 
100 - 
80 - 
60 - 
40 - 
20 
0 
2468 10 12 14 16 IS 20 136 
167 
(b) Secondary Measures of Change 
Personal Questionnaire Measures. The PQ scores for the 
degree of preoccupation and anxiety are shown in Figure 5.6. With 
rare exceptions, the anxiety and preoccupation scores during 
baseline were the same for each belief; that is, BG tended to think 
about- all-three beliefs together, rather than one on'one occasion and 
another at a'different time. However, the effect of the intervention 
was to disrupt this pattern somewhat, although there was still a fair 
degree of overlap. 
4. 
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Figure 5.4. Preoccupation and anxiety scores for each of BG's three 
beliefs during the three phases of the study: B (baseline), VC 
(verbal challenge) and FU (follow-up). 
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The five correlations calculated were identical to those in 
Experiment 2(a). Thus, three Pearson's analyses were conducted, 
one on the PQ scores for each separate belief, and two partial 
correlations were conducted, one on baseline PQ scores for all 
beliefs and one on all PQ scores. All correlations are shown in Table 
5.6. 
As in Experiment 2(a) an overall significant correlation 
emerged between degree of conviction and preoccupation. Unlike 
Experiment 2(a), the correlation between conviction and 
preocupation was significant in the case of each of three beliefs 
individually. During baseline sessions there was no significant 
correlation between PQ scores. This suggests that it was the 
intervention which was responsible for the significant correlation 
between conviction and preoccupation. However, as in Experiment 
2(a) two of the three beliefs appeared to be dependent (see Figure 
5.3). 
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Table 5.6 . Analyses of covariance between PQ scores for: 
each belief individually (Beliefs 1,2 and 3), the baseline, 
scores for all beliefs . 
(Baseline), and for all-PQ scores (All 
data). 
Conviction 
,& 
Conviction Preoccupation 
Preoccupation & Anxiety & Anxiety 
Belief 1 . 725 -. 
207 . 178 
Belief 2 . 752 -. 
096 . 145 
Belief 3 . 667 -. 
059 . 126 
Baseline . 369 . 188 . 
127 
All data . 701 ** -. 098 . 148 
ft 
p<05 
** P<001 
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Beck Depression Inventory. The scores on the Beck ' Depression Inventory are shown in Table 5.7. The BDI was 
administered once during the baseline phase (week 4), three times 
during the intervention phase (weeks 4,9, and 13) and at each 
follow-up (I month, 3 month and six month). Over the course of 
the intervention phase there was a steady downward trend in BDI 
score; at follow-up scores were also lower than the pre-intervention 
score recorded during the baseline phase. As in Experiment 2(a), 
this finding offers no support for the view that the loss of a 
delusion or delusions would result in increased depressive feelings. 
4h 
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Table 5.7. Beck Depression Inventory Scores at weeks 4, 
9,13 and 20, and at each follow-up (I month, 3 month 
and 6 month). 
WEEK MONT 
49 13 20 136 
17 12 12 69 11 8 
0. 
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The Symptom Checklist. This measure proved sensitive to the 
changes in BG's delusional thinking brought about by the 
intervention. No new symptornatology was reported in response to 
the Symptom Checklist during the course of the study. 
Accommodation. In the case of both Belief I and 2 BG did 
report instances of disconfirmation which led to her doubting both 
beliefs during the baseline phase. In the case of belief 1, at week 2 
of the study BG reported having felt tired and old; certainly not 
how a'teenager should feel. In the case of the belief about being the 
daughter of Princess Anne BG reported an experience of - 
disconfirmation at week 7 of the baseline phase. This concerned 
seeing Anne on television and feeling too old to be her daughter; 
however, this instance was clearly due in part to her view that she 
was more than likely not in her teens. In the case of the belief 
about being controlled by the government, at no point during the 
baseline phase did BG report an instance of disconfirmation; nor 
indeed did she do -so during the verbal challenge phase. Following 
the introduction of the interventions BG reported several instances 
of disconfirmation in Beliefs 2 and 3. For instance, at week 9 BG 
reported having Met a friend with whom she was in regular 
contact; the friend's daughter, who was in her thirties, was also 
present at the meeting. BG stated feeling that she could not possibly 
be younger than the daughter. 
Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction. As in Experiment 2(a) 
RTHC was measured for one belief only - in BG's case, her belief - 
that she was the daughter of Princess Anne. BG was asked whether 
her belief about, Princess Anne (i. e. that Princess Anne was BG's 
mother and had placed BG with foster parents when she was a 
baby) would be affected if Princess Anne herself told BG that the 
belief was completely false. Both at week 2 and 4 of baseline, when 
faced with this instance of hypothetical contradiction, BG replied 
that this would not affect either her belief conviction or her belief 
content; rather, it would be seen as part of the overall plan. 
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(C) Independent Assessment 
A first meeting was conducted prior to the experimenter 
challenging BG's first belief. At this initial interview the 
interviewer, a trained nurse and psychology graduate, obtained 
answers to the following questions: what were BG's beliefs, how 
long had they been held, had BG doubted her beliefs at all over the 
past 12 months, how certain was BG of her beliefs at present, and 
how BGs beliefs influenced her life. The initial interview yielded 
the following information. First, BG reported holding the following 
beliefs: (i) that she was only in her late teens, (ii) that she was the 
daughter of. Lord and Lady Montague, who had her adopted when 
she was very young, (iii) that the government was monitoring her 
constantly. , 
to ensure that she led the kind of life her real parents 
desired of her, and (iv) that she had been raped and had children 
with a young man whom the voices told, her was her real husband 
and with whom she was subsequently to be reunited. Second, BG 
said that she had held these beliefs for over ten years. Third, BG 
stated that at no point in time over the past 12 months had she 
doubted the truth of her beliefs, adding 'the government wouldn't 
have gone to all 'this trouble if it wasn't true'. Fourth, BG reported 
being absolutely certain of each of these beliefs. Fifth, she felt that 
the beliefs impinged on her life only in so far as she tried to do 
things in the way Lord and Lady Montague would wish; thus, she 
did not smoke and drank wine in moderation only. However, she 
said of her beliefs 'it frightens me not knowing what is really 
happening'. % 
The second interview was conducted prior to the tenth 
session of the study - that is, following four sessions at which BG's 
belief about being in her late teens was challenged and prior to her 
remaining beliefs being challenged. When discussing her belief that 
she was not yet twenty, BG said that although the voices told her 
she was young she was unable to reconcile this with the fact that 
she looked like a 50 year old woman: BG -stated 'I am almost certain 
that-I am 51'. BG stated having doubts that she was the daughter of 
Princess Anne and Marc Phillips. BG remained absolutely certain of 
her final belief that she was controlled by the government. The 
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interviewer*, concluded by stating" that since the previous meeting 
with BG there had been a major drop in the degree of conviction 
with 'which BG held her belief about- being under twenty, and a less 
dramatic 'reduction in her degree of certainty that she was the 
daughter of 'Princess Anne. 
The, third assessment was conducted. prior to session 14 - that 
is, following, four, sessions at which the royalty belief was 
challenged and prior, to the challenge being introduced to the final 
belief. BG was ýstill almost certain that she was 51. When discussing 
her belief aboutbeing of royal blood, BG said that although the 
voices told her this was the case her own logic was now telling her 
that she could not be their daughter - 'If I am 51 how can I be, I 
mean, she's younger than me'. BG reported having no doubt 
whatsoever that the government was controlling her life. 
The fourth assessment was conducted prior to the 20th and 
final session of the intervention phase. BG reported being 
absolutely certain that each of her beliefs was false, corresponding 
to 0% certainty. To ensure that this was the case for each of BG's 
beliefs, the interviewer asked BG to list those beliefs which she now 
rejected totally. These were: that she was the daughter of Princess 
Anne, that the government was using brainwashing and hypnotism 
to control her, that she had children and that she was in her teens. 
No other beliefs were recalled. At this point the interviewer asked 
BG why she had rejected her beliefs. BG stated that it was due to 
her participation in the present study. Of the study she stated: 
'We've thrashed it out, we've discussed it, it's all come to a head 
and I feel tons better .... I realize now it was all in my mind, it wasn't 
anything from outside doing it to me. The whole thing was in my 
mind. ' BG stated that the discussions had occasionally been slightly 
upsetting, but that she had come through it. 
A final assessment was conducted prior to the final follow-up 
meeting. At this meeting BG reported still being absolutely certain 
that she was in fact 51 and that she was not being controlled by the 
government. When asked whether she believed she was the 
daughter of Princess Anne and Marc Phillips, BG replied 'I am not 
certain this is true, but I think it could be'. When asked to quantify 
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this she stated being 20% certain that she was their daughter. BG 
attributed this increase in her conviction that she was of royal 
descent to 'things going against her at home': she stated that she 
was aware the belief might be an escape route., BG reported having 
been able to prevent her beliefs from returning by applying 'logic'. 
Specifically she was able to remind herself of the alternative 
explanation put forward to account for her beliefs during the verbal 
challenge phase. BG also reported reminding herself of the evidence 
discussed with the experimenter in the present study which ran 
counter to her beliefs, and in this way too being able to regulate her 
delusional thinking. 
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Discussion 
In the present study three delusions were challenged which 
had been held for over ten years-, each was rejected following 
between six and 15 sessions of the verbal challenge intervention. In 
each case maintenance was good. As in the first experiment there 
appeared to be a generalisation effect between two of the beliefs; in 
this case BG's doubt that she was in her late teens seemingly led 
her also-to doubt that she was the daughter of Princess Anne. 
However, the effect was neither immediate nor was it maintained. 
BG also reported being able to regulate her thinking 
effectively as a, consequence of the intervention. Specifically she 
was able, to remind herself both of the alternative explanation put 
forward to account for her beliefs during the verbal challenge 
phase, and of the evidence which ran counter to her beliefs. This. 
self-regulation was ongoing at the time of the final follow-up and 
independent assessment and included being able-to resist the 
promptings of her auditory hallucinations. For instance, BG resisted 
the temptation to accept, that she was mother of Sarah Ferguson, as 
the voices would. have her believe. 
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General Results and Discussion 
In each of the experiments reported in this chapter three 
delusional beliefs held for between two and 10 years, were rejected 
as a consequence of the verbal challenge intervention. This finding 
is consistent with other studies which have attempted to modify 
the delusional thinking of people diagnosed as schizophrenic (e. g. 
Wattsýet al., 1973, Chapter III). In the cases of five of these six 
beliefs maintenance was good. Although one of BPs beliefs did 
return at the I month follow-up, conviction fell again at the final 
follow-up meeting and subsequently at the independent ' 
assessment, and BP attributed these two reductions in belief 
conviction to his ability to draw on the discussions with the 
experimenter during the verbal challenge. 
In both studies there appeared to be a generalization effect. 
On one level both might have been expected: in the case of BP the 
two beliefs concerned reincarnation, whilst BG's belief that she was 
only in her teens had direct implications for whether she was the 
daughter of Princess Anne. However, in both cases the two beliefs' 
shared no comon evidence; moreover, neither generalization effect 
was immediate nor consistent. Certainly this was not the only 
possible outcome - both clients could easily have modified their 
untreated belief to accommodate the change. Thus, for example, BG 
could simply have stated that Princess Anne was far older than she 
looked; this is rendered more plausible when one remembers that 
people's true age being disguised successfully was already part of.. 
BG's thinking. The fact that the effect generalized in both cases 
might indicate an ability on the part of each client to think 
rationally about their beliefs. This would be consistent with the 
suggestion made by Bleuler and Bleuler (1986) that'in the case of 
many people diagnosed as schizophrenic the ability to reason is not 
lost. 
The PQ was employed to measure conviction, preoccupation 
and anxiety. The two experiments offered support for the view of 
delusions as mulidimensional. First, during the baseline phase there 
was a fair degree of fluctuation in both preoccupation and anxiety 
scores, even though conviction remained stable. Analyses of 
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covariation of PQ baseline scores yielded no significant correlation. 
Second, in both cases when all data points were correlated, anxiety 
was 'found to be independent otpreoccupation. In the case of BG 
conviction was found to be independent of anxiety too; and 
although a significant correlation emerged between BP's anxiety 
and conviction scores across all sessions, this correlation is rendered 
highly dubious by the total lack of variation in anxiety scores on 
two of BPs three beliefs. In both experiments a significant 
correlation did emerge between conviction and preoccupation 
scores for all sessions; this finding might seem to mitigate -against 
the multidimensional view. However, given ýthat in neither 
experiment was the correlation between baseline conviction and 
preoccupation scores significant, this suggests that the overall 
significant correlation between preoccupation and conviction was 
due to the intervention. Put in other words, whený BP and BG 
stopped believing that their delusions were true, they subsequently 
spent far less time thinking about them. 
The Beck Depression Inventory was included to see whether 
the loss or partial loss of a strongly held long-term delusion might 
have a detrimental effect on the clients affective state. In facrthe 
converse appears to be true. In the case of both BP and BG the BDI 
score recorded at the close of the intervention phase, by when each 
belief was rejected, was lower than the BDI score recorded during 
the baseline phase. In the case of BG the BDI scores remained low 
during the follow-up period. BP's, BDI score escalated dramatically 
at the 6 month follow-up. This probably was due not just to his 
rejection of his new belief about the sportswoman and partial 
rejection of his Amanda belief; but to theý self-accusatory 'manner in 
which he was challenging his own delusional -thinking: 'I can't do 
bugger all for myself, and then, I start blaming other, people for it'. 
To see whether the general downward trend in BDI score over time 
was significant statistically, a' Friedman's analysis of variance was 
calculated on the two sets of scores: the trend turned out to be non- 
significant. 
The symptom checklist was included to assess whether the 
loss of one delusion would be followed by the formation of a new 
belief. The symptom checklist proved sensitive to the changes in 
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delusional thinking over the course of the two experiments. 
Although in the case of BP the loss of his delusions was followed by 
the formation of new belief, in the case of BG no new beliefs were 
reported following the loss of her three delusions. In the case of BP 
the large degree of similarity between the Amanda belief, and the 
subsequent sportswoman belief suggests that it was the loss of the 
Amanda belief in particular which led to the emergence of the new 
delusion. The similarity of the two beliefs also begs the question of 
whether the beliefs were functionally similar. Certainly, both 
beliefs may have helped allay BP's often voiced fear that he would 
never be married, perhaps -whilst also protecting him' from the 
danger of another painful rejection such as happened in 1983. 
However, the argument that beliefs which are functional will 
therefore be replaced is inadequate. The beliefs held by BG might 
also be seen as functional, as indeed might the Jesus belief held by 
BP. 
Results, on the reaction to hypothetical contradiction measure, 
were ambiguous. BP was responsive to hypothetical contradiction 
and sensitive to the interventions, -whereas BG was unresponsive to 
hypothetical contradiction and yet sensitive to the interventions. 
The accommodation measure was more informative. As in the 
Brett-Jones et al., study, very few instances of disconfirmation were 
reported during the baseline, phase; in fact, BP did not report a 
single instance and BG reported only two, and these had little effect 
on her beliefs. Both clients reported, numerous instances of 
confirmation. However, it should be remembered that a failure to, 
seek to disconfirm a strongly held -belief, appears to be a further 
instance of continuity with the normal functioning. Interestingly, 
both clients also interpreted ambiguous information as 
confirmatory. Thus, for instance, 'BP reported an occasion when a 
dishevelled, messy girl with' no laces in her shoes had asked him for 
some money at a bus stop. Although he did not recognize the girl, 
BP's core delusion led him to believe that the girl had in fact been 
Amanda 'in disguise', and that she' had planned the meeting as a 
way of reminding him of her presence. This is a clear case of rule 
governed behaviour, and more particularly of 'behavioural rigidity', 
a familiar feature of the human operant research discussed in 
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Chapter II, where a particular rule or hypothesis leads the 
individual to interpret events in a prescribed fashion. 
Having come to doubt his beliefs during the verbal challenge 
phase, BP subsequently did report instances of disconfirmation and 
began to 'reality test' his beliefs. Hole et al. (1978) reported a 
similar finding (see Chapter III). BG also reported a number of 
instances of disconfirmation following the introduction of the verbal 
challenge phase. Thus, following the introduction of the verbal 
challenge- both clients appeared to view their beliefs ýmore as 
hypotheses than as dogmas. This finding is consistent with the 
notion of 'deautomizing' verbal control, a central aspect of many 
cognitive-behavioural therapies (Chapter I). ' This concerns the 
process whereby the regulatory power of particular core beliefs or 
rules is 'weakened as the client gains insight into the way they 
guide and direct his or her behaviour. Having deautornized the 
control of core beliefs, the therapist typically then attempts to 
assist the client to monitor his or her verbalisations and actions in a 
critical manner - that is, the therapist seeks to impart self-control. 
In the present study the long-term maintenance of the effects 
appeared to owe. much to just this process. The independent 
assessments and follow-up meetings suggested that the 
intervention left both clients better able to regulate their own 
delusional thinking. Both reported coping well with delusional ideas 
which recurred after the close of the verbal challenge phase. In the 
case of BG this included resisting the urgings of her auditory 
hallucinations. Even BP's ideas about Amanda were ultimately, if, 
somewhat painfully, brought under verbal control. 
The ability of BP and BG to regulate their thinking effectively is 
consistent with the growing literature on the role of language in 
guiding behaviour within the normal and clinical populations (see 
Chapter 1). As such, it is yet further evidence of a continuity 
between the functioning of people with delusions and those 
without. If one thought in terms of the theories of delusional 
behaviour discussed in Chapter III, a continuum view would be 
most consistent with the position of those like Maher, and Nisbett 
and Valins, who argue that delusions are rational explanations for 
experience. When one bears in mind that very few people are 
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rational in any optimum sense (see Chapter 1), this can be taken to 
mean that deluded people are using the same kinds of belief 
formation processes as non-deluded people. Certainly both BP and 
BG formed beliefs which within the framework of their experiences 
were understandable. It. might be countered that, whilst, the belief 
processes are the same, deluded people have abnormal experiences, 
and in this sense are not on a continuum with normal functioning. 
However, although BG's beliefs, for instance, were based partially 
on auditory hallucinations, there is evidence to suggest that 
hallucinations may be on a continuum of their own with normal 
functioning (Strauss, 1969; Slade & Bentall, 1988). 
In summary, the two experiments reported in this chapter 
corrobarate further the view that delusions are., open. to 
modification. Furthermore, the studies suggest that it is both 
possible and productive to measure a number of aspects of 
delusional thinking before, during and after introducing an 
intervention. In order to define the parameters of the, _verbal 
challenge as an intervention, and to assess the generality, of the 
trends recorded on the secondary measures of change, there was a 
need to conduct additional studies involving more clients. 
4. 
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CHAPTER VI 
THE MEASUREMENT AND MODIFICATION OF 
DELUSIONAL BELIEFS. EXPERIMENT 3 
Introduction 
In Chapter V two single-case experiments were reported 
involving clients with three distinct delusional beliefs. Each 
experiment employed an across behaviours multiple-baseline 
design. However, many deluded individuals hold only one 
delusional belief. In Experiment 3 six clients took part in a belief 
modification experiment., each of whom held only one clearly 
defined delusion. Therefore, a multiple-baseline design across 
subjects rather than behaviours was employed (see Chapter-111) - 
that is, the verbal challenge intervention was introduced to the 
different clients at one week intervals, following a minimum of 
five weeks of baseline. The measures employed in Experiment 3 
were very similar to those used in Experiments 2(a) and (b). 
Experiment 3 introduces a second belief modification intervention 
- reality testing - which involved putting the delusions to 
empirical test (cf. the work of Beck, discussed in Chapter 1). 
Reality testing was conducted in the cases of three of the six 
clients; in each case reality testing followed the verbal challenge 
intervention. 
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Method 
Subjects 
Clients' who had held a delusional belief for the previous two 
or more years were referred by their psychiatrist and community 
psychiatric nurse for participation in the study. Six men took part, 
each of whom satisfied D. S. M. III criteria for schizophrenia (APA, 
1980). At the time of the study all the clients were out-patients 
and had been on stable drug r egimes for the past six months or 
more. The clients were aged between 28 and 42, with a mean age 
of 34 years. A brief summary of each client's psychiatric history 
and belief follows- 
TD: Date of birth 14-6-55 
TD was brought to the attention of the psychiatric services 
in 1980 with what was thought to be an insidious onset of 
schizophrenia. He was first admitted to hospital in February 1985 
having run away from a rehabilitation centre. At this point TD 
was described as being preoccupied almost the whole time with 
an unbearable fear of the public and police, who he believed 
wanted to harm him for his imagined sexual offences. There was 
one subsequent admission to hospital in 1986. 
At the onset of the present study TD was, still preoccupied 
with delusional thoughts. Specifically he believed that his 
appearanc 
'e 
was sinister and suspicious and that he was suspected 
of committing various criminal offences. He feared that these 
suspicions would be reported to either the police or other 
members of the public, who would take some form of reprisal or 
retribution. TD was. unmarried and, lived with his parents. 
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WH: date of birth 2-6-55 
WH was first admitted to hospital in 1977. He believed that 
he was being persecuted by the British and Russian intelligence 
forces, who had interrogated him and subjected him to 'mental 
torture' because he had seen some top secret documents. There 
had been numerous readmissions. The delusion was still firmly 
fixed at the onset of the present study. WH was unmarried and 
lived alone. 
JE: date of birth 11-11-45 
JE had a long psychiatric history dating back to his late 
teens. There was also a long history of criminal offences, including 
shopbreaking, larceny, arson and indecent assault. JE was first,, 
admitted to the North Wales Hospital in 1979 presenting with 
what. were described as clear schizophrenic symptoms. There was 
evidence of thought disorder and delusional ideas of possessing 
special powers and of being Elvis Presley. 
At the onset of the current study the only residual 
delusional thinking' concerned the belief that he was Elvis Presley. 
JE believed that when Elvis died in 1977 he took over JE's mind 
and body so that he was, now Elvis. This transformation had been 
total, so that JE now had Elvis' voice and was privee to the 
information stored in Elvis' mind. JE was unmarried and lived in a 
hostel. 
MM: date of birth 28-1-56 
A long period of vagrancy and, psychiatric disturbance had 
preceded MM's first admission to the North Wales Hospital in 
1978. On his first admission MM made grandiose claims to 
possessing powers such as being able to change the weather and 
knowing in advance what people were going to say. The last of 
numerous re-admissions was in 1985. 
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At the onset of the present study MM was still claiming to 
have control over other people and events, such as being able to 
cause things to happen or be said on television simply by thinking 
them. MM was unmarried and lived in a hostel. 
DR: date of birth 3-11-68 
DR was first admitted to hospital in 1979 with delusions of 
grandeur . and reference, claiming to be the 'key to history'. Ile 
believed that the radio and television communicated with him, 
and that this enabled him to contact people from the past and to 
change the course of history. There had been numerous 
readmissions since 1979. 
At the onset of the study the delusional belief system was 
still completely fixed and remained the only psychiatric problem. 
DR was married and lived with his wife. 
HM: date of birth 17-5-47 
HM had first come to the attention of the psychiatric 
services in the late 1960's. He was hallucinating and had delusions 
of reference and persecution. It was not until much later 
(approximately 1982) that these symptoms were incorporated 
into one belief system: this was, that a man whom HM believed to 
be his father was controlling him telepathically via voices 
(auditory hallucination -3). HM's 'father' also controlled others in 
similar ways, including; making disc jockeys on the radio refer 
constantly to HM, being responsible for HM receiving the wrong 
set of 'A' level results, and leading people to think that HM had 
experienced a nervous breakdown. HM believed that this 
persecution was all part of a larger plan to 'harden him to life' and 
produce a kind of evolutionary resilience which was then to be 
handed on to his children through his genes. HM was unmarried 
and lived alone. 
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Measures 
The measures, which are summarised in Table 6.1, were the 
same as employed in Experiments 2(a) and 2(b). The only 
procedural variation in the way the measures were administered 
concerned the two clinical measures, the BDI and Symptom 
Checklist. These two measures were given during the final session 
of the baseline phase, at the final session of the intervention 
phase, and at each follow-up meeting. 
Ak 
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Table 6.1. A summary of the measures employed in 
Experiment 
---------- 
3 
-- 
and, when 
----------- 
they 
---- 
were administered. 
------------------------ 
Delusional Dimensions 
CONVICTION - measured with PQ and % rating. 
PREOCCUPATION - measured with PQ 
.Iý 
ANXIETY - measured with PQ 
Conviction, preoccupation and anxiety were measured at the close 
of every session throughout the study. 
Measures of Susceptibility to Change 
ACCOMMODATION - measured at the start of every session by 
asking whether anything had happened over the past week to 
change the belief. 
REACTION TO HYPOTHETICAL CONTRADICTION - measured at 
weeks 2 and 4 of baseline by posing a plausible but contradictory 
occurrence and asking how it would affect the belief. 
Clinical Measures of Change 
BECK DEPRESSION INVENTORY & SYMPTOM CHECKLIST - measured 
at the final baseline session, the final session of the intervention, 
and at each follow-up. 
External Validation 
Assessments conducted following the final follow-up. 
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Experimental Design 
The present study employed a multiple-baseline across six 
subjects. The principle is the same as in a multiple-baseline 
across behaviours: the difference is that the different behaviours 
belong to different people. Following a minimum five weeks of 
baseline the intervention was introduced at one week intervals to 
each subject in turn (see Figure 6.1). 
Procedure 
Unless stated otherwise, the procedure was the same as in 
Experiment 2(a) and 2(b). 
Phase I : Preliminary Interviewing. 
One and, in some cases, two, interviews were conducted with 
each client and these served the dual function of defining the 
belief to be modified, and of establishing rapport. 
Phase 2: Baseline. 
I 
Baselines of -between 5 and ten sessions were conducted 
with each client. These interviews adhered to those guidelines 
laid down in the General Method. 
Phase 3: Verbal challenge. to 
In order to clarify further how the clients' evidence for their 
beliefs was challenged, there follows a summary of the discussion 
of the evidence TD rated as most important to his belief system. 
This occurrence took place when TD was in Preston attending a 
rehabilitation course. Whilst walking through the town centre one 
evening TD was stopped and questioned by the police. Over the 
subsequent, week TD saw a number of different police cars. TD 
believed that the police questioned him because he looked 'odd 
and suspicious', and that his sinister appearance caused the police 
to place him under surveillance. This interpretation was countered 
by pointing out the following facts. First, TD stated that he had , 
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, jumped' on seeing the police car; this may have accounted for the 
police stopping to talk to him. Secondly, the police did not ask TD 
where he lived or worked, but only where he had been that 
particular evening. Thirdly, immediately after the interview the 
police drove off and TD was absolutely certain that he had not 
been followed home. The experimenter concluded, therefore, that 
the police could not have placed TD under surveillance without 
knowing where he lived or worked. Moreover, not only was it not 
possible that the police had placed TD under surveilance, it was 
also implausible: if they had been so suspicious of this 'odd and 
sinister' character, they Would surely simply have taken him in 
for further questioning or interviewed him far more extensively 
at the time. 
When challenging the evidence for TD's belief, the 
experimenter made TD aware of the regulatory function of 
language. This was, achieved by illustrating the way in which TD's 
interpretations of events were directed by his own core belief 
about-his appearance. For example, when in Preston TD 
interpreted his being passed by police cars in town as 'evidence 
that he 'was under police surveillance. However, the experimenter 
pointed out to TD, that to be passed by a police car in ýa large, town 
was nothing unusual: TD agreed with the experimenter's 
suggestion that prior to going to Preston TD was passed by police 
cars just as frequently. Furthermore, the experimenter drew 
attention to TD's own observation that the drivers of those police 
cars that passed him in Preston did not appear to, be looking at 
him. The experimenter suggested that TD's view that he was 
under surveillance was determined not by any salient features of 
the encounters themselves, but by his belief that he was of 
sinister appearance and suspected of crimes: this explained why 
prior to forming his belief about his appearance TD thought 
nothing of being passed by police cars. 
To provide an illustration of the second stageý of the verbal 
challenge, there follows a summary of the manner in which DR's 
belief that he was the 'key to history' was discussed. The 
essential feature of the argument was that DR's belief came about 
in reaction to and as a way of making sense, of his experiences of 
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people hearing' his thoughts ('Id think of something and they'd 
copy it') and making reference to him ('I'd pick up a pint and John 
Wayne would say "He's picking up his pint" '). 
To begin with, the experimenter highlighted instances of 
irrationality and inconsistency within DR's belief system. One 
example involved two claims made by DR that were contradictory. 
The first of these was that the government was instructing the 
medical profession to give DR medication in an attempt to subdue 
his ability to communicate -with people from the past. DR justified 
this claim by stating that the government was afraid of what 
might happen if he was allowed to, exercise his powers. DR 
explained that the government's fear was largely responsible for 
his remaining out of the public limelight. The second, and 
conflicting, claim was that at peak television viewing time Prince 
Charles had issued DR with a personal warning not to attempt to 
change the course of history. DR said that in his warning Prince 
Charles both-'referred to DR by name and supplied information on 
the nature of DR's abilities. The experimenter pointed out to DR 
the inconsistency inherent in these two claims, one of which 
described him and his power as unknown and the second of which 
meant inevitably that he was known to a large portion of the 
public. The experimenter also stated his opinion that if Prince 
Charles had issued such a warning it was inconceivable that no 
mention of it would have been made by the media. 
Inspection of the case notes, together with DR's comments 
during the baseline phase, made it possible for. the experimenter' 
to formulate the following developmental account for the 
emergence of DR's belief. DR reported first experiencing people on 
the radio and television reading his mind and referring to him 
soon after the death of his father in a car accident and the break 
up of his first marriage. DR also reported meeting people who 
seemed to 'know what he was thinking'. DR stated initially 
believing that he was part of some kind of an elaborate game . or 
trick. However, these experiences quickly became frightening and 
chaotic. DR reported forming his belief gradually in order to make 
sense of these new and disturbing experiences. The fact that 
people, including those-on the radio and television, were able to 
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read his thoughts led DR to 'realize' that he could communicate 
messages to people on television and the radio simply by thinking 
whatever he wished them to know. The next 'realization' 
concerned the fact that many of these instances of mind reading, 
thought broadcasting and reference occurred on old films and 
songs made many years before. This suggested to DR that he was 
able to communicate with people from the past as well as from 
the present. This led DR finally to conclude that he therefore was 
able to change the course of history by passing on information to 
people in the past which would enable them to prevent or create 
particular outcomes. DR reported that he started to think of 'all 
the marvellous things' he could do, such as preventing people 
from dying. The experimenter put forward this developmental 
account as a way of demonstrating to DR that his belief might be 
understood as being both a reaction to and a way of making sense 
of his experiences of reference and thought broadcasting. 
DR's experiences of reference and thought broadcasting were 
not challenged; nor was DR told that these behaviours were signs 
of 'schizophrenia'. He was re-assured that these experiences were 
'real' - it was his interpretation of these experiences that was 
under scrutiny. Rather, it was suggested that these behaviours 
might be effects of a breakdown, possibly induced by the stress -of 
his father's death and his divorce. The experimenter advised DR 
that reports of similar experiences were quite common. The 
experimenter observed that although for the individual concerned 
an experience of someone on the radio referring to him or her was 
indistinguishable from someone on television actually doing so, 
other people were able to make the distinction. For this reason the 
experimenter stressed that it was important not to dismiss the 
word of th , ose people who 
told DR that they were unable to hear 
the things he heard, until all possible alternative interpretations 
of the experience had been considered. The experimenter 
described DR's belief about being the key to history as being one 
such interpretation. That is, the experimenter suggested that DR 
developed his belief gradually in an attempt to make sense of his 
experiences. DR stated that his quest for understanding was 
motivated by the high degree of fear and distress he was 
experiencing at the time. In the sense that DR's new 
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'understanding' lessened his confusion, the experimenter indicated 
that DR's belief might be thought of as functional. The 
experimenter added that DR's belief might be an aid to coping 
with the death of his father, and in this sense too might be viewed 
as functional. 
This account was offered to DR as a plausible alternative 
interpretation of his experiences. The experimenter pointed out 
that within the context of DR's experiences his' belief was 
, 
understandable. However, given that there was an alternative 
explanation, it was necessary to weigh up the two in the light of 
the available evidence. The experimenter argued that the 
alternative interpretation put forward was both more plausible 
and supported better by the available evidence. To support this 
contention the experimd'nter drew DR's attention to a number of 
points, including the following. First, the multitude of occasions 
upon which DR had tried to change history without success went 
against his belief and offered support for the alternative. Second, 
further support for the alternative interpretation was provided by 
the multitude of people, including family and close friends, who 
over the years had said that they did not hear what DR claimed to 
have heard said on the television and radio. It seemed 
inconceivable, for instance, had DR's mother and sister also heard 
the television and radio talking to DR, that they would not have 
said so. 
Phase 4: Reality testing. 
Inevitably there would be some clients for whom the verbal 
challenge phase was not persuasive, and who would adhere to the 
delusion. In such cases the client and researcher collaborated to 
devise a simple test of the belief (c. f. Beck, 1967; Hole et al., 
1979). For example, with MM, who maintained that he could tell 
what was going to be said on television before it was actually said, 
a video recording was put on 'pause' at prearranged times, and 
MM was then asked to say what was coming up next. The defining 
principle behind the reality testing was that the client agreed in 
advance that the chosen task was a genuine test of the belief. 
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- It only proved possible to reality test the beliefs of three 
clients (JE, MM & DR); HM rejected his belief totally during the 
verbal challenge phase, and reality testing was not performed 
with TD and WH on' the recommendation of their communtity 
psychiatric nurse and psychiatrist respectively. 
Phase 5: Follow-Up. 
To assess for maintenance of behaviour change, one month, 
three month and six month follow-up meetings were conducted. 
Phase 6 : Independent Assessment. 
After the final follow-up, an independent clinical 
psychologist interviewed each of the six clients to assess his 
conviction in the delusional belief at that point in time and his 
observations on the study. 
4 
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Results 
(a) Belief Conviction 
The primary measure of recovery from delusional thinking 
was degree of belief conviction. Figure 6.1 shows the percentage 
conviction scores for each client in the different phases of the 
study. Because percentage conviction score and the PQ conviction 
score correlated very closely (a Pearson's r of 0.99), the PQ 
conviction measure is not presented separately. During baseline 
sessions percentage conviction was extremely stable across all 
clients, with only DR showing any slight variation. Even though by 
the close of the first session of verbal challenge TD accepted that 
the events which had led to the formation his belief did not 
warrant such an interpretation, he still reported being 70% certain 
that his belief was true. (This is reminiscent of the debriefing 
studies reported in Chapter 2 where beliefs were maintained even 
after the initial evidence on which they were based had been 
discredited: e. g. Jennings, Lepper and Ross, 1980; Lepper, Ross and 
Lau, 1980). TD accounted for his relatively high degree of 
certainty in a belief he recognized had been formed on 
misinterpretation by stating that he had held the belief for so long 
that he thought that it wo 
, 
uld take, time for him to change the way 
he thought. This said, even a thirty per cent reduction in belief 
conviction appeared to be beneficial; TD observed at the close of 
the first session of verbal challenge 'its made me feel better ... its a 
bit of reassurance that I don't necessarily look sinister'. After the 
second session of verbal challenge, this doubt was increased still 
further, with TD rating the likelihood of. his belief ý being true as 
only fifty-fifty and reporting that he was 'beginning to think 
differently now'. TD also reported being able to regulate his 
anxiety somewhat by reminding himself that he did not 
necessarily look sinister and suspicious. Conviction remained at 
the 50% level throughout the remaining verbal challenge and 
follow-up sessions. ,- 11,1 
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In the case of WH, the conviction rating did not change for 
the duration of the study. During the verbal challenge phase the 
suggestion that other interpretations could be placed on WH's 
experiences was met with resistance and, occasionally, hostility: 
on one occasion WH expressed his opinion that the interviewer 
was the sort of bloke who if he had a machine gun would threaten 
and interrogate him! However, there was a change in belief 
content at the one month follow-up. Specifically, WH's belief 
became encapsulated, in much the same way as happened to BP's 
Amanda belief in Experiment 2(a). Even though WH still felt sure 
that the Russians and British had been persecuting him for over 
ten years, at the one month follow-up he stated that he thought it 
possible that the persecution may now have stopped, and at the 
three and six month follow-up stated that he was now sure of this. 
(This may have been in response to the verbal challenge, part of 
which involved pointing out that if the combined Russian and 
British intelligence forces had been "after him" for over ten years, 
they would surely have "got him" by now). Even though at the 
three and six month follow-ups WH said he no longer believed 
that he was still being persecuted, his, conviction that, he had been 
persecuted in the past remained at 100%, and in this sense WH - 
completely refused to accept that his delusional belief system was 
false. For this reason, belief conviction for WH is shown at 100% on 
Figure 6.1 throughout the follow-up phase. 
Verbal challenge initially produced a mijor reduction in the 
belief conviction of JE, followed by a fluctuation between total 
acceptance or rejection of the belief at week two of the verbal 
challenge. However, for the three remaining verbal challenge 
sessions belief conviction was 100%. It was only with the 
introduction of reality testing that conviction -fell to 0% (i. e. that 
the belief was definitely false). The reality test agreed with JE was 
a series of related tasks aimed at proving that he was Elvis 
Presley. One of the tasks involved making tape recordings of JE 
singing, and talking, and then asking ten people to listen to these 
two tapes and say which famous dead pop star they thought made 
the recordings. The third test, supplied by JE, was that he would 
write down the lyrics to any. Presley song. Interestingly, on two of 
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the, occasions when JE accepted that he was not Elvis (during the 
first session of reality testing and once during the first session of 
verbal challenge), he countered by saying that he therefore must 
be someone else, possibly Jim Reeves. This degree of 
accommodation was peculiar to JE, and was not repeated after the 
first session of reality testing. JE's rejection of his belief that he 
was Elvis wasý maintained throughout the follow-up period, during 
which JE actually performed some reality testing of his own. For 
instance, at the one month follow-up meeting JE said 'if I was Elvis 
I would -be a millionaire' and 'if I was Elvis I would be in the 
States'. 
With MM it was , 
not until the reality testing stage that he 
expressed any doubt 
lin 
his belief. The reality test, outlined earlier, 
was conducted at the first and third session of the reality testing 
phase: different video recordings were used at. the two sittings. 
MM requested the second test having failed to predict even one of 
the ten key words on the first test, though to no avail - he also 
failed to identify even one of the 10 key words on the second test. 
In the course of the first session of reality testing MM seemed 
genuinely -surprised that he was unable to predict what was said 
on. a video recording, observing midway through the test 'I can't 
guarantee it'll work, because I'm not sure of it now'. For the 
remainder of the study conviction never again moved above the 
50% level. 
In the case of DR, verbal challenge initially had a vcry strong 
impact, and the client wondered aloud as to whether he could 
indeed change the course of history. He reported 'I - 
don't know 
what to believe, it baffles me ... one half of me is saying its got to be 
true, and the other half, is-saying it can't'be done'. Reality testing 
did not improve upon the reduction, in belief conviction recorded 
during the verbal challenge. The reality test was supplied by DR 
and was one he had wanted to perform for a number of years. it 
involved attempting to win the football pools by making a video 
recording on a Wednesday, and playing it back the following 
weekend whilst DR read out the football results. In this way DR 
planned to communicate the winning coupon numbers to the 
people on the video recording, who would thus know on the 
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Wednesday the results of the football matches to be played on the 
coming 'Saturday. The test was performed twice, using different 
video recordings: the first recording was of a conversation 
between the interviewer and the interviewer's brother, and the 
second recording was of DR talking to his wife. DR made both the 
decisions about how many times to conduct the test and 'who to 
incluqe in the vidoes. DR was extremely open minded prior to 
making 'each attempt at winning the football pools, saying that if it 
did not work it would be proof that his belief was untrue. 
However, in spite of his open minded attitude prior to both tests, 
when each proved unsuccessful DR simply accommodated this by 
making minor changes to his belief system (e. g. that his mind had 
not been active). However, at the follow-up meetings DR's 
conviction ratings together with the following comments suggested 
that the doubt generated by the interventions was a long lasting 
one: 'Sometimes I think its impossible, but then it happens and I 
hear something and I believe' (one month follow-up); 'I still don't 
believe it can be done, its just impossible' (three month follow- 
up); and 'Its a possibility, just a possibility' (six month follow-up). 
HM's conviction rating was unwavering throughout the ten 
week baseline phase. Towards the end of the first session of 
verbal challenge HM stated that he thought his belief 'highly 
unlikely', and added 'if I could drum those arguments into my 
head every day, it might even get me out of this'. However, rather 
as was the case with TD, when HM's degree of belief conviction 
was measured at the close of this session, he replied 'more' to each 
of the PQ conviction cards except 'almost definitely true' and gave 
a percentage conviction rating of 70%. One week later, at the 
second session of verbal challenge, HM gave a percentage 
conviction rating of only 1%, and stated that his beliefs were 'pure 
science fiction' and 'couldn't have been true'. 
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Percentage conviction at the close of the third session of verbal 
challenge, and indeed At all subsequent sessions, was 0%. During 
the third session of verbal challenge HM revealed an insight into 
the possibility of relapse, observing 'its a load of bloody rubbish, 
what I was thinking, a load of bloody rubbish ... Whether it will 
come back or not when you've finished with me is another 
matter'. In fact, HM reported resisting the temptation to interpret 
infrequent hallucinations and references in a delusional mannner 
over the follow-up period. 
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Figure 6.1. 
Percentage conviction for the six clients during each phase of the 
study: baseline (B), verbal challenge (VC), reality testing (RT), and 
at follow-up (FU). 
Note. The arrow at week 2 of the verbal challenge condition in the 
case of JE indicates that belief conviction vascillated, between 0 
and 100% certainty. 
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(b) Secondary Measures of Change 
Personal Questionnaire Measures. The PQ scores for the 
extent of preoccupation with the belief, and the degree of anxiety 
experienced at such times are both shown in Figure 6.2. Unlike 
belief conviction, there was a fair degree of variability in both the 
preoccupation and anxiety scores during the baseline phase. There 
was also no consistent relationship across clients between these 
two measures. In the baseline phase, for example, of the clients 
who showed a high degree of preoccupation, some also had high 
anxiety scores (TD, WH & DR) whereas others had very low 
anxiety ratings (JE & MM). In the case of WH, changes from high to 
low preoccupation were paralleled by similar changes in anxiety. 
During the intervention phases there was again considerable 
individual variability. For example, in the case of TD, a marked 
reduction in conviction and anxiety was not accompanied by a 
similar reduction in preoccupation. On the other hand, the changes 
in the preoccupation and anxiety scores for DR were similar to and 
paralleled those in the conviction measure. Much the same was 
true of HM, who had the lowest anxiety and preoccupation scores 
following the verbal challenge, which also markedly reduced 
conviction. Overall, as Figure 6.2 taken together with Figure 6.1 
shows, whether the three measures of conviction, anxiety and 
preoccupation are related is highly dependent upon the 
individuals concerned. 
4 
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Figure 6.2. Preoccupation and anxiety scores for the six clients 
during each phase of the study: baseline (B), verbal challenge (VC), 
reality testing (RT), and at follow-up. 
Note. Beca6se both measures are retrospective, applying to 
behaviour in the week prior to when the measure was taken (see 
General Method), the shading to mark the introduction of the 
interventions appears one week later than in Figure 6.1. 
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While Figures 6.1 and 6.2 provide a detailed -picture of 
changes in the, three measures for individual clients throughout 
the study, Table 6.2 shows the results of an analysis of covariance 
between PQ measures for the group as a whole. Partial 
correlations were calculated which established the correlation 
coefficient between any two PQ scores while controlling for the 
third. Two sets of partial correlations were calculated, one of 
performance on baseline sessions onlý and the other of scores on 
all sessions. All partial correlations are shown in Table 6.2. 
Analyses of covariation were not calculated for individual clients 
because of the small number of sessions conducted in some cases. 
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TabIe 6.2. Partial correlations of PQ scores for all clients 
during the baseline phase and for, all sesions. 
Baseline Sessions All Sessions 
Conviction & 
Preoccupation -. 137 . 372 
Conviction & 
Anxiety -. 085 . 084 
Preoccupation 
& Anxiety . 417 . 
389 
p< 0.05 
** P< 0.01 
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, Of the three correlations based solely on baseline 
performance, only pre occupation -anxiety, reached significance, 
suggesting (i) that conviction was independent of both the amount 
of time spent preoccupied with the belief and the degree of 
anxiety experienced at such times, and (ii) that preoccupation and 
anxiety were linked. When all data points were taken together, 
both the preoccupation -anxiety and conviction-preoccupation 
correlations reached significance at the 1% level. Such summary 
statistics can, however, be misleading. For example, while there 
was an overall significant correlation between conviction and 
preoccupation, it would be a mistake to assume that this meant 
that the two measures always varied together; for at least two 
clients (TD & MM) the interventions produced a major reduction in 
belief conviction even though preoccupation remained constant. 
Again, although there was a significant correlation between 
anxiety and preoccupation across all sessions, some individuals 
(TD & JE) showed marked changes in one of the measures but not 
in the other. 
Beck Depression Inventory. According to the severity of the 
symptom, each item on the B. D. I. is scored 0,1,2 or 3. A score of 
18-24 constitutes mild depression, 25-29 moderate depression, 
and 30 and above severe depression. As is shown in Table 6.3, 
there was a downward trend in B. D. T. score over time and a 
Friedman's two way analysis of variance revealed this to be 
significant at the 1% level: X r2 (4)= 21.6 , p<001. 
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Table 6.3. Beck Depression Inventory scores before (PRE) 
and after (POST) the intervention, and at one month (IM 
FU),, three month (3AI FU) and six month (6M FU) follow- 
up. 
Subject PRE POST IM FU 3M FU 6M FU 
'ID 35 27 27 29 27 
WH 18 17 8 5 7 
JE 24 20 6 5 5 
mm 1 0 0 0 0 
DR 20 19 17 10 4 
HM 19 14 17 2 3 
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Symptom Checklist. Results from the Symptom Checklist 
revealed that no. client reported a new symptom during the study. 
The Symptom Checklist proved sensitive to the changes in belief 
conviction brought about by the intervention for five of the clients 
(TD, JE, MM, DR & HM). Wil reported pre- and post- interven 
' 
tion 
that he believed people were still trying to harm him deliberately, 
but at the one month follow-up stated that he doubted thi 
' 
s, and at 
the three and six month follow-up that he thought it was no 
longer the case. 
(c) Measures of Susceptibility to Change 
Accommodation. This measure was concerned with the 
extent to which clients spontaneously acknowledged events which 
disconfirmed their beliefs. During a total of 45 baseline interviews, 
no client recognized an external event which caused him either to 
reject his delusional belief, or to reduce his degree of belief 
conviction in that belief. However, following the introduction of 
the verbal challenge. - TD reported one instance of disc onfirmati on, 
and HM reported experiencing disconfirmation at the start of the 
third and fourth sessions of the verbal challenge. For example, 
part of HM's belief system involved the notion that women. in 
cafeterias showed a great deal of interest in him, even to the 
extent of coming to sit by him and crossing their legs when they 
believed him to be watching. At the beginning of the second 
session, of verbal challenge, HM reported observing that in actual 
fact when he looked at women in the cafeteria, far from leading 
him on they looked away, and that when a woman did sit by him 
he looked around and saw that all the other tables were full. At 
the start of the third session of reality testing, MM also reported 
an experience of disc onfirmation. 
Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction. This second measure 
of susceptibility to change was concerned with a person's potential 
for accommodation. A plausible but contradictory occurrence was 
posed, and the client asked how, if at all, his belief would change if 
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such an event took place. Th 
'e 
instances of proposed hypothetical 
contradiction put forward to each client are as follows. TD was 
asked whether his belief would be altered in any way if a number 
of people were shown a film clip of him walking around a busy 
town centre (a situation in which he believed he appeared at his 
most sinister and suspicious) and when asked to choose adjectives 
to describe TD none of the people mentioned anything akin to 
sinister or suspicious. WH was asked whether his belief would be 
altered by a personal assurance from top ranking military officers 
that they had no interest in him, and an invitation to look at any 
dossiers the military might have on him. JE was asked whether 
his belief would be altered if Elvis Presley appeared on television 
and announced that he had stage managed his death in order to 
avoid the glare of the public eye. MM was asked whether his 
belief would be altered by his failing to demonstrate his abilities 
in a number of tests of his choosing. DR was asked whether his 
belief would be altered if he were given the chance to try to 
change history under conditions of his choosing and he failed. HM 
was asked whether his belief would be altered if the man whom 
he believed to be his father and behind his persecution were 
found to have died a number of years ago. As is shown in Table 
6.4, when faced with hypothetical contradiction four of the six 
clients responded on at least one occasion that if such an 
occurrence did take place, then they would either lower their 
belief conviction, or reject their belief altogether. Two clients (WH 
& DR) flatly refused to acknowledge even the possibility of the 
disconfirming experience, and it was these two, particularly WH, 
whose conviction scores were affected least by the interventions 
(see Figure 6.1). 
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Table 6.4. Measures of reaction to hypothetical 
contradiction at week 2 and 4 of baseline. 
ID WH JE MM IM HM 
Week 2 2 0 3 3 0 3 
Week 4 2 0 3 0 0 3 
Key. 
0 denotes no change 
1 denotes change in belief content but not conviction 
2 denotes change in belief conviction but not content 
3 denotes rejection of the belief 
I- 
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(d) Validation of the Effect 
I The effect of the intervention was externally validated by an 
independent clinical psychologist, with interviews being conducted 
after the final follow-up. 
Although his belief was still present to some extent, TD 
reported being able to understand that there were different ways 
of thinking about his ideas, and plausible explanations other than 
the delusion. When asked to quantify the extent of the change 
that had occurred as a consequence of the intervention, he 
reported a drop in belief conviction of between 50 and 60%. The 
clinician concluded that the intervention had given TD insight and 
coping skills which continued to be of benefit. 
WH gave no suggestion that the intervention had led him to 
doubt his belief that he had been the subject of long-term 
persecution. 
JE_ had continued untroubled by any delusional ideas up 
until the time of the assessment, and he reported that he was still 
able to make good use of the intervention by reminding himself of 
how it had disproved his belief. 
MM explained to the clinician what the reality test had been 
and why it had led him to doubt his belief. When asked to 
quantify his current degree of belief conviction MM reported 
being 20% sure of his belief. MM also reported being more relaxed 
as a consequence of the intervention. 
DR stated that the intervention had been helpful and, when 
asked to quantify this, reported a 30% drop in belief conviction; he 
added that what he had gained from the intervention helped him 
to cope still, although this varied with the intensity of his ideas. 
HM continued untroubled by the delusional belief; he 
reported that the intervention had been very beneficial and that 
he was now better able to regulate his own thinking. 
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The independent assessment also revealed that, with the 
exception of WH, each client had found it beneficial to view his 
belief as having developed in response to particular life 
experiences. 
In addition to this independent assessment, there was 
ongoing external validation for three of the six clients. TD's 
community psychiatric nurse reported a genuine doubt having 
arisen in the client as to the truth of his belief, and a new 
understanding that the belief was not based on reality, but on the 
way he approached and interpreted events. During the verbal 
challenge phase, DR's community psychiatric nurse reported that 
DR was less dogmatic when discussing the belief, and was far less 
anxious about the belief. The community nurse also reported that 
the intervention had provided DR with a new insight into the 
nature of his delusion. At a chance encounter some nine months 
after the close of the intervention the community nurse revealed 
that DR was still experiencing these benefits of participation in the 
present study. Lastly, HM observed to his community psychiatric 
nurse that the intervention had been very beneficial, and 
complained that - someone should 
have done something like it 
sooner. 
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Discussion 
In line with Experiments 2(a) and 2(b), the present study 
shows that very marked reductions in delusional belief conviction 
can be achieved in a relatively small number of 'sessions. In the 
present study beliefs which the clients had held for between two 
and eleven years were challenged over a small number of weekly 
sessions, ranging from four to 10 for individual clients. Although 
in almost every case belief conviction remained at 100% 
throughout the baseline sessions, five of the six clients showed 
substantial reductions in conviction by the end of the intervention 
phases and these improvements were maintained throughout the 
follow-up period of six months. In the case of two clients, JE and 
HM, the delusions were completely rejected. 
The first stage of the intervention, the verbal challenge, 
produced a strong reduction in belief conviction in four of the six 
clients (TD, JE, DR & HM). Subsequently, reality testing reduced 
belief conviction in two (JE & MM) out of three clients. Clearly, 
within the context of the present study, no claims can be, made for 
the effectiveness of reality testing per se, because it always 
followed the verbal challenge phase. In the case of JE the belief 
was rejected completely during reality testing, an effect which had 
appeared sporadically during the second session of" the verbal 
challenge, when he had fluctuated between total acceptance or 
rejection of the belief. (As in Brett-Jones et aUs 1987 study, only 
one client showed this 'all or nothing' pattern of belief conviction. ) 
Reality testing was the phase in which MM Produced the first 
reported doubt in his belief, whilst for DR it clearly did not 
improve upon the verbal challenge intervention. 
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Group, correlational analyses were conducted on the PQ 
measures of conviction, anxiety and preoccupation, both for 
baseline sessions . only, and 
for all sessions combined. The baseline 
correlations suggested that degree of conviction was independent 
of preoccupation,., a finding also reported by Kendler et al. (1983) 
and Brett-Jones et al. (1987); they also suggested that conviction 
was independent -of anxiety,, but that anxiety and preoccupation 
were linked. When all sessions, (i. e. both baseline and 
intervention) were analysed, there, were significant correlations 
between anxiety and preoccupation, and between conviction and 
preoccupation. However, the merit of the single-symptom 
approach adopted in the present study is that it provided an 
ongoing and detailed picture of different aspects of each client's 
delusional, thinking, which illuminates the analysis of group data 
and corrects any, misleading impressions that the latter may give. 
Thus, these data for individual clients, presented in Figures 6.1 
and, 6.2, show a high degree of individual variation in the 
relationship between the three main belief measures and, 
moreover, provide strong evidence for a multidimensional view of 
delusions (Kendler et al., 1983). During the baseline phase 
conviction was very stable in all cases, even though there was 
much varia bility in preoccupation and anxiety. Furthermore, there 
was no consistent relationship among the measures; whilst for WH 
and DR, baseline preoccupation and anxiety scores were similar, 
with JE and MM, preoccupation was constantly scored at the 
maximum intensity level (5) and anxiety was constantly scored at 
the minimum level (0). Also, following the introduction of the ft 
intervention, there was no consistent pattern of change across the 
three measures. 'In some cases (JE & DR) conviction and 
preoccupation both declined during the verbal challenge phase, 
whereas in others (TD & MM) only conviction, but not 
preoccupation, ' was reduced. 
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In response to the accommodation test, no client reported an 
experience of disconfirmation duringý baseline interviews. As in 
Brett-Jones et al. 's study, the results on-the accommodation 
measure suggest that such clients are not engaged actively in an 
ongoing process of reality testing their beliefs. It should be 
remembered, however, as Brett-Jones et al. have observed, that a 
failure to test a belief is a charge which could equally well be 
levelled at the non-clinical population (see Maher & Ross, 1984). 
In Hole et al. 's (1979) study both the clients who experienced a 
reduction in belief conviction subsequently came to view their 
beliefs less as absolute truths and more as hypotheses which they 
began to 'reality test. In the present study three of the clients 
(TD, MM'& HM) who experienced a reduction in belief conviction 
as a consequence of the intervention, subsequently began to 
observe' disconfirmation, and, in the case of HM, to test the belief. 
It would thus appear that clients may only begin to 'reality test' 
their beliefs following an initial reduction in belief conviction. 
I 
Clearly a reduction in belief conviction is more likely to be 
maintained if the client begins to, observe disconfirmation. 
However, maintenance may also be dependent on the way the 
client reacts toinstances of confirmation.. - that is, to occurrences 
which prior to the intervention had been taken as evidence that 
the delusional belief was true.. If a reduction in belief conviction is 
to be maintaned, presumably the client must resist the temptation 
to interpret such instances as confirming. In the case study by 
Johnson, Ross and Mastria (1978: see Chapter 111) the client 
resisted the temptation to place a delusional interpretation on 
events which prior to the intervention would have been seen in 
this way. Similarly, in the present study, with the exception of 
WH, I when faced with situations which prior to the study were 
viewed as confirmatory, each client demonstrated an ability to 
keep such interpretations in check. For example, following the 
intervention, HM no longer interpreted infrequent auditory 
hallucinations and references as being instances of telepathic 
control by his - father. Results from the present study suggested 
that maintenance may also be promoted when clients 'initially 
interpret events in a delusional fashion, but subsequently re- 
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evaluate them. For example, following the verbal challenge phase, 
TD reported being able to regulate his thinking and to maintain a 
healthy doubt in the belief most of the time. However, he 'was 
aware that he was not always able to prevent himself interpreting 
events in a delusional manner. When this did occur, he was able to 
subsequently re-interpret the experience and re-affirm his 
doubts. DR reported a similar procedure for keeping delusional 
thoughts 'in check. 
The RTHC measure revealed that when actually confronted 
with an instance of hypothetical contradiction, on at least one 
occasion four of the, six clients said it would lead them either to 
lessen their belief conviction or reject the belief altogether. This 
finding, would seem to suggest that whilst these four clients did 
have the potential to accommodate contradiction, this was not 
manifested in their everyday lives, as evidenced by their 
performance on the accommodation , test. Brett-Jones et al. 
reported that 'those subjects who ultimately entirely rejected 
their delusional beliefs dealt with hypothetical contradiction in a 
more rational way than those who did not', and this led them to 
speculate that, RTHC might be of some value in predicting the 
success of attempts at belief modification (p. 261). The present 
study offered tentative support for this proposition. The four 
clients (TD, JE, MM & HM) who were most responsive to 
hypothetical contradiction were also the most sensitive to the 
interventions, whereas the two clients whose conviction scores 
were affected least by the interventions (WH and DR) both flatly 
denied even the possibility of an instance of disconfirmation. 
The two clinical measures (the B. D. I. and Symptom Checklist) 
were included to assess for possible side effects of the loss or 
partial loss of a delusional belief. The scores on the B. D. I., suggest 
that the weakening of a deluded belief has a general beneficial 
impact,, and this would tally with the association found by Milton 
et al. (1979) between a fall in strength of delusions and a 
'worthwhile reduction in overall psychiatric disturbance' (p. 129). 
It should be noted that the B. D. I. score also went down for WH, for 
whom the intervention was seemingly ineffective. However, the 
main reduction in his B. D. I. score occurred at the one month 
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follow-up, which was also when he first doubted, that he was still 
being persecuted. It is quite possible that this new found doubt 
was instrumental in reducing the BDI score. The results of the 
Symptom Checklist for all six clients, though non-diagnostic, 
offered no inkling that any form of 'symptom replacement' 
followed the weakening or loss of a delusional belief. 
One obvious question to be asked is why the modification 
procedure was effective. The independent assessment revealed 
that a good rapport had been established between the interviewer 
and the clients, and this may have been valuable in limiting 
psychological reactance (Brehm, 1966). However, the assessment 
also revealed that the five clients whose belief conviction had 
fallen during the intervention phase found it beneficial to see 
their beliefs as having arisen out of their life experiences, and in 
this sense being an 'understandable reaction'. In this respect, the 
intervention emphasised the extent to which the client was like 
other people, rather than someone set apart by a 'mental illness'. 
Conceptually, this approach was consistent with the notion of a 
continuum function (Strauss, 1969), and also with the view of 
those, like Bleuler and Bleuler (1986), who have argued that 
schizophrenic symptoms may be understood in terms of the 
client's life experiences. 
Perhaps most important of all, both the follow-up meetings 
and the independent assessment revealed that, with the exception 
of WH, the intervention left each of the clients better able to cope 
with delusional ideas which recurred after the close of the 
intervention. A similar finding was reported in Experiment 2(a) 
and 2(b). These findings suggest that, with assistance, such clients 
can come to regulate their own thinking, and this is consistent 
with the growing literature on the role of language in guiding 
behaviour within the normal and clinical populations (e. g. 
Vygotsky, 1962; Abramson, Seligman and Teasdale, 1976). 
Experiment 3 suggested that those behaviours exhibited by 
BP and BG in Experiment 2(a) and (b) respectively were not 
atypical. The study also went some way towards delineating the 
parameters of the effectiveness of the verbal challenge 
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intervention. Moreover, in reality testing, Experiment 3 provided 
an intervention which seemed to be most effective in those cases 
where the verbal challenge was at its weakest. However, because 
in all three cases reality testing followed the verbal challenge, it 
was not posible within the context of Experiment 3 to determine 
how much the success of reality testing was due to the clients 
prior exposure to the verbal challenge. In order to address this 
issue a final experiment was conducted where the reality testing 
intervention preceeded the verbal challenge. 
I 
4. 
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CHAPTER VII 
THE MEASUREMENT AND MODIFICATION OF 
DELUSIONAL BELIEFS: EXPERIMENT 4. 
Introduction 
In Experiment 3 the effects of the verbal challenge and 
reality testing interventions were assessed on a number of 
different delusional dimensions. The modification procedure 
produced a reduction in the belief conviction of five out of the six 
clients, two of whom rejected their beliefs entirely. Of these five 
clients, 'three received only the verbal challenge and three received 
both the verbal challenge and reality testing. In the cases of two of 
the three clients who received the reality testing intervention, 
conviction scores recorded during the reality testing phase were 
lower than those recorded in the preceding verbal challenge phase. 
However, because reality testing followed the verbal challenge 
intervention, these effects could not be attributed to reality testing 
per se. Therefore, in the present study the reality testing 
intervention was introduced before the verbal challenge 
intervention. Otherwise the procedure and measures employed in 
Experiment 4 were very similar to those employed in Experiments 
2(a), 2(b) and 3. 
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I Method 
Subjects 
Clients were referred jointly by their psychiatrist and 
community psychiatric nurse on the following criteria: (i) that they 
had held a delusional belief for the previous two or more years (ii) 
that they had been on a stable drug regime for the past six months 
or more (iii) that they were out patients and (iv) that they satisfied 
DSM III criteria for schizophrenia. Four clients took part in the 
study, three females and one male. The clients were aged between 
35 and 70, with a mean age of 51 years four months. There follows 
a brief summary of each client's psychiatric history and belief: 
HJ: date of birth 22-5-32 
HJ, who had a psychiatric history dating back over 30 years, 
was div, orced and lived in a hostel. For the past two and a half 
years she befieved that she was being persecuted by an unknown 
man, who was intent on killing her. The belief was reinforced 
frequently by auditory hallucinations to this effect. For example, 
the voices told HJ the name of her persecutor and often described 
the manner in which he proposed to kill her. The belief was also 
supported by evidence not supplied by the voices. Thus, for 
instance, on one occasion HJ saw a man in a parked car opposite the 
hostel where she lived; HJ believed that the man was her 
persecutor waiting for her to leave the hostel before attempting to 
kill her. At the time of the present study HJ's delusion and her 
experience of auditory hallucinations remained the only psychiatric 
problems. 
LJ: date of birth 24-4-45 
LJ was first admitted to hospital in 1976, just a few weeks 
after the birth of her second son. There had been numerous re- 
admissions. In 1986 LJ divorced her husband, who has been 
described as being of a possible psychotic dispositon, since when 
she has looked after her two sons alone. It was LJ's long-held 
intention to commit suicide when her two boys were both old 
enough to look after themselves. This plan was motivated by her 
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deluiional ý belief - that she was an evil person who contaminated 
others. There was evidence to suggest that LJs husband was 
instrumental in the formation of her belief. 
In 1987 LJ reported hearing auditory hallucinations 
commanding her to shave off her eyebrows and hair and to keep 
her hair in a drawer. In addition the voices instructed LJ to cut her 
scalp with razor blades, which she also did. LJ viewed these deeds 
as acts of preliminary punishment for her evil nature; the final 
punishment was to be her suicide, which she hinted would be 
preceded by similar acts of self-injury. LJ stated that she had not 
heard any -voices over the 12 months prior to the onset of the 
present,, study, at which time the major clinical problem, other than 
LJ's suicidal intent, was her delusional belief that she was evil and 
harmful to others. 
CE: date of birth 13-11-17 
CE believed that a health worker who used to visit her - Mr F 
- was sending noxious and poisonous gases through the walls and 
fireplace into her end-of-terrace home. Although Mr F lived and 
worked some distance away, CE believed that he spent the majority 
of his time in the adjoining house persecuting her, to the neglect of 
both his family and work. CE had never actually seen Mr F, or 
indeed any stranger, going into her neighbour's house; she believed 
he must enter surreptitiously via the back of the house. CE claimed 
that Mr F used some sort of heavy iron machine to pump the gases 
through into her home, which she reported having heard being 
moved around. The smells occurred often when her next door 
n. eighbours were out, which led CE to conclude that they were not 
involved directly in her persecution: she presumed that her 
neighbours were paid a fee for the use of their premises. The 
smells came at all times of day and night and could last for a 
number of hours at a time. Because Mr F spent so much of his time 
persecuting her, CE felt sure that he must be receiving payment. 
However, she had no idea who might be paying him or why she was 
being persecuted. Although at the onset of the present study CE's 
delusion was the only psychiatric problem, there were associated 
behavioural problems. For example, CE often harrassed her 
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neighbours when the gases bothered her most, and sometimes 
would ýeven telephone the police. 
EE : date of birth 5-6-52 
EE's psychiatric history went back 9 years, beginning soon 
after he left a teacher training course prematurely. At the time EE 
presented with paranoid ideas about being ýpersecuted by certain 
lecturers from his old University. There were also delusions of 
mind reading and, reference, but these were subsumed by the 
delusion of persecution. 
EE reported that his persecution began as an , 
undergraduate 
when lecturers in his department Iread 
his mind and discovered, 
that he was 'immature' and 'impulsive'. EE claimed that on the 
basis of this assessment, his lecturers gave him a poorer degree 
class 
, 
then, he deserved. EE believed that since his graduation the 
lecturers had being going to great lengths in order to prevent him 
from finding employment, even to the extent of having him fired 
from, a teaching training course after only a few weeks. EE 
contended that the lecturers would continue to prevent him from 
finding employment 'until such time as they decided that he had 
MI atured sufficiently, at which point they would help him to find 
suitable employment. EE stated that in order to carry out their 
plan, the lecturers were having him monitored at his family shop 
where he worked frequently - that is, they were sending people 
into the shop to check up on him. Thus, when working in the 
family shop EE viewed many articulate customers whom he did not 
know as 'spys': many times in the past he had shouted and sworn at 
those customers 'whom he suspected of being sent by the 
University. The belief was still fixed at the start of the current 
study. Often EE expressed suicidal intent - this was linked in part to 
his delusion and in part to his general malaise. 
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Measures 
With the exception of the independent assessments, the 
measures were employed in the manner described in Experiment 3 
and summarised in Table 6.1. In the present study the independent 
assessments were ongoing. Each client was interviewed both 
during the baseline phase and soon after the final session of the 
intervention phase. However, there was some degree of variation in 
the number of additional assessments conducted with each client. 
In the case of one client (EE) the ongoing validation was supplied by 
his mother. Because this marked a departure from the manner in 
which assessments were conducted for all other clients in 
Experiments 2(a), 2(b), 3 and 4, in addition to the validation from 
his mother an independent assessment was conducted following the 
final follow-up meeting. (Precise details of the independent 
assessments conducted with each client are presented in the results 
section). 
ExperimentaL Design 
A multiple-baseline design across four subjects was 
employed. Reality, testing was introduced to the four clients at one 
week intervals following a minimum five weeks of baseline. 
Procedure 
Interviqws lasting. approximately one hour were conducted 
weekly. 
Phase 1. Preliminary Interviewing. 
In order to gain a'cl'ear picture of the belief to be modified 
and to ýestablish rapport one and, in some cases, two interviews 
were conducted prior to the onset of the baseline interviews. 
Phase 2. Baseline. 
. Baselines of between five and eight weeks per client were 
conducted. Baseline interviews adhered to the guidelines presented 
in the General Method. 
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Phase 3. Reality testing. 
As in Experiment 3 the client and researcher collaborated to 
devise a simple test of the belief: in each case the client agreed in 
advance that the chosen task was a genuine test of the belief. For 
example, in the case of HJ the reality test involved her wearing ear 
muffs to determine whether she was still able to hear the voices. HJ 
predicted that she would not be able to do so because the voices 
were coming from other people, whereas the experimenter 
suggested that HJ would still hear the voices because they were her 
own thoughts. In, fact HJ was still able to hear the voices even with 
the ear muffs on. 
The reality test agreed upon with LJ was to discover whether 
those people whom she believed she affected adversely concurred 
with this opinion and whether they felt that LJ was an evil person. 
To'begin'with LJ was asked to specify what she understood by the 
term evil. The resultant five-point definiton was presented to those 
people whom LJ felt she affected adversely and would classify her 
as evil according to her definition, to see if they would indeed do so. 
Not one of the five people tested classified LJ as evil. Each stated 
independently that LJ did satisfy one criterion out of the five - 
occasionally having bad thoughts about people - but that in their 
opinion this was true of most people and was not one of the 
hallmarks of an evil person. (The reality test conducted with, LJ was 
constructed -with the help of a clinical psychologist. ) 
In the case of CE the reality test involved a meeting between 
CE and Mr F, with the experimenter present. CE predicted that 
because of his guilt Mr F would not agree to the meeting, or if he 
did would not attend. When pressed, CE stated that if Mr F could be 
persuaded to attend he would be unable to account for his actions. 
The experimenter predicted that not only would Mr F attend the 
meeting, but would also be able to demonstrate that he was not 
persecuting her. Prior to the meeting the experimenter kept a 
record of those times at which CE reported smelling the gases; Mr F 
kept a record of his actions at these times. At the meeting Mr F 
presented CE with his account for his actions, and made CE aware of 
the number of people, including the experimenter, who would 
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confirm that Mr F could not have been in her neighbour's house at 
the times she claimed. 
In the case of EE the agreed reality test was that the 
experimenter should meet with the spouse of one of the key 
persecutors and seek to ascertain whether EE was being persecuted. 
The spouse, who had come across EE in a professional capacity at 
hospital, was familiar with the nature of EE's belief about her 
husband. (It should be noted that the husband declined to, meet 
with EE in person). EE stated that an assurance from the spouse that 
the lecturers were, not persecuting him would be sufficient to make 
him doubt the truth of his belief. Following the meeting the 
experimenter. reported back to EE that: (i) when attending 
University EE was held in high regard by the lecturers, who felt 
that he had not done himself full justice in his final examinations, 
(ii) they had done all they possibly could to help EE to find 
employment subsequent to his graduating from University, and (iii) 
they most assuredly were not having him monitored and did not 
know that his family had a shop. 
Phase 4. Verbal challenge. 
The'výerbal challenge intervention was as described in 
Experiments 2(a). Initially the challenge was restricted to the 
evidence for the bý61ief, which was discussed in inverse order of 
importance to the belief system. The following discussion details 
the argument put forward to challenge Us interpretation of the 
piece of evidence she rated as most important to her belief system'. 
This was that she had done something awful to her husband to 
make him behave in an unkind and cruel way towards her. In this 
way b interpreted his cruelty towards her as proof that she was 
evil-'and harmful to others. The experimenter made the following 
points in order to combat JL's interpretation of her husband's 
behaviour. First, prior to marrying, LJ and her husband had courted 
for seven years; throughout their courtship his behaviour had 
always,, been kind and there had been no indication of the cruelty 
that was to come later. Second, his behaviour towards her changed 
virtually as soon as they were married. Third, LJ's parents had 
expressed their opinion that she had actually been affected 
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adversely by her husband. Fourth, in the opinion of friends, family 
and health workers, it was he and not she who was an 'evil' person 
and had a harmful effect on his family. On the basis of this evidence 
the experimenter concluded that whatever it was which had caused 
the sudden change in her husband's behaviour, it was-, not that LJ 
had affected him adversely. The experimenter supported this claim 
by observing that -if 
LJ were an evil and harmful person this would 
surely have manifested itself during their seven years of courtship. 
Equally, there had been insufficient time following the marriage for 
LJ to have affected him in such a way as to have justified his 
changed behaviour. 
When discussing the evidence for each client's belief the 
experimenter made clear the way in which beliefs lead people to 
interpret events. in particular ways. In each case this point was 
made first by . explaining that this was true for most people, and 
second, demonstrating the way in which the client's own belief 
directed his or her behaviour. For example, CE reported that Mr F 
sent the gases through into her home with a heavy iron machine of 
some kind. CE, based her claim on the fact that she occasionally 
heard what sounded like a heavy metal object being dragged 
around. However, as the experimenter observed, the 'machine' was 
moved only rarely, even though the source of the gas switched 
often: indeed, even though CE stated that the gases were pumped 
through frequently from the ground floor of her neighbour's house, 
she only ever heard the 'machine' in her neighbour's upstairs 
bedroom. 
, 
Moreover, not only did the gas come through often in the 
absence of CE hearing the machine being moved, but on several 
occasions CE heard the machine being moved in the absence of any 
gas. - Therefore, the experimenter suggested that it was CE's core 
belief which led her to believe that there was a machine next doort 
rather than any good evidence. 
Having dealt with the evidence for the belief the discussion 
was moved on to challenge the belief itself. There follows a 
summary of the way in which EE's belief that he was being 
persecuted was challenged: as before, the essential feature of the 
argument was that EE's belief came about in reaction to and as' a 
way of making sense of particular experiences. To pave the way 
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for this discussion, a short description of the development of EE's 
belief,. --drawn from case notes, discussion with professionals and 
EE's own, comments is presented. 
Apart from feeling disappointed by his class of degree, EE 
experienced no paranoid ideas about his lecturers whilst actually 
attending University. Following graduation EE went to Rhodesia for 
just over two years as a teacher. Whilst in Rhodesia EE was advised 
that his career prospects would be enhanced if he acquired a 
recognized teaching qualification, so he returned to England to join 
a post-graduate teacher training course. However, after less than 
one-month on'the course EE appeared to have a breakdown and 
was asked to leave, the course. Although EE said he could remember 
shouting at the children until his throat was sore, he felt that he 
had been dismissed ýunfairly and had not been given an adequate 
chance to prove himself. The development of, his paranoid belief 
about the University staff began at this point. 
Challenging the belief started with a discussion of those 
aspects of the belief which were internally inconsistent or 
irrational: two examples of this are given. First, it was pointed out 
that EE's spell as' a teacher in Rhodesia was inconsistent with his 
belief. EE stated that on leaving to take up the post in Rhodesia he 
had no intention of returning to Britain. Furthermore, he felt 
absolutely certain that the staff at his University had played no 
part in his decision to return to Britain. On his application form for 
the job in Rhodesia EE gave the names of two of his University 
lecturers as referees. Thus, these two members, of staff had, actually 
been instrumental in EE getting the job and leaving the country: yet 
subsequently it was these two lecturers in particular who EE 
believed were at the heart of his persecution. Therefore, EE's move 
to Rhodesia was 
, 
totally inconsistent with his belief. It made no 
sense for the two main protaganists in EE's persecution - people 
who were intent supposedly on preventing him from finding 
employment until their close monitering of him revealed sufficient 
emotional development - to have assisted him to leave the country 
to work, possibly for good. (A similar argument was forwarded in 
relation to EE's entry to teacher training, where again a reference 
was sought from the University). A second example of irrationality 
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concerned the fact that for the entire three years EE spent in close 
contact - with his lecturers he remained blissfully unaware of their 
special interest in him. By his own admission, at no point during his 
degree ý course 'did EE have the slightest inkling that lecturers were 
reading', his mind or that they viewed him as 'impulsive' and 
'immature'. At the time EE felt that his relationship with his 
lecturers was mutually satisfactory; only almost three years later 
did he 'realize' that this impression was mistaken. 
The second stage of challenging the belief consisted of 
showing that there was an alternative explanation for the client's 
experiences. In the case of EE, this involved interpreting his belief 
about the University staff as a reaction to and way of making sense 
of a number of disappointing and distressing experiences. A 
developmental account for the formation of EE's belief was put 
forward in support of this alternative. EE admitted to having been 
under a considerable strain at the time he entered teacher training: 
his lack of an adequate social life and his continued failure to find a 
girlfriend had prayed on his mind over a number of years. It was 
argued that at the time he entered teacher training he was under a 
considerable mental strain and that this appeared to have affected 
his performance teaching. This was by far the most plausible 
explanation for his leaving the teacher training course. It might be 
argued that those people in charge of the course could have been 
more understanding and that they might have made allowances for 
him, but-this was nothing to do with his old University lecturers. EE 
first developed -his ideas following his premature departure from. 
the course- a period he described as one of great anger and 
distress - in order to explain why he had 'not been given a fair 
crack of the whip' at teacher training. He described a period of 
confusion and anger, before he realized why he had been dismissed 
- that his old University staff had written to the course to have him 
sacked. 
_ 
because they felt that he was too 'immature' and 'impulsive. 
This interest came to be seen as dating right back to when EE was a 
student, when the staff read his mind and first discovered his 
shortcomings. This explained why he was awarded a poor degree 
class. EE's subsequent long-term failure to find employment was 
interpreted in the same way. The final piece in the jigsaw came 
later, when EE came to view chance encounters with members of 
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the - University staff in the family shop and elsewhere as instances 
of spying. Subsequently this generalised to include all articulate 
people who came into the shop. (It was, emphasized that there was 
nothing 'abnormal' in a strongly held belief directing behaviour in 
this way. ) 
This 
" 
account was forwarded as a plausible alternative way of 
interpreting EE's belief, not as a discovery, but as an attempt to 
make sense of his experiences. The experimenter suggested that 
given EE's level of anger and confusion at the time, his belief had 
been an understandable reaction. Indeed, it was pointed out that 
many people formed similar beliefs to account for long-term 
disappointment and stress. The feature common to these beliefs 
was that the responsibility for the situation was externalized or 
projected onto others. In this sense EE's belief was not only 
understandable but also functional. In viewing bad events as 
reflecting not personal failings but the failings of others, the belief 
helped protect the inidividual's ego or self-esteem. Thus, 
unnacceptable thoughts were denied and projected outwards: it 
was suggested that EE's belief that the University staff viewed him 
as 'immature' and 'impulsive' might be an example of such denial 
and projection. The belief could thus be seen as an attempt to make 
sense of 'particular circumstances which was motivated by a 
psychological need to protect one's self-esteem. It should be 
pointed'out that the aim of this discussion was not to persuade EE 
that everything was therefore his fault! Rather it was to offer him 
a way of seeing his belief as a functional attempt to account for his 
experiences. It was pointed out that it made no more sense to say 
that the disappointments EE had experienced were his fault any 
more than it did to state that they were were the fault of the 
lecturers - but if EE had felt, however explicitly, that they were his 
fault then it was functional to project the blame elsewhere. 
Having put forward the alternative interpretation of the 
belief, the final stage of the verbal challenge involved arguing that 
the available evidence offered strong support for the alternative. 
This included drawing attention to: (i) the major flaws inherent in 
the belief, such as the move to Rhodesia, and (ii) the unanswered 
question of why the University staff should want to expend so 
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much time and energy on only one of many ex-students. (It is 
interesting that EE had not developed any grandiose ideation to 
account for this point. It might be expected that he would have 
interpreted the University's interest as reflecting a knowledge of 
some unique or important aspect of his character or destiny. ) The 
experimenter also observed that many beliefs formed following 
similar breakdowns shared common characteristics. For instance, 
the belief was often formed during a period of withdrawal and 
anger: during this period the individual often re-constitutes his or 
her environment and experiences in the light of the new belief. So, 
for example, EE re-interpreted his experiences at University in just 
this way, As 
Istated, 
the beliefs often involved projection. Another 
feature seen frequently in such beliefs was that incidental 
occurrences and events were of special significance to the 
individual: EE himself reported feeling that the way certain people 
walked past the family shop revealed that they too viewed him as 
'immature'. The idea that people could read one's mind was 
identified as another feature reported commonly. 
Phase 5. 'Follow-Up. 
- To assess for maintenance of behaviour change one month, 
three month and six month follow-up meetings were conducted. At 
these ýsessions all the, measures were administered (with the 
exception. of RTHC) in the order and manner described earlier. 
ab 
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Results. 
(a) Belief -Conviction 
The two interventions were designed primarily to reduce the 
client's degree of belief conviction - the major measure of 'recovery' 
from delusional thinking. Figure I shows each client's percentage 
conviction scores for the entire study. Because the percentage 
conviction scores correlated very closely with the PQ conviction 
scores (a Pearson's r of 0.98) the PQ conviction measure is not 
presented separately. In the case of HJ the reality testing 
intervention had no observable effect on degree of belief 
conviction, which remained at the baseline level of 100% certainty. 
With the introduction of the verbal challenge intervention at week 
8, conviction fell dramatically to only 20%. ý However, over the next 
two sessions of verbal challenge belief conviction rose to 50%: HJ 
said at session 10 'But the people seem so real and they-say such 
terrible things to me sometimes'. ý At week 11, the ý fourth week of 
the verbal challenge phase, conviction fell again, this time to 0% (i. e. 
the belief was definitely false). At this session HJ'said, of her voices 
'I'm not believing them ... I think you've 
helped me up to now'. 
Although there was -another climb 
in conviction over the two 
subsequent sessions, belief conviction was rated 0% at the final two 
sessions of verbal challenge. Maintenance at follow-up was good, 
with conviction never being rated more than 30% sure that the 
belief was true. 
During, baseline, LJ's conviction score fluctuated between 80 
and 100% certainty. With the introduction of reality testing, 
conviction plummeted to 0%; at the close of the first session of 
reality testing - LJ -stated 
'at the moment I don't feel I'm evil at all ... I 
feel like a normal person'. Although conviction rose slightly to 20% 
at, weeks 2 and 3 of reality testing, LJ still appeared to be highly 
swayed by the reality test: at the third session of reality testing she 
stated 'I seem to be. very clear in my thoughts just recently ... I think 
I am getting quite well'. However, at the final session of the reality 
testing phase (week 10) conviction returned to the baseline rate of 
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80%. With the introduction of the verbal challenge condition 
conviction once again fell steeply (week 11) and subsequently rose 
(week 12). Over the following three sessions of verbal challenge 
conviction fell steadily, and the intervention phase was concluded 
following two consecutive sessions when conviction was rated at 0% 
( i. e. the belief was definitely false). Maintenance at follow-up was 
good. 
In the case of CE neither reality testing nor the verbal 
challenge had any observable effect on belief conviction, which did 
not waver during the entire study. However, reality testing did 
produce a change in belief content: at the first session of reality 
testing CE accepted that Mr F was not persecuting her, but still 
maintained that someone most definitely was. By the second 
session of reality testing CE's position changed again - she now 
stated that Mr F was persecuting her, but that he had a partner 
with whom he shared the burden and this was why he was able to 
account for his actions at times when the gases came through. At 
the second session of reality testing CE said of Mr F's proclamation 
of his innocence the week before 'its all lies'. Midway through the 
verbal challenge CE made one final modification to her belief 
content. She stated that although in the past Mr F had been her 
sole persecutor, someone else had taken over and he had not been 
persecuting her for some months now. CE's conviction remained at 
100% throuhout the six month follow-up period, four weeks of 
which were spent in hospital. 
In the case of EE the baseline conviction scores were stable, 
the only slight variation occurring at week 3. The first session of 
reality testing produced a slight drop in belief conviction to 80% 
certainty, EE saying 'I have got a few doubts, genuinely ... but I only 
half believe them'. The reduction in belief conviction was not 
maintained over the two remaining sessions of reality testing at 
which conviction was rated at 100%: at week 10 EE said of the 
reality test 'I don't believe them'. With the introduction of the 
verbal challenge condition belief conviction fell to 50%, and 
remained at low levels for the subsequent verbal challenge and 
follow-up meetings. At weeks 17 and 21 EE rejected his belief 
completely. Typical verbalizations during this period were: 'Your's 
235 
is the right answer to things' (week 15) and 'It's false, what I 
believe is false'. EE also displayed insight into the link between his 
level of conviction and general affective state; at week 18 he stated 
'I believe your explanation ... Sometimes I 
don't, though, when I'm 
feeling low'. Indeed, at week 19 when conviction rose to 50% 
certainy, EE reported having had a 'terrible' week during which he 
had felt suicidal. At the follow-up meetings conviction was never 
higher than 50% certain of the belief. 
4 
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Figure 7.1. 
Percentage conviction scores for the four clients (HJ, LJ, CE and EE) 
during each phase of the study: baseline (B), reality testing (RT), Z:, 
verbal challenge (VC) and follow-up (FU). 
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(b) Secondary. Measures of Change 
Personal Questionnaire Measures. The PQ scores for the' ' 
degree of preoccupation with the belief and the amount of anxiety 
experienced at such times, are both shown in Figure 7.2. 
In contrast to the stability of the baseline conviction scores, 
there was a large amount of baseline fluctuation in preoccupation 
and anxiety baseline scores - indeed, the variation continued 
throughout the intervention and follow-up period. There was also 
no clear relationship between these two PQ measures across the 
four clients. (In the case of CE the one month follow-up was 
conducted in hospital, where CE was not bothered by any noxious or 
poisonous smells, and this explains why preoccupation and anxiety 
were scored zero. ) 
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Figure 7.2. 
Preoccupation (PRE) and anxiety (ANX) scores for the four clients 
(HJ, LJ, CE and EE) during each phase of the study: baseline (B), 
reality'testing (RT), verbal challenge (VQ and follow-up (FU). 
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To' assess whether' 'the three delusional dimensions 
represented in Figures 7.1 and 7.2 were independent, an analysis of 
covariation among conviction, anxiety and preoccupation PQ scores 
was calculated for the group as a whole. As in Experiment 3, partial 
correlations were calculated; this allowed a correlation to be 
calculated between any two PQ measures whilst controlling for the 
third. Two separate analyses of covariation were calculated; first, 
an ana lysis based solely on the baseline PQ scores, and second, an 
analysis of PR scores for all sessions. All correlations appear in 
Table 7.1. 
Of_the three correlations based solely on baseline PQ scores 
only conviction-preoccupation reached significance; none of the 
correlations based on PQ scores for all sessions was significant. 
These findings, taken together with Figures 7.1 and 7.2, testify to 
the large degree of individual variability in terms of the 
relationship among the three PQ measures, and suggest that for the 
four clients involved in the present study the three PQ measures 
were independent. 
44 
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Table 7.1. Partial correlations of PQ scores for all clients 
during the baseline phase and for all sessions. 
Baseline All 
Sessions Sessions 
Conviction & 
Preoccupation . 420* . 
205 
Conviction 
& Anxiety -. 099 . 008 
Preoccupation 
& Anxiety . 013 
033 
* p<05 
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Beck Depression Inventory. According to the severity of the 
symptom, each item on the BDI is scored 0,1,2 or 3. A score of 18 
and above constitutes mild depression, 25 and above moderate 
depression, and 30 and above severe depression. As is shown in 
Table 7.2, for three of the four clients there was a downward trend 
in BDI score over time, and a Friedman's analysis of variance on BDI 
scores for the four clients revealed there to be a significant 
downward trend at the 5% level: X r2 (4)= 10.5, p<05. 
4 
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Table 7.2. Beck Depresion Inventory sc . ores before (PRE) 
and after (POST) interventions, and at I month (IM FU), 3 
month (3M FU) and 6 month (6M FU) follow-up. 
Subject PRE POST IM FU 3M FU 6M FU 
lu 23 12 10 10 8 
li 28 24 18 16 10 
CE 9 9 10, 12 8 
EE 25 22 20 '20 9 
I 
ob 
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Symptom Checklist. Results on the Symptom Checklist 
revealed that no client reported a new symptom during the study. 
The Symptom Checklist proved sensitive to the changes in the 
belief conviction of HJ, LJ and EE. 
(c) Measures of Susceptibility to Change 
Accommodation. Over a total of 26 baseline interviews no 
client reported having modified or abandoned his or her belief in 
response to a disconfirming experience. There was evidence to 
suggest that for at least two clients (HJ and EE) disconfirming 
experiences had occurred, but were simply not recognized as such. 
For example, part of HJ's 'persecution' involved being told 
repeatedly by the voice of her persecutor that her boyfriend was 
being unfaithful. On one instance during the baseline phase the 
boyfriend hotly denied the charge. In spite of the fact that all the 
boyfriend's behaviour befitted that of a doting and faithful partner 
and even though the only evidence HJ had for his infidelities was 
the auditory hallucinations, she reported 'knowing' that he was 
lying and was seeing other women. Following the introduction of 
the verbal challenge phase one client, LJ, reported two separate 
instances of disconfirmation. For instance, on one occasion she was 
out shopping with her young son when her ex-husband saw them 
and yet walked straight past without acknowledging either one of 
them. LJ believed that this had been an attempt to upset her son 
deliberately, and felt that it had been an 'evil' thing to do and 
unlike any of her actions. % 
Reaction to Hypothetical Contradiction. The instances 
of hypothetical contradiction put forward to each client were as 
follows. HJ was asked whether her belief would be altered in any 
way if the voices turned out to be coming from part of her own 
mind and not from other people. X was asked whether her belief 
would be altered in any way if those people whom she respected 
most (including her father whom she respected greatly) had stated 
that they felt that she was not an evil person and had not 
contaminated them in any way. CE was asked whether her belief 
would be altered in any way if she were allowed in her neighbour's 
house at a time when the gas was coming through and discovered 
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nothing - no Mr F and no machine. EE was asked whether his belief 
would be altered in any way if it could be proven beyond doubt 
that the staff from his University had nothing to do with his being 
asked to leave the teacher training course. 
As is shown in Table 7.3, when faced with these instances of 
hypothetical contradiction three of the four clients (HJ, LJ & EE) 
responded on at least one occasion that if such an occurrence took 
place it would lead them to lower their belief conviction. No client 
reported that the instance of hypothetical contradiction would lead 
him or her to reject totally his or her belief. One client, CE, flatly 
refused to acknowledge even the possibility of a disconfirming 
experience: CE was the only client whose conviction scores were 
unaffected by the interventions (see Figure 7.1). 
ol 
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Table 7.3. Measures of reaction to hypothetical 
contradiction at week 2 and week 4 of baseline for each 
subject. - 
Subject 
lu Li CE EE 
WEEK 22 0 0 2 
WEEK 42202 
Key. 
0- denotes no change. 
I- denotes change in belief Content but not conviction. 
2- denotes change in belief conviction. 
3- denotes rejection of the belief. 
4 
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(d) Validation of the Effect 
External validation of the effect was obtained for each client. 
In the case of HJ, external validation was provided by the client's 
community psychiatric nurse. Interviews were conducted during 
the baseline phase, soon after the final session of the intervention, 
and after the six month follow-up. Assessment taken prior to the 
introduction of the interventions revealed: (i) that HJ was 
absolutely certain that she was in danger of being murdered (ii) 
that she had held the belief for over 2 years, and (iii) that she had 
never doubted her belief. However, at the close of the verbal 
challenge phase HJ reported to her community psychiatric nurse 
that although she still heard voices telling her that she was going to 
be killed, most of the time she now discredited what they said. 
When asked to quantify this she stated being only 25% certain that 
she was in danger, and felt if far more likely that the belief was 
false. Only on rare occasions did HJ actually believe she was , 
going 
to be harmed. The independent assessment also revealed that HJ 
was gaining insight into the true nature of her belief by beginning 
to attribute her belief to voices which were inside her head and as 
such were not based on reality. 
During the 
'follow-up 
period validation of change was also 
provided independently by two members of staff from the day 
hospital HJ attended. Each stated that following the intervention 
phase HJ was much improved and was coping better with her 
problems; also whereas before she had been absolutely certain of- 
her beliefs, now she 
- 
Was expressing a doubt in her belief. One of 
these members of staff made the interesting observation that on 
those occasions when HJ heard a voice say she was going to be 
killed, whereas in the past she could not be re-assured verbally, 
this was now the case. That is, to re-assure her in the past staff had 
to escort her outside to see for herself that there was no one there; 
now they need only tell her that there was no one trying to harm 
her. HJ's CPN conducted a final assessment shortly after the six 
month follow-up. At this meeting HJ stated that when hearing the 
voices say she was going to be killed she was absolutely certain 
that this was true. However, when not hearing them she did not 
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believe that the voices were real and felt certain that no one was 
going to harm her. 
In the case of LJ, the external validation was provided by a 
clinical psychologist who had been working with LJ for about one 
year. Three assessments were conducted, one during baseline and 
two during the intervention phase. Prior to the introduction of the 
intervention LJ told the clinician that she had held her belief that 
she was evil, and would be punished because of this, for the past 
eight years. LJ reported having slight doubts about her belief, and 
when asked to quantify this reported that she was 80-90% certain 
of her belief. At an assessment conducted following the first session 
of reality testing LJ reported to the clinician feeling the benefit of 
the intervention. She reported coping well and changing her ideas 
about herself, and stated that she currently did not feel that she 
was evil. At week 12 of the study LJ reported being 50% certain 
that part of her was evil: she stated that her degree of 'belief 
conviction had increased somewhat since the last assessment, 
because she had seen her ex-husband who looked ill and gaunt. 
(Maternity leave prevented the clinician from conducting further 
assessments). 
In the case of CE, the external validation confirmed that her 
degree of belief conviction had remained at 100% for the duration 
of the study. In the case of EE, who was particularly guarded 
about his beliefs, external validation was supplied by his mother. 
EE discussed his beliefs with his mother frequently; she was both 
the person most familiar with the nature of the belief and the one 
best situated to observe change. Before the introduction of the 
intervention EE's mother confirmed that he was totally certain of 
his belief - despite her constantly telling him it was 'all rubbish' - 
and had held the belief for close to ten years. She reported how EE 
shouted and swore at people in the shop whom he suspected of 
spying on him. By the close of the verbal challenge intervention, 
EE's mother reported observing a change in her son, who now 
accepted (i) that his belief might be false, and (ii) that his belief 
might have been formed in reaction to his unsatisfactory life 
situation. However, she did point out that his new-found open 
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mindedness diminished considerably when he was highly stressed 
or agitated, at which times he was sure of his belief. 
Largely as a result of the intervention, it was felt that EE 
would be more willing to discuss his belief openly. Therefore, 
following the final follow-up meeting an independent assessment 
was conducted by a trained nurse and psychology graduate. The 
assessment revealed that EE had held his belief for nine years, 
during which time he had never doubted his belief. EE reported 
being far less certain of his belief as a consequence of participation 
in the present study, although he stated that at present he was not 
able to 'completely cast the belief aside'. Although EE stated that at 
times his thinking still could be 'a bit wild', he felt that as a result 
of the intervention he was better able to control his thinking and 
felt that he was 'making more sense'. In support of this claim he 
was able to recall counter arguments put forward by the 
experimenter 
, 
to counter his belief: he added that he believed the 
alternative explanation put forward by the experimenter made 
more sense than his own belief. Finally, EE said that he felt calmer 
as a result of the intervention, although he was still a bit anxious. 
ob 
251 
Discussion. 
As in Experiment 3, major reductions in delusional belief 
conviction were achieved in a small number of weekly sessions. In 
the present study beliefs of between two and nine years standing 
were challenged over six to 13 weeks. Although baseline conviction 
scores were consistently high, by the end of the intervention phases 
three of the four clients (HJ, LJ and EE) showed substantial 
reductions in conviction. In two cases (HJ and LJ) the beliefs were 
rejected totally at the two concluding sessions of the intervention 
phase. Maintenance was good, with the benefits of the 
interventions still in evidence at the six month follow-up sessions. 
The study also offers support for the view of delusions as 
multidimensional: as in Experiment 3 no consistent relationship 
emerged between the three delusional dimensions of conviction, 
preoccupation and anxiety. 
The first stage of the intervention, reality testing, produced 
no change in belief conviction with two clients (HJ and CE). 
However, in the case of one of these clients (CE) reality testing did 
produce a change in the belief content. In the case of EE reality 
testing produced a slight, fleeting reduction in belief conviction. 
Although in the -case of LJ reality testing initially had a powerful 
effect on belief conviction, as was the case with EE the effect was 
not maintained. The introduction of the verbal challenge condition 
produced major reductions in belief conviction in two of the three 
clients with whom reality testingý alone had produced little or no 
effect (HJ and EE). In the case of LJ, low conviction scores were 
observed during both the reality testing and verbal challenge 
phases. 
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On the basis of the present study, reality testing on its own 
would seem to be a weak intervention, perhaps because of people's 
ability to 'rationalize away' instances of direct disconfirmation (this 
point will be discussed more fully in Chapter VIII). Reality testing 
might be better, suited as a second intervention, following the 
verbal challenge, where in the study reported in Experiment 3 it 
improved upon the effectiveness of the verbal challenge 
intervention alone in two out of three cases. It might be argued 
that the effectiveness of the reality testing intervention was 
dependent entirely on the adequacy and nature of the test itself, 
rather than on the individual client's ability to accommodate 
disc onfirmati on. Clearly this remains a possibility. In the case of EE, 
for instance, the chosen reality test might seem to be weaker than 
an actual meeting between EE and one of the lecturers: it might be 
argued that the, latter would have produced a more dramatic and 
stable drop in belief c. onviction. And yet EE's attribution that his 
persecutors were lyingý applies just as easily to words spoken face 
to face as, those conveyed through a go-between. Equally, when LJ's 
friends stated that they felt that she was neither evil nor a 
contaminating influence on those around her, LF might have 
decided that her friends were lying - but she did not. Clearly, it is 
difficult to say what constitutes a 'good' test of a belief. For this 
reason the choice of the tests involved negotiation with the clients. 
In this way, 'ýhowever diverse the, reality tests may be they shared 
at least one common feature;, each client agreed in advance that the 
task chosen was a good test of his or her belief. In this respect the 
different responses to reality testing observed in this study, and in 
Experiment 3, represent different responses to direct 
disc onfirmation. On the basis of his or her belief each client made a 
specific prediction which was not born out. Reality testing might 
also be thought of as assessing. the degree of correspondance (cf. 
Risley & Hart, 1968) between what the clients say they will do in 
such-and-such an eventuality (i. e. if the experimenter's prediction 
is born out), and what they actually do when faced by it. 
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In response to the accommodation test, during baseline 
interviews no client reported having altered his or her belief in 
response to an instance of disc onfirmation. An identical finding was 
reported in Experiment 3. Also, as in Experiment 3, each client 
reported instances of confirmation. However, a poor response on 
the accommodation test might reflect not simply a confirmation 
bias; clients may also be disregarding quite blatant instances of 
disc onfirmati on. In the present study, two clients (HJ and EE) 
reported events which appeared to be disconfirming and yet were 
not seen to be so by the client. Yet even a failure to accept 
disconfirmation when confronted with it might be a further 
example of continuity in functioning between deluded and non- 
deluded people. " There "is now a body of evidence to suggest that the 
beliefs held by the 'normal' population can be very resistant to 
quite direct forms of, disconfirmation ( e. g. Lord et al., 1979; 
Jennings, Lepper & Ross, 1980, discussed in Chapter 11). 
Following the introduction of the interventions LJ reported 
two examples of disconfirmation. Similarly, in Experiments 2(a), 
2(b) and 3, clients who had begun to doubt their beliefs 
subsequently started to report disconfirming experiences. Also as in 
these studies, in the present, study clients began to 'not observe 
confirmation'. Thus, during the intervention phase, two clients (IIJ 
and EE) were able to interpret, events in a non-delusional manner' 
which they had seen in delusional terms prior to the intervention 
phases. For instance, although prior to the 'intervention HJ's 
frequent auditory hallucinations stating that she was going to be 
killed were interpreted as strong evidence that her belief was true, 
during the verbal challenge phase only rarely were her 
hallucinations interpreted delusionally. Although by the six month 
follow-up HJ reported that when the voices threatened her she once 
again believed them totally, she subsequently was able to re- 
evaluate the experience in Ia non-delusional way. Cleary this is 
another way in which maintenance might be promoted. EE 
reported a similar experience. At the 6 month follow-up meeting 
EE reported having been certain that a particular person had come 
into the shop in order to spy on him, but later on rejecting this 
interpretation as implausible. Thus the present study offers 
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further support for the contention that such clients can come to 
regulate effectively their own behaviour: a finding of obvious 
clinical benefit, and one which represents further evidence of the 
continuum in behaviour with the non-clinical population, as well as 
with other clinical groups (cf. Lowe, 1983; Vygotsky, 1962; Woods 
& Lowe, 1986). 
Although results on the accommodation measure 
demonstrated that the four clients were not seeking to disconfirm 
their beliefs, the reaction to hypothetical contradiction (RTHC) 
measure indicated that three of the four clients (HJ, LJ and EE) 
possessed at least the potential for accommodation of evidence at 
odds with their beliefs. Results from Experiment 3 suggest that 
response to hypothetical contradiction might be a useful predictor 
of sensitivity to a mofication treatment. In the present study the 
three clients who were most responsive to RTHC (HJ, LJ and EE) 
were also those most sensitive to the interventions: conversely, the 
client whose conviction scores were unaffected by the interventions 
(CE) also recorded the lowest score on the RTHC measure. 
The two clinical measures, the BDI and Symptom Checklist, 
were included to assess for possible side effects of the loss or 
partial loss of a delusional belief. In the cases of the three clients 
whose belief conviction was lessened by the interventions, there 
was a significant downward trend in BDI scores over the course of 
the study supporting the view that there are wider clinical benefits 
associated with the wealkening or loss of delusions (cf. Milton et al., 
1978, and Experiment 3). The BDI scores for CE did not change 
noticeably over the course of the study. Results on the final 
measure of change, the Symptom Checklist, offered no suggestion 
that the weakening or loss of one delusion would lead to the 
formation of a new belief. 
In short, the present experiment reinforced the view of 
delusions as complex phenomena on a continuum with normal 
functioning, and developed further the component analysis of the 
verbal challenge and reality testing interventions begun in 
Experiment 3. On the basis of these two studies it can be concluded 
tentatively that the reality testing intervention might be more 
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effective following the verbal challenge. The verbal challenge 
appears to be very effective either as a first or second intervention. 
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CHAPTER VIII. CONCLUSION 
The present research had two broad aims. The first of these 
wýs to achieve a better understanding of the characteristic 
behaviour of people with delusional beliefs. This goal was pursued 
jointly through description and intervention. The second goal was 
to assess the degree to which the behaviour of people with 
delusions was like the behaviour of other groups, particularly the 
normal population. 
The first aspect of delusional functioning which might be 
described is the process of belief formation. The present research 
did not address the issue of the formation of delusions directly. 
Indeeed, it is difficult to conceive of how such a study would be 
undertaken. However, the topic was addressed indirectly in two 
ways. First, Experiment 1. was devised to look at how people with 
delusions, formed rules in a general problem-solving situation. 
Second, the nature of the modification studies was such that a 
great deal of information about the formation of delusions was 
collected post hoc. 
The ability of people with delusions to form rules in an 
abstract problem-solving situation was assessed in Experiment 1. 
Clients were given the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test, which 
required them to form and subsequently abandon a number of 
problem-solving rules. The study demonstrated that in at least 
some situations people with delusions are able to both form 
appropriate rules with which to organize their behaviour, and 
subsequently to abandon these rules in the light of changing 
experimental conditions. Moreover, these abilities were present to 
a level which was comparable with normal control subjects and 
better than that of a group of non-deluded 'schizophrenics'. Thus, 
Experiment I suggested that at least some aspects of the belief 
formation processes in people with delusions were on a continuum 
with normal functioning. The. study also suggested that in at least 
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some contexts, albeit 'experimental', the behaviour of people with 
delusions was sensitive to environmental control. 
Description was also an integral part of the four modification 
studies. In the case of each client a baseline phase of at least five 
weeks was conducted. In the modification studies each of the 12 
clients put forward a plausible account for the formation of his or 
her delusions. All 12 clients were able to indicate specific events 
which had led them to form their beliefs - that is, each client gave 
evidence, albeit constructed on a post hoc basis, of an ability to 
base a core belief on a number of inter-related interpretations of 
reality. From the evidence provided delusions could be viewed as 
understandable attempts at making sense of particular 
experiences: indeed, the verbal challenge intervention was 
dependent on this being the case. No client in the present 
research presented with what has been called a primary delusion 
(Jaspers, 1915, discussed in Chapter III) - that is, a delusion which 
could not be understood in terms of the client's life experiences. 
In this sense, the present research supports the view put forward 
by Maher (1974: see Chapter III) that deluded individuals are 
I good scientists'. However, bearing in mind the discussion in the 
opening chapter of the bias and error inherent in the normal 
belief formation processes (cf. Tversky & Kahneman, 1973; 
Bruner, 1957), the use of the word scientist might be misleading. 
Maher's point is that there are common processes responsible for 
the formation of delusional and non-delusional beliefs. 
It might be argued that because in many cases the 
experiences the delusion was invoked to explain were abnormal, 
then it would be wrong to view the behaviour of people with 
delusions as being on a continuum with normal functioning. 
Certainly, in the present research seven clients appeared to form 
their beliefs, at least in part, to account for experiences which 
might be called abnormal (BP, BG, DR, HM, CE and HJ). In response 
to this argument two points can be made which preserve the 
notion of a continuum. First, it is by no means clear that 
experiences such as auditory hallucinations are abnormal (Strauss, 
1969). Research on the existence of so-called schizotypal traits in 
the normal population has suggested that auditory hallucinations, 
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for example, might be on a continuum of their own (Slade & 
Bentall, 1988). 
' 
Second, the relative normality of these experiences 
says nothing about the normality of the belief formation processes 
underpinning delusions. As Maher (1974) highlighted, it is 
possible to form normal explanations for abnormal experiences. 
Thus, drawing attention to other behaviours which one may 
beli eve to be abnormal in no way constitutes a demonstration that 
the belief formation processes underpinning delusions are 
abnormal. 
in keeping with an emphasis on description, a number of 
as . pe I cts of delusional behaviour were measured during extensive 
baseline phases in each of the modification studies. These baseline 
sessions thus provided a detailed picture of the nature of a 
number of dimensions of delusional experience over time. The 
first of these, measures, accommodation, assessed the extent to 
which clients both recognized instances of disconfirmation and 
altered their beliefs accordingly. 
Clients in all four experiments responded in a similar fashion 
on the accommodation measure. Prior to the intervention phases 
clients typically did not report instances of disconfirmation. There 
was only I one exception to this rule: BG reported two instances of 
disconfirmation during the baseline phase, one in the case of Belief 
I (that she was only in her teens) and one in the case of Belief 2 
(that she was daughter of Princess Anne). However, in the case of 
BG's first belief, conviction was not absolute during the baseline 
phase: during a far longer baseline phase BG did not report an 
instance of disconfirmation in the case of her third belief, which 
she held with absolute conviction. Also, in the case of BG's second 
belief, the instance of disconfirmation was reported at the start of 
the seventh session of the baseline, when belief conviction fell to 
only 80% due to an apparent generalisation effect. It is thus 
possible that BG observed these instances of disconfirmation 
because she was not certain of the two beliefs in question. Other 
than. BG no client reported an instance of disconfirmation prior to 
the introduction of the interventions during a total of 85 baseline 
sessions. 
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Following the introduction of the interventions many clients 
did report instances of disconfirmation. During the verbal 
challenge phase four clients (BP, TD, HM and LJ) who had begun to 
doubt their beliefs reported instances of disc onfirmati on. Two 
clients (MM and LJ) reported instances of disconfirmation during 
the reality testing phase. In addition to observing 
disconfirmation, clients also began to 'reality test' their beliefs. 
During the verbal challenge phase BP tested his interpretation of a 
comment made by one of his friends, which at the time he had 
taken to be evidence that his belief about Amanda was true. 
Having come to doubt his belief HM tested his notion that women 
in cafeterias showed a particular interest in him. 
It might be argued that these clients began to doubt their 
beliefs because of their observations of events at odds with their 
beliefs. However, on the basis of the present research this seems 
unlikely. The only client to report an instance of disconfirmation 
during the baseline phase did so in the case of beliefs about which 
she was not totally certain. In fact not one client reported a 
contradictory occurrence in the case of a belief of which he or she 
was absolutely certain at that Point in time. Thus on the basis of 
these findings it would appear that clients observe 
disconfirmation spontaneously only in the case of beliefs about 
which they are not absolutely certain. There was no evidence to 
suggest that it was disconfirmation other than that provided 
through the interventions which was responsible for the 
reductions in belief conviction observed at the start of the 
intervention phases. Thereafter results on the accommodation 
measure throughout the intervention phases suggested that the 
relationship between degree of belief conviction and observing 
disconfirmation was dialectical. 
These results on the accommodation measure are open to at 
least two different interpretations. Either disconfirmation is, for 
whatever reason, being missed, or disconfirming experiences are 
not occurring. No doubt particular beliefs will be far less open to 
disconfirming experiences. For example, BP's belief that he was 
Leonardo de Vinci impinged very little upon his everyday life and 
it is difficult to think of ways in which it might have been 
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disconfirmed 
'through, everyday experience. 
So too with BP's belief 
that he had been Jesus Christ in a prior life, and JE's belief that he 
was Elvis Presley. However, intuitively it seems unlikely that 
instances of disconfirmation do not occur in the case of all 
delusions. Indeed, the present research suggested that this is not 
the case. First, in the case of DR, for example, his consistent failure 
to change the course of history required considerable efforts of 
'accommodation' on his part in order to retain his belief intact. 
Other clients were forced into similar efforts of accommodation in 
order to retain their beliefs. In the case of BP, although his belief 
led him to predict that the famous sportswoman would be coming 
for him very soon, he was still able to interpret her non- 
appearance in such a way as to be consistent with his belief. 
Second, in the case of two clients in Experiment 4, instances were 
reported during the baseline phase which although not 
interpreted by these clients as disconfirmatory certainly appeared 
to be so. Third,, the finding that having come to doubt their beliefs 
many clients subsequently did report instances of disconfirmation 
suggests that such occurrences are not uncommon. Thus, whilst it 
remains a possibility that the failure of some clients to report 
instances of disconfirmation may have been an accurate appraisal 
of, their experience, in other cases instances of disconfirmation 
occurred but were interpreted in some other way. 
A similar argument applies when discussing why clients in 
the present research did not seek to reality test belicfs until 
during the intervention phases. The very fact that some clients did 
engage in reality testing during the intervention phases suggests 
that at least in some cases the beliefs were open to testing. 
Moreover the reality testing intervention was based on the 
premiss that beliefs can be tested, and in the cases of seven clients 
a test was conducted. Thus, it would seem that at least some 
clients were not testing beliefs which could have been tested. 
On one level these findings are unsurprising. Each of the 
clients involved in the four modification studies had held his or 
her belief for a minimum of two years and, typically, for far 
longer. It seems plausible that the long-term maintenance of a 
delusion relies at least in part on the client's ability to ignore or 
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'accommodate' disconfirming experiences. Equally, one might 
expect that a client who sought to test his or her belief would be 
less likely to hold the belief for a number of years. However, far' 
from being an example of discontinuity from normal functioning, - 
the failure to observe disconfirmation and to reality test a 
strongly-held belief appears to be a further point of continuity. As 
was discussed in Chapter 1, there are very few practicising 
Popperians. People who hold delusions, like people who hold 
other strongly held beliefs, are not normally in the business of 
seeking to disconfirm their beliefs - indeed, to the contrary, they 
appear to go to great lengths in order to retain them. 
What is perhaps equally noteworthy is that each client 
reported instances of confirmation during baseline interviews. 
Many of these instances were not of an obviously confirmatory 
nature. Often ambiguous information was interpreted as 
confirmatory. In the case of his Amanda belief, BP's quest for 
confirmation even extended to interpreting a meeting with a girl 
he did not recognize as being a meeting with Amanda in disguise. 
In the case of DR, his failure to change history was interpreted as 
evidence that his belief was true by virtue of the fact that people 
were choosing to ignore his messages. In the case of EE, a customer 
entering the family shop need only be 'articulate' for EE's belief to 
be reinforced. In the case of, LJ any bad occurrence was 
interpreted as punishment and therefore taken as proof that she 
was an evil person. Similar examples occurred in the cases of all 
12 clients. Thus, although the 12 clients in the present research 
appeared to experience difficulty in recognizing disconfirmation, 
they revealed no such difficulty in observing confirmation. That is, 
they displayed a 'confirmation bias' (cf. Wason, 1960; 1976 and 
Popper, 1976, discussed in Chapter 1) -a familiar feature of 
normal belief maintenance and yet another instance of continuity 
with normal functioning. 
On the basis of the accommodation measure as employed in 
the present research three important conclusions can be reached. 
First, clients with long-standing delusions neither typically 
observe instances of disconfirmation nor engage in reality testing 
until after they have begun to doubt their beliefs. Second, and of 
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equal importance, the behaviour of people with delusions is 
sensitive to the influence of an intervention. Following the 
introduction of the verbal challenge and reality testing clients did 
begin, to observe disconfirmation and even to seek actively to test 
their beliefs. Third, the processes underpinning the maintenance 
of delusions appear to be the same as those underpinning the 
maintenance of normal strongly held beliefs. Delusions, it would 
appear, can neither be distinguished from normal beliefs in terms 
of the processes underpinning their formation nor their 
maintenance. 
In addition to the accommodation measure, three 
dimensions of delusional experience were also measured at each 
baseline session. These were the degree of belief conviction, the 
extent of preoccupation with the belief and the amount of anxiety 
experienced at such times. In the case of each experiment an 
analysis of covariation was conducted between conviction, 
preoocupation and anxiety scores over the baseline period. There 
was no consistent correlation between these three dimensions 
across the baseline stages in the four experiments. In Experiment 
3 the only significant correlation between baseline scores was for 
conviction and anxiety. In Experiment 4 the only significant 
correlation on baseline scores was for conviction and 
preoccupation. ' In Experiments 2(a) and 2(b) none of the three 
measures was correlated significantly during the baseline phases. 
These findings are consistent with the view of delusions as 
multidimensional phenomena. 
For each experiment an analysis of the degree of covariance 
was also calculated between the conviction, preoccupation and 
anxiety scores for all sessions. In Experiments 2(a), 2(b) and 3 an 
overall significant correlation did emerge between conviction and 
preoccupation: no other correlation was significant in more than 
one of the four experiments. This might be interpreted as 
evidence that as people reject or come to doubt their beliefs, so 
they spend far less time thinking about them. However, while this 
may be true in some cases, this finding is not true universally. 
In Experiment 4a significant correlation did not emerge between 
conviction and preoccupation scores from all sessions. Moreover, 
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even within those studies where the correlation between 
conviction and preoccupation was significant, inspection of these 
graphical data revealed exceptions to this rule. In Experiment 3, 
for instance, in the cases of two of the six clients (TD and MM) 
belief conviction fell dramatically following the introduction of the 
int'erventions even though preoccupation scores remained high. 
Thus, whether the 'three measures of conviction, preoccupation 
and anxiety were related was highly dependent on the individuals 
concerned - a'finding which is consistent with the 
multidimensional view of delusions. 
In each of the four studies the PQ measure of conviction and 
the percentage conviction rating were correlated very closely. 
This suggests that the two measures are reliable. The reliability of 
the remaining two PQ measures, preoccupation and anxiety, was 
not assessed in the present research. This omission needs to be 
rectified in future research. However, an attempt was made to 
improve the reliability of the preoccupation measure by 
quantifying' the different statements of intensity. Thus, where 
Brett-Jones et al. employed statements such as 'I think about my 
belief absolutely all the time', in the present research 'At least 
once an hour' Was preferred. It might be argued that this created 
a ceiling effect and that in the cases of TD and MM in Experiment 
3 (where preoccupation scores were constant) preocupation was 
falling but the measure was not sufficiently sensitive to detect the 
reduction. That is, it is possible that these two clients were 
thinking about 'their beliefs ten times an hour at the onset of the 
baseline phase and only twice an hour by the close of the 
intervention phase. However there was evidence to suggest that 
this was not the case. During the intervention phase each client 
stated that he still thought about his belief just as often as before 
but was no longer as certain. In future research as well as 
incorporating a test-retest reliability check for preoccupation and 
anxiety scores, a wider spectrum for responses might also be 
included, possibly involving more than five statement cards. 
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Changing Delusional Behaviour 
The two interventions employed in the present research 
were designed primarily to reduce the clients' degree of belief 
conviction. Each of the four experiments suggested conclusively 
that major reductions in the degree of belief conviction with which 
-delusions are held can be achieved using a belief modification 
treatment. Moreover, these effects can be achieved'in a small 
number of weekly sessions. Of the 12 clients who participated in 
the modification experiments, seven rejected their beliefs entirely 
at some point during the verbal challenge or reality testing phase. 
Of the remaining five, three experienced substantial reductions in 
their degree of belief conviction. Only two of the 12 clients 
maintained their baseline levels of belief conviction throughout 
the intervention phases. 
The verbal challenge intervention was designed to challenge 
the client's core delusion through structured non-confrontational 
discussion. The intention was (i) to make the client aware of the 
way in which beliefs guide behaviour, (ii) to deautomise the 
regulatory power of the delusion, and (iii) to supply the client 
with an alternative rule with which to interpret his or her past 
and future experiences. The verbal challenge was the only 
intervention employed in the first two modification experiments 
(2a and 2b) reported. In each case the client rejected entirely his 
or her delusions. In Experiment 3 the verbal challenge preceded 
reality testing, where it led to a reduction in belief conviction in 
the cases of four out of the six clients (TD, EJ, DR and HM). One 
client (HM) rejected his belief completely during the verbal 
challenge. In Experiment 4 the verbal challenge followed reality 
testing. In the case of two (HJ and EE) of the three clients whose 
belief conviction was affected least by reality testing, major 
reductions in belief conviction were observed in the verbal 
challenge phase: indeed, in both cases the delusions were rejected 
totally at some point during the verbal challenge. In the case of 
one further client (U) the verbal challenge proved as effective as 
reality testing. Thus, the verbal challenge intervention was seen to 
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be very effective coming either, as a first intervention or following 
reality testing. 
The effectiveness of the reality testing intervention was far 
less consistent. Reality testing was conceived as a means of 
demonstrating to the client that his or her belief was false. In 
each case the client and experimenter agreed upon and conducted 
a test of the delusion. In Experiment 3 the reality testing 
intervention followed the verbal challenge in the case of three 
clients, and in Experiment 4 preceded the verbal challenge in the 
case of a further. four clients. In Experiment 3, reality testing had 
a major effect on the degree of belief conviction in the case of two 
of the three clients whose conviction was affected least by the 
verbal challenge. This finding was encouraging in that it suggested 
that clients who were not sensitive to the verbal challenge alone 
might be receptive, to reality testing. In Experiment 4 when 
reality testing was the first intervention employed, it did not 
produce a stable reduction in belief conviction in the case of any 
of the four clients. In two cases (HJ and CE) reality testing had no 
effect on belief conviction, whilst in the remaining two cases (LJ 
and EE) it produced effects which were not maintained. (It should 
be noted that in the case of LJ there was also a return to the 
baseline conviction rate during the verbal challenge. ) Thus, on the 
basis of these seven clients who received the reality testing 
intervention, it can be concluded tentatively that reality testing is 
moreý, effective when it follows the verbal challenge. 
It is possible to interpret the observed discrepancy between' 
the effectiveness of reality testing as an initial or secondary 
intervention in a number of ways. First, it might be pointed out 
that the finding would need to be replicated in order to draw any 
firm conclusion. ' 
Second, it might be argued that the discrepancy 
is a function of the adequacy of the reality test - this point was 
discussed in Chapter VII. Clearly, some reality tests will be more 
powerful than others - although it might equally well be argued 
that the same objection holds good in the case of the verbal 
challenge. Just as some beliefs might be more suited to the verbal 
challenge, others might be more suited to direct testing: with 
respect to the latter, the belief of MM, discussed in Chapter VI, 
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might be a ''Case in point. If this second interpretation is to carry 
full force, what constitutes a good reality test needs to be 
established - other than by its effect on belief conviction., Otherwise, 
a good reality test becomes by definition one which produces a 
reduction in belief conviction: such a state of affairs runs the risk 
of obscuring the potential benefits inherent in determining the 
optimum manner, in which to employ belief modification 
interventions. One distinction which might be drawn between the 
different reality tests would be that some involved actually doing 
something, whereas others involved being done unto in the form 
of a verbal disconfirmation. In other words where one client was 
asked to predict specific words on television and another to 
attempt to win the foootball pools, others were told that they were 
not being persecuted. It might be felt that a verbal re-assurance 
was the weaker of these two types of test. And yet in the case of 
LJ a verbal re-assurance was sufficient to produce a dramatic drop 
in belief conviction. Moreover, although MM did reduce his belief 
conviction when faced by his inability to demonstrate his powers, 
DR did not. Finally, it is important to remember that the reality 
tests were not the product of just one person. In each case the 
test was selected after a process of collaboration between the 
client and the experimenter; this adds weight to the argument that 
the reality tests were valid. 
II Alternatively the discrepancy between the effectiveness of 
reality testing as a first intervention and following the verbal 
challenge might be interpreted in terms of the clients' behaviour... 
On one -level reality testing involves simply providing an instance 
of- disconfirmation. However, this is something of an over- 
simplification. Reality testing also involves the client and 
experimenter making explicit and contradictory predictions with 
both parties accepting that one of the two outcomes contradicts 
their respective position. The force of the intervention hangs 
jointly on the extent to which the client both accepts the outcome 
as an instance of disconfirmation and modifies his or her belief 
accordingly. Thus there are at least two ways in which the client 
can retain his or her belief in the face of an unsuccessful reality 
test. First, the client can simply not accept that disconfirmation 
has occurred. Thus, in order to maintain their beliefs, both CE and 
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EE-ý chose ultimately to believe that people were lying. Second, the 
client can accept the outcome of the test at face value, but 'not 
revise his or her belief in any way - that is, he or she can 
'acommodate', "-the eventuality. Although DR recognized that he 
had not woný the, foootball pools, and in this sense had failed, this 
did not lead to any revision of his belief. Rather than questioning 
his ability, to communicate with people in the past DR was able to 
attribute the ýoutcome to contextual variables such as his mind not 
being 'active' on the two occasions when the test was conducted. 
People with delusions, like people with other strongly held beliefs, 
are very capable of adhering to beliefs in the face of quite direct 
forms of disconfirmation (cf. Lord et al., 1979; Jennings et al., 
1980, d. iscussed in Chapter I). 
The example of DR's response to reality testing highlights a 
critical difference, between the verbal challenge and reality' testing 
interventions, and one -which might account for why reality testing 
is not a strong first intervention. In Popperian terms particular 
beliefs are well 'immunised' (cf. Popper, 1977) - that is, they are 
able to incorporate most occurrences, however contradictory. 
Thus, clients might well be able to accommodate disconfirmation 
by falling back on the explanatory or regulatory power of their 
core delusions - that is, the delusion directs the way in which the 
outcome of the reality test is interpreted. Reality testing does not 
challenge the client's core delusion or rule directly: rather it 
challenges the predictive power of the rule. In Experiment 3 each 
of the clients who was subjected to reality testing already had 
been" exposed to a plausible alternative explanatory system. This 
meant not only that the regulatory power of the delusion had 
been challenged, but also that the clients had at least the option of 
replacing the delusion with another rule with which to understand 
their experiences. In Experiment 4, where reality testing followed 
the verbal challenge, the clients were not provided with an 
alternative rule or interpretive framework within which to 
interpret the outcome of the test. 
Thus, it might be the case that the differences between the 
two interventions can be understood in terms of their effect on 
the regulatory power of the delusion. When reality testing 
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appeared first clients, were asked to abandon their delusions 
without being offered an alternative: this might explain why the 
reductions in., belief conviction in the cases of LJ and EE were 
short-lived. When the reality testing followed the verbal challenge 
clients had a. ready alternative explanation to the delusion. Thus, 
they were still able to construct a meaningful account for their 
past, and present experiences in the absence of their delusion. The 
alternative account also offered the client a way of interpreting 
ongoing events. This would explain why many clients began to 
observe disconfirmation - that is, the alternative explanation put 
forward by the experimenter was internalised (Vygotsky, 1962) 
and was- gaining a regulatory property of its own. 
The behaviour of many of the clients during the follow-up 
period offers support for the idea that the clients were using the 
alternative rule put forward by the experimenter to guide their 
behaviour. First, events which prior to the intervention phase 
were viewed as confirmatory were no longer seen to be so., For 
example, both BG and HM ceased to view auditory hallucinations 
as confirmatory. This would appear to be clear evidence that the 
regulatory power of the delusion had been deautomised. Second, 
clients were able to reinterpret events non-delusionally. which ý 
they interpreted initially in delusional terms. For instance, EE was 
able to reject his initial attribution that a particular customer was 
spying on him. In the case of BP, although mind reading was the 
first thing that came to his mind when he experienced the 
pulsating sensation in his temple, he was able to reinterpret the 
experience subsequently. This is in marked contrast to his 
behaviour prior to the intervention, when he was doing precisely 
the reverse that is, reinterpreting events in a delusional way. For 
instance, although he did not recognize the girl at the bus stop, he 
later 'realized' that she had been Amanda. Both instances are 
extremely similar to the notion of rule governed behaviour (cf. 
Skinner, 1969), a familiar feature of human operant research, 
where a' particular rule or hypothesis leads an individual to 
interpret events in a prescribed fashion (Lowe, 1979, discussed in 
Chapter 1). Clearly rules can affect all kinds of behaviour, 
including 'ýther verbal behaviour. 
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Thus, in many cases, the maintenance of the effects of the 
intervention appeared to be due both to the deautomization of the 
regulatory power of the delusion and to non-delusional self-, 
regulation. The notion of deautomising the verbal control of 
particular beliefs or rules is a familiar one within cognitive 
behaviour therapy (e. g. Kelly, 1955; Hayes, 1987). In the case of 
treatments' for depression, in particular, attempts have been made 
to"'deautomize the regulatory control of particular types of 
negative self-statement (e. g. Abramson et al., 1983; Beck, 1976). 
The-, present' research suggests that such an approach can usefully 
be extended to 'include the treatment of delusional beliefs in those 
people diagnosed as schizophrenic. 
One obvious question to be asked is why the interventionsý 
were so effective: equally, why did the beliefs of two of the 
clients prove to be resistant to the interventions. The 
independent assessments revealed that the clients found it useful 
to be able to view their beliefs as having developed in response to 
their life situations, and in this sense being understandable 
reactions. - It is interesting to speculate whether emphasising the 
extent to which the clients are like other people, and playing down 
the extent to which they might be set apart from others, limits the 
amount of 'psychological reactance' (Brehm, 1966: Chapter 111). 
That is, whether it is the case that offering the client a way, of 
interpreting his or, her experience in terms other than those, of 
'mental illness' actually makes the client more susceptible to, an 
alternative viewpoint. Certainly this possiblity merits further 
investigation. 
In Chapter I it was suggested that the therapeutic setting 
might be thought of as exploring the client's zone of proximal 
development (Vygotsky, 1962). Within the present research the 
experimenter attempted to assist the clients to adopt an 
alternative framework within which to interpret their experience 
and direct their. behaviour. Adopting the Vygotskyian framework 
a successful intervention becomes one where the client not only 
rejects his or, her delusion, but subsequently is able to regulate his 
or her thinking during the follow-up period. That is, in order to 
reap the full long-term benefit the ability acquired during the 
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intervention mu*st become internalised. 
research the reductions in belief convici 
intervention phaies and the subsequent 
changes appeared to owe a great deal to 
'exercise mature self-regulation of their 
Within the present 
ion observed during the 
maintainance of these 
the clients ability to 
behaviour. 
Promoting self-regulation might therefore be thought of as 
one, of the major benefits of the present research, and may explain 
why the interventions were effective. Equally, the, Vygotskyian 
analysis offers a way of understanding why in two cases the 
interventions were not effective. Clearly on the basis-of only two 
clients it is difficult to begin to state why a technique does not 
have an effect: this problem is particularly acute given that one of 
these clients (WH) received only the verbal challenge and one (CE) 
recieved both the verbal challenge and reality testing. However, in 
general '-terms the successful exploration of a client's, zone of 
proximal development is dependent on the ability of the clinician 
to establish a starting point from which to assist the client to 
progress (cf. Wertsch, 19&1ý, discussed in Chapter I). In this way 
the failure of the interventions to reduce the degree of belief 
conviction with which WH and CE held their delusional beliefs 
might reflect a failure on the part of the experimenter to negotiate 
a-starting point from which to begin the discussion of the beliefs. 
In the absence of such a base it might well be that the client 
would perceive the interventions as confrontational and hostile. 
This would 
, 
be 
, consistent 
both with the finding that at no point did 
either WH or CE give any indication that they viewed their belief$. 
as o ther than, definitely true, and the occasional hostility shown by 
WH during the verbal challenge. Although this analysis of why 
the intervention phase was ineffective in two out of the twelve 
cases remains purely, speculative at this stage, it has the 
advantage of , 
highlighting the possibility that failure need not 
reflect. a shortcoming on the part of the client. 
Another way of approaching the task of determining why an 
intervention is effective in some cases and not in others is to 
isolate measures which predict the outcome. Within the present 
research two measures were employed for this purpose: the 
Symptom Checklist and reaction to hypothetical contradiction 
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(RTHC). The Symptom Checklist was included to determine 
whether the success of the belief modification was related to the 
presence of symptoms other than the delusion. It might be 
thought that a delusion which was reinforced by 'primary' 
experiences such as auditory hallucinations or experiences of 
reference would be more resistant to change. The present 
research suggested that this is not the case. First, major 
reductions in belief conviction were achieved in the case of all 
clients who' reported experiences of reference or auditory 
hallucination. Second, WH reported no symptoms other than the 
delusion. Third, although CE reported olfactory hallucinations, so 
too did BP (often the pulsating in his temple was accompanied by 
the smell of a 'female scent') and yet BP rejected each of his 
beliefs , totally during the intervention phase. 
Brett-Jones et al. (1987) observed that those clients whose 
belief conviction fell most dramatically over the course of their 
study tended to be the most sensitive to reaction to hypothetical 
contradiction. This led them to speculate that RTHC might be used 
to predict the likely outcome of a belief modification intervention. 
This possibility was tested in the present research. 
RTHC proved to be a useful guide to the clients' future 
responses to the interventions. Eight of the 12 clients who took 
part in the present research responded on at least one occasion 
that the proposed instance of hypothetical contradiction would 
lead them either to reject their delusion outright or to lower their 
degree of belief conviction. Each of these eight clients did lower. % 
their belief conviction in the face of the interventions. Conversely, 
two of four clients who stated that an instance of hypothetical 
contradiction would not affect their beliefs subsequently did not 
alter their belief, conviction in the face of the interventions. 
However there was not a one-to-one relationship between RTHC 
and sensitivity to the interventions. Two clients (BG and DR) gave 
responses to RTHC which were at odds with their subsequent 
reactions, to the interventions. Moreover, those clients who 
replied that the instance of hypothetical contradiction would lead 
them. to reject their delusions were not always the ones who did 
reject, their beliefs during the intervention phase: conversely, 
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some of those clients who stated that the hypothetical 
contradiction would lead them to doubt but not reject their beliefs 
in fact rejected their beliefs during the interventions. (This is not 
to suggest that one would have expected an exact match, but only 
to temper over-enthusiasm at the predictive power of the RTHC 
measure). Overall, however,. RTHC would seem to be a useful 
guide -to, the success of a belief modification intervention. 
It might be argued that the relationship between response 
to hypothetical contradiction and sensitivity to the interventions 
would have been closer still but for the variable nature of the 
instances of--plausible contradiction put to the clients. This point is 
similar to the one made earlier in relation to reality testing. As 
was the case when forming reality tests, it is, likely that some , 
beliefs will be more, amenable to hypothetical contradiction than 
others. In defence of those instances of hypothetical contradiction 
posed in the present research, it should be noted that very similar 
instances of hypothetical contradiction evoked quite different 
responses - in different clients. For example, when asked whether 
her, belief, that she was the daughter of Princess Anne would be 
altered by being told by Princess Anne that the belief was false, 
BG replied that this occurrence would not affect her belief. 
However, when BP was asked whether his belief about Amanda, 
would be, ýaltered by her saying that it was untrue, he replied that 
this occurrence would lead him to reject certain aspects of his 
beliefs and to doubt those aspects of the belief that remained. 
As is the case with the reality tests, it is by no means clear 
what constitutes a good example of hypothetical contradiction. 
Part of the ý reason for this is that statements such as 'I am Elvis 
Presley' or 'I am an evil person' are part of complex belief systems 
to which the experimenter has limited access. The nature of this 
largely covert belief system determines in part what constitutes a 
good instance of hypothetical contradiction, reality test, and so on. 
For example, the effect of a particular reality test or 
disconfirmatory experience is dependent on the extent to which 
the delusional belief system is 'immunized' (Popper, 1976) against 
contradiction. Bearing in mind the problem of access to the belief 
system, the element of collaboration inherent in selecting a reality 
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test is critical. Hence, in the case of RTHC, one strategy which 
might'be 'Used in future research would be to ask clients whether 
they could think of an instance of hypothetical contradiction, 
perhaps by asking 'Is there anything which would make you 
doubt your belieff. This could be done either instead of, or as 
well as , the experimenter posing a hypothetical contradictory 
occurence. 
It -is. noteworthy that although the majority of clients stated 
that an instance of hypothetical contradiction would lead them to 
lower their belief conviction, those instances of disconfirmation 
which occurred during the baseline phases did not have this 
effect. Rather these instances were 'accommodated' in such a way 
as to retain the belief intact. This indicates an important feature of 
. 
RTHC, namely, that on one level it is almost an exercise in logic. 
Consider the case of a top politician who is asked whether if it 
could be shown unequivocally that his or her policy had failed he 
or she would abandon the policy. The answer would surely be 
'Well if it could be shown unequivocally - then yes'. However, this 
is quite different from pointing to a particular instance which 
appears to be disconfirming and saying 'Look, your policy is not 
working - will you abandon it. Here the politician might well 
dispute whether the instance demonstrated that the policy did not 
work. Thus it might not seem quite so unusual that although many 
clients were sensitive to instances of hypothetical contradiction, 
during a total of almost 100 baseline sessions only two instances 
of disconfirmation were recognized, and both by the same client 
(BG). 
-A final point about the RTHC measure concerns the apparent 
contradiction inherent in the behaviour of DR and CE, both of 
whom refused to accept the possibility of an instance of 
disconfirmation and yet agreed to a reality test. For example, 
when faced with an instance of hypothetical contradiction DR 
stated that failure to demonstrate his power under conditions of 
his choosing would not lead him to doubt his belief, and yet prior 
to the reality test DR stated that if it did not succeed then it would 
be evidence that his belief was false and he did not possess the 
ability to communicate with people 
(om 
the past . In the case of A 
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DR the', apparent inconsistency can be explained quite easily if one 
assumes that the change was brought about by the verbal 
challenge intervention. 'The case of CE is more difficultýto explain. 
It is possible that the example of hypothetical contradiction 
(searching her neighbour's house at a time when the gases were 
coming through) was inadequate; that if CE had been asked 
whether her belief would be altered by a meeting with Mr F at 
which he proved his innocence, she would have replied yes. 
However, on , 
the basis of the time spent with CE this seem, 
unlikely. Two possible, explanations remain. First, CE did not 
consider seriously the possibility that Mr F would turn up and be 
able to demonstrate his innocence. Second, CE did not view the 
meeting as a genuine test of her belief - rather she viewed it only 
as a way of proving that she was right. 
Alt ho 1ý ugh the interventions were designed primarily to 
reduce the degree of belief conviction, a number of different 
dimensions of delusional experience were also measured, so 
providing a fuller description of the nature of 'recovery' from 
delusional thinking. Thus, for example, in the case of two of'the 
clients in 'Experiment 3 (TD and DR), a reduction in belief 
conviction during the intervention phase was accompanied by a 
reduction in the degree of anxiety experienced when thinking 
about the belief. In the case of WH both preoccupation and anxiety 
scores fell during the baseline and verbal challenge phases even 
though conviction remained unwavering. In other cases a 
reduction in conviction during the intervention phase was 
accompanied by a fall in the degree of preoccupation (BP, JE , and 
HM). Each 
, 
of these outcomes might be thought of as being 
beneficial clinically and as constituting one form of recovery. 
In the cases of two clients a quite different change occurred 
which might also be seen to be beneficial. In the cases of BP and 
WH the delusion was 'encapsulated' - that is, it was no longer seen 
to apply to their current life situation (cf. Hole et al., 1978). BP 
stated at the three month follow-up meeting that although he was 
absolutely c ertain that in the past Amanda had been reading his 
mind and influencing his life, he no longer believed that she was 
still doing so. Similarly, at the one month follow-up WH stated that 
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although he had no doubt that he had been persecuted in the past, 
he believed it to be possible that he was no longer being 
persecuted. At the three and six month follow-up meetings he 
stated being sure of this. Hence, whilst a reduction in the degree of 
delusional belief conviction marks one definite form of clinical 
improvement, it is by no means the only possible one. 
Concluding 
, 
Remarks 
Much research conducted on people with delusions 'has 
attempted to isolate ways in which their behaviour is different to 
the behaviour of the normal population, as well as other clinical 
populations. In accordance with the view of delusions as being on 
a continuum with normal functioning, a different emphasis was 
adopted in the current research. A constant theme running 
through the present thesis has been to determine the extent to, 
which delusional behaviour is like the behaviour of non-deluded 
individuals. This endeavour has proved to be a worthwhile one. 
In so far as the research looked at the processes underpinning the 
formation and maintenance of delusions, those processes observed 
also appear to be familiar features of the belief processes common 
in the normal population. 
A potential point of distinction between delusional and non- 
delusional beliefs is the belief content (cf. Mullen 1979, discussed 
in Chapter 111). It might be felt that 'normal' people do not make 
claims to being able to change history or to being a member of the 
ro yal family. However, the case for this line of argument is weak;. 
On the one hand delusions would become abnormal beliefs by 
definition. Typically, one of the criteria for a delusional belief is 
that the content is fantastic, or at the very least is not shared by 
the individual's peers. To distinguish delusions on the basis of 
content alsoý requires that unusual content can be measured 
reliably. Yet the evidence does not support this assumption: , in the 
study by Kendler et al. (1983, discussed in Chapter 111) 
bizarreness was the only dimension which proved difficult to rate 
reliably. Even were bizarre or unusual content amenable to 
measurement, to rely upon it as the sole point of distinction 
between normal and abnormal beliefs would be a disturbing move 
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politically. This concern would be heightened by the prospect of 
an individual being diagnosed as suffering from a 'mental illness' 
such as schizophrenia, solely on the basis of a delusion. Moreover, 
the logical veracity of a belief cannot be asserted unequivocally on 
the basis of consensus, as individuals like Galileo would no doubt 
emphasize. If this were the case, what constituted a delusional 
belief would vary not only across cultures, but within a culture 
over time. Perhaps Jesus' own contemporaries would have 
diagnosed him as 'schizophrenic', as one of the clients in the 
present study did, had the social and political climate then been 
what it is now. 
Another potential point of distinction between delusions and 
non-delusions is the function the belief might be serving. It - has 
often been contended that delusions serve a particular function: 
to Freud and Cameron, for instance, it was to protect the ego from 
unacceptable thoughts and anxieties (see Chapter III). Certainly 
in, the present research a number of clients held beliefs which 
appeared to be functional. BP's belief that he was Jesus might 
have been serving to account for why he was a 'schizophrenic. 
His belief about Amanda might have been a way of reducing his 
anxiety that he was never going to be married. BG's beliefs 
appeared to be, initially at least, a way of helping her to live with 
a situation which she otherwise would have found unbearable. It 
is tempting to speculate whether DR's belief was related to the 
death of his father in a road accident. EE's belief appeared to be 
an example of denial and projection in order to protect him from,. 
unacceptable thoughts. It seems unlikely that these beliefs were 
formed in a conscious effort to achieve these ends. However, this 
means that if these speculations are correct then the belief 
formation process is influenced by pre-conscious processes. 
According to this account, one might predict that the loss of one 
delusion would lead to the formation of another belief which 
satisfied the'same fundamental need. In the present research the 
Symptom Checklist was included to assess for this possibility. In 
the case of BP one of his three beliefs was replaced by a new 
belief with which it shared many properties. However, in the case 
of no other client, was the loss or partial loss of one belief followed 
by the appearance of a new belief. 
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I The possible functions delusions serve is a promising avenue 
for future research efforts. However, there may be difficulties in 
using belief function as a demarcation point between delusions 
and non-delusions. The first problem is to identify what function 
the delusion is serving. Assuming that this could be done reliably, 
thený it would be necessary to show that non-delusional beliefs do 
not fulfill the same function. However, there seem to be good 
'grounds for assuming that those functions fulfilled by delusions 
may also be filled by certain non-delusional beliefs. The research 
showing the existence of 'schizotypal' traits in the normal 
population (e. g. Chapman et al., 1982, discussed in Chapter'11) 
might be seen to offer preliminary support for this possibility. For 
instance, it is not difficult to think of beliefs held by the non- 
, clinical population which might be thought of as 'paranoid' or 
'grandiose'. The point is that these beliefs may well be serving the 
same 'ego-protecting' or attributional function as delusions. Thus, 
'the distinction would once again be one of degree rather than 
kind, and would be consistent with the notion of a continuum 
function between delusional and non-delusional behaviour. 
The possibility that at least some delusions are functional 
raises an interesting ethical consideration. If, as Jaspers suggested, 
delusions are of 'vital necessity' to the individual, without which 
he or she would,. inwardly collapse', can attempts at modifying 
these beliefs be, justified? It might be the case that beliefs, such 
as those held by BG, are helping individuals to cope with situations 
vihich, otherwise would be unmanageablc: ccrttainly this is Jaspers 
implication. This question is given more force by the problems 
besetting the diagnosis of schizophrenia (Bentall et al., 1988, 
discussed in Chapter 11). In the absence of a clear point of 
demarcation between delusions and non-delusions, on what 
grounds can the treatment of people with delusions be justified? 
Questioning the assumption that people with delusions are 
suffering from a mental illness, or some other identifiable 
abnormality, demands that the traditional justifications for 
'treating them as though such an abnormality did exist' be re- 
con sidered. Such arguments have been voiced in relation to a 
number of clinical disorders (cf. Szasz, 1969). This is not to 
suggest 'that people with delusions should not be treated, but 
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rather that the premisses upon which they are being treated at 
least be made 'explicit. 
This ethical consideration applies to the present research. 
The first point to be made is that participation in the present 
research,. was on a Purely voluntary basis: it was also made , clear to the individuals concerned that they were free to withdraw from 
the research at any, point in time. No client did so. This point is 
not a pedantic one - if an individual chooses freely to be exposed 
to a, particular treatment many of the ethical dilemmas do not 
apply. Szasz (1969) also acknowledges this point. The second 
point is that, insofar as it was possible, the clients were offered a 
way of seeing their beliefs and behaviour as being governed by 
the 'same Processes that govern the behaviour of People in 
general. The extent to which they were set apart by a 'mental 
illness' was, minimized. Third, it does not appear to be the case 
that without their delusions individuals 'inwardly collapse'. . This 
claim is based on, two sources of information; responses to the 
Beck Depression Inventory, and the clients' own verbal reports. 
Results on the BDI offered no suggestion that the loss of a delusion 
had a detrimental effect on clients. Indeed, quite the opposite 
trend was 'observed: in the cases of each of the ten clients whose 
belief conviction fell during the course of the intervention phase, 
his or her-BDI score fell also. In nine of these ten cases during the 
follow-up period the BDI scores either continued to fall or 
remained at the same level as at the close of the intervention. 
Only in the case of BP was the highest BDII score not observed 
during the baseline phase, and even here this appeared to be due' 
to his own efforts at belief modification. It would therefore appear 
that the loss of a delusion has a general beneficial impact on 
clients (cf. Milton et al., 1978, discussed in Chapter III). 
, Further evidence for the beneficial nature of the present 
study was provided by the clients' verbalizations made during the 
study. ' Although three clients (BP, BG and HM) reported finding 
the verbal challenge initially quite stressful, these three and many 
other clients soon began to report experiencing the benefits of the 
intervention. Having rejected his three delusions BP reported at 
one point feeling 'absolutely great, like I did before I was ill'. 'At 
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one, of her independent assessments BG reported feeling 'tons 
better' as a result of the interventions. At his independent 
assessment, MM reported feeling more relaxed as a consequence of 
the intervention. HM reported that the intervention had been - very 
beneficial and felt that something like it should have been 
attempted sooner. DR's community psychiatric nurse observed 
that he seemed far less anxious as a result of participation in the 
present study: workers involved with TD and HJ made similar 
comments. At his independent assesment EE reported being more 
relaxed as a result of his new-found doubt as to the truth of his 
belief. 
It might be argued that although the present research has 
clear benefits clinically, it is not viable practically for clinicians to 
expend so much time and energy on one client. However, there is 
a good case for suggesting that belief modification can and should 
be attempted. The first point is that it provides an alternative 
treatment to medication: many of the clients in the present study 
had been tried on a multitude of medications which had little or 
no effect on their delusions. The second point is that there appears 
to be the potential for instigating a major improvement in the 
clients well being. Third, the effects can be achieved in a relatively 
small number of sessions, sometimes as few as four. Is it 
unreasonable to expect this kind of resource outlay? Fourth, the 
benefits appear to be very long-lasting: future research will need 
to address just how long-lasting, and to determine whether 
infrequent 'booster' sessions can extend these benefits still 
further. Fifth, a treatment which enhances the clients' ability to 
regulate their own behaviour is of obvious clinical utility and 
would fit well with an emphasis on rehabilitation. 
The present research was designed to harness and extend 
the developments made in measuring and modifying delusional 
behaviour. Much work remains to be done in both domains. As 
understanding of the nature of delusional behaviour improves no 
doubt some of the measures employed in the present research will 
need to be refined and new measures will be required. Although 
the verbal challenge. and reality testing interventions show 
promise, the component analysis started in the present research is 
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by no means complete. Part of the future analysis of these 
techniques may well involve their application to individuals newly 
diagnosed as deluded. It is to be hoped that the approach to 
delusional behaviour adopted in the present research proves to 
have been a useful step along the way to a fuller awareness of 
how best jo benefit people with delusional beliefs. 
I. 
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